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This study assesses four institutional approaches to governing the use of the 
Northwest Passage, including the current rules in use. The assessment is conducted 
through the use of expert interviews, a review of the theoretical literature, and an 
examination of comparative cases. Because of significant environmental changes 
underway in the Arctic region, institutional change for Northwest Passage management is 
receiving increased attention. Due to the potential environmental and security impacts of 
regularized ship transits through the Northwest Passage, a number of informed observers 
have discussed the need for considering alternative means of governing the waterway. 
The advantages and disadvantages of institutional alternatives are investigated here. The 
analysis suggests maintenance of the status quo institution appears to be the most likely 
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A new allocation of rights between Canada and the United States to the Northwest 
Passage has not occurred.  
This condition prevails despite incremental Arctic ice loss from 1979 to the 
present; record-setting Arctic ice loss in 2005; record-breaking Arctic ice loss two years 
later in 2007;
1




  This condition prevails, 
also, despite numerous calls for institutional change from experts, scholars, and even 
government officials close to the situation (e.g. Byers, 2009; Charron, 2004, 2005a, 
2005b; Flemming, 2008; Griffiths, 2008; R. Huebert, personal communication, February 
30, 2009; Kraska, 2007; J. Kraska, personal communication, February 8, 2010; C. 
Kirkey, personal communication, December 1, 2009; M. Treadwell, personal 
communication, November 9, 2009; I. Townsend-Gault, personal communication, March 
20, 2009; D. VanderZwaag, personal communication, April, 2, 2009; Young, 1987).  
According to these commentators, the global warming- induced meltdown in the 
Arctic will create an influx of ships transiting the ―opened‖ Northwest Passage, seeking 
to capitalize on the reduced costs of inter-oceanic transport. But besides carrying valuable 
cargoes to markets, these pending transits may also carry negative consequences – for the 
environment of the Northwest Passage and the wider Arctic, for local residents, for vessel 
                                                 
1
 ―Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows,‖ Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis, National Snow 
and Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.html 
2
 ―Arctic sea ice settles at second lowest, underscores accelerating decline,‖ Arctic Sea Ice News and 
Analysis, National Snow and Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2008/091608.html 
3
 ―Arctic sea ice reaches annual minimum extent,‖ Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis, National Snow and 
Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2009/091709.html 
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safety, for continental security, and for Canadian territorial sovereignty and national 
identity. In the face of these mounting concerns, it is now imperative that Canada and the 
United States resolve their long-standing dispute over the governance of Northwest 
Passage use. 
As of this writing however – indeed since 1988, when the existing rules were 
made – there has been no change to the structure of rights for bilateral use of the 
Northwest Passage (Figure 1.1) despite the seriousness of the surrounding issues. How 
can this situation be explained? How, given the severity of Arctic warming reported by 
science and the problems associated with transit shipping mentioned above, can the 
absence of a new, and ideally better, form of governance between Canada and the United 
States for the Northwest Passage be explained?  
 





This work provides an answer by examining the conditions and processes 
involved in the development, selection, and conversion from one institution for governing 
a particular situation to a different one. That is, by studying institutional change – its 
process and prospects.  How and why does institutional change occur? And how and why 
does it not? This study offers the case of the Northwest Passage, the icy waterway 
through Arctic Canada that connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as one that is 
exemplary for exploring these questions. 
 
The Northwest Passage Governance Dispute 
It is hard to believe that the phrase ―hot, flat, and crowded‖ (Friedman, 2008) 
could ever be applied to Earth‘s Arctic region. But today these very phenomena – global 
warming, mounting claims to valuable assets, and increasing numbers of Arctic actors – 
are converging to shape a new circumpolar reality, one for which Friedman‘s 
terminology provides an apt description. In a flat world, resource claims can often 
transcend borders. As that world grows hotter and more crowded, the question of whether 
these claims will be dealt with in a competitive fashion or a collaborative one becomes 
critical.  
Conflicting claims to valued resources are a common cause of governance 
disputes. Settling such claims through institutional allocations is a common goal of public 
policy. Consistent with Barzel‘s (1990) distinction between the legal and economic forms 
of rights to property, a claim to a resource can be seen as economic ownership of an 
expected value (p. 91). In this view, a claim is not necessarily guaranteed by law; it is 
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rather an assertion of entitlement. Claims to valuable environmental resources – clean air, 
clean water, energy stores, a stable climate – have become increasingly important in the 
modern world as greater understanding of the benefits of environmental goods and 
services are obtained. As such, competitive, or even conflicting, resource claims may 
become more pronounced in a world of expanding populations, interdependent 
economies, enhanced social participation, and resource scarcity. This is particularly so as 
the modern world becomes further defined by environmental change. Under such a 
scenario, individuals, organizations, or nation-states may make ever-expanding claims to 
the expected values attached to useful environmental resources. Overlapping, competing, 
or conflicting claims to resources may become frequent. In these cases, the management 
and resolution of resource claims through the use of institutions and public policies 
becomes imperative. 
In the present study, two Arctic states, Canada and the United States, disagree 
over the allocation of a commonly-claimed resource, the Northwest Passage. The 
Northwest Passage is the fabled waterway which stretches across Arctic Canada from the 
Labrador Sea in the east to the Beaufort Sea in the west. For decades, Canada has claimed 
the waterway as a sovereign possession. At the same time, the United States has laid 
claim to the Northwest Passage based on a notion of common property. The two states 
formulate their responses to the issue on these differing bases, and so to this point a 
policy of ―agreeing to disagree‖ over use rights to the resource has been the outcome.  
This dispute is not new to these states; it has been ongoing since at least the 
voyage of the SS Manhattan through the Northwest Passage in 1969. However the setting 
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for this dispute – the Arctic ecosystem – is surprisingly new. Today the Arctic zone is 
experiencing dramatic environmental and economic changes, causing the value of the 
claimed resource to rise for both states.  
On the issue of the Northwest Passage, Canada and the United States experience a 
governance dispute (Gourevitch, 1999). Governance disputes are institutional contests, 
contests over rules. Which rules, and whose rules, will be used to allocate valuable 
resources are the fundamental questions of disputed governance. Choices among 
alternative rule sets for governing the Northwest Passage can be thought of as 
institutional outcomes – the development and selection of institutions.  
Research has shown that the interests and preferences of states are important in 
shaping the development and choice of institutional alternatives (Frieden, 1999; 
Gourevitch, 1999, 2002). For this reason, this study makes observation of the interests 
and preferences of Canada and the United States regarding the resource in question. 
However, the manner in which interstate interactions occurs, the opportunities  and 
constraints present, the history of interaction, and the previously agreed rules are also 
important in shaping future institutional development (Morrow, 1999; Rogowski, 1999).  
Considering these aspects, the case of the Northwest Passage becomes a rich 
empirical example for exploring institutional development and change with respect to the 
allocation of environmental resources. It is used to address a broad question – how do 
institutions change – by investigating a narrower one – what encourages and what 





The divergence in Canadian and American claims over the Northwest Passage is 
illustrative of the larger uncertainty surrounding the future of Arctic resources. The world 
is wondering if forthcoming resource management efforts on the part of Arctic states will 
occur in joint or individualized fashion. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‘s recent 
comments to the Joint Session of the Antarctic Consultative Treaty Meeting and the 
Arctic Council in Washington DC alludes to this 
The warming of the Arctic has profound implications for global 
commerce, with the opening of new shipping routes. It raises the 
possibility of new energy exploration, which will, of course, have 
additional impacts on our environment. And Arctic warming has already 
serious consequences for the indigenous communities that have made their 
homes there for many generations. The changes underway in the Arctic 
will have long-term impacts on our economic future, our energy future, 
and indeed, again, the future of our planet. So it is crucial that we work 
together (Clinton, 2009). 
 
 Increasingly over the past half century, institutions have been devised through 
which nations can work together, pursue cooperation, resolve conflicts and achieve more 
efficient and harmonious interactions. We are fortunate to live in a world that enjoys the 
profound benefits of such institutions. Though war, as a form of dispute resolution 
between nation states, has not disappeared, its use has diminished. As of this writing, 
sixty-five years have passed since the close of the last great global conflict which pitted 
so many massively-armed nations against one another. No outbreak of this type of 
conflict that characterized the first half of the 20
th
 century has occurred since. More 
important still is the fact that this great global conflict which has not occurred has also 
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not been nuclear (Schelling, 2005). Some Cold War-era events signify that it could have 
been. 
 Institutions can be credited, in large measure, for these achievements. Examples 
of institutions range from the informal to the formal and include norms and conventions, 
markets for economic exchange, contracts between business firms, treaties between 
governments, even government itself. The development of instruments such as these in 
recent decades has helped to achieve this period of relative peace and societal progress.  
Some scholars define institutions quite simply. Ostrom (2002) says they are ―rules 
. . . to specify the do‘s and don‘ts related to a particular situation‖ (p. 21). For many 
scholars, rules are the most salient aspect of so-called institutions; rules for governing the 
actions of players.  The provision of rules brings order to interactions between parties and 
helps to shape expectations. As such, institutions become mechanisms for conflict 
resolution, for exchange, and for cooperative efforts in addressing common concerns.  
Institutions are important to the interactions of nation-states. Keohane (1984) 
discusses institutions as ―patterns of practice,‖ and finds them to be significant because  
―. . . these patterns of practice . . . affect state behavior. Sophisticated institutionalists do 
not expect cooperation to always prevail, but they are aware of the malleability of 
interests and they argue that interdependence creates interests in cooperation‖ (p. 8)  
When institutions are brought to bear on the allocation of environmental 
resources, it has been noted that they  
define who has access to a resource; what can be harvested from, dumped 
into, or engineered within a resource; and who participates in key 
decisions about these issues and about transferring rights and duties to 
others. The stimulus for changes of institutional arrangements frequently 
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has been fights over the distribution of resources. Multiple types of 
institutional arrangements have been devised to try to reduce the problems 
of overuse and of free riding as well as distribution conflict (Dolsak & 
Ostrom, 2002, p.21). 
 
The opposing claims to the Northwest Passage made by Canada and the United States 
highlight this distribution conflict. At issue are the rights, duties, access, participation, 
and expectations involved in Northwest Passage use, precisely as the above theorists have 
identified. Whether state interests and interdependence will indeed lead to cooperation, as 
Keohane indicates, is an important question in this study.  
 
Competing Claims 
The claims made by Canada and the United States to the Northwest Passage of 
course do reflect their own self-interests. Canada‘s position is that the system of channels 
through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago known collectively as the Northwest Passage 
comprises ―historic internal waters.‖ In this view, waters internal to Canada are subject to 
whatever laws and regulations the Canadian government sees fit to apply to them. These 
waters were included in the transfer of the Arctic Archipelago from Great Britain to 
Canada in 1880 and are therefore the historic entitlement of Canada (Huebert, 2001). 
Inuit peoples of Arctic Canada, who are now themselves Canadian, have used these 
waters for millennia. In the Canadian view, this fact adds greater strength to the 
historicity of the claim (Huebert, 2001). For the Canadian government and populace, the 
record clearly shows that Canadian assumption of full control over the waters of the 
Arctic Archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, and all activity within in them, is 
fully justified. In the words of one official from Canada‘s Legal Affairs Bureau, ―Canada 
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has unqualified and uninterrupted sovereignty over the waters of the Northwest Passage‖ 
(Huebert, 2001).  
The United States does not dispute that the waters of the Northwest Passage are a 
Canadian possession. The difference, in the United States‘ opinion, lies in exactly what 
Canada can and cannot do, under international law, with these waters. The position of the 
United States, which it believes represents the position of many other countries of the 
world, is that the Northwest Passage is an international strait, and therefore subject to 
international rules, notably the doctrine of transit passage which allows a relatively freer 
hand to transiting ships, submarines, and aircraft (Kraska, 2007). Transit passage, 
according to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention cannot be impeded and coastal states 
can affect only international standards to regulate shipping through international straits 
(McRae, 2007).  
The evidence supporting the view of the Northwest Passage as an international 
strait is that the Northwest Passage is a waterway joining two areas of high seas. 
According to the United States, this simple definition of an international strait under 
international law is wholly met in the case of the Northwest Passage since it joins Davis 
Strait at the eastern gate of the Northwest Passage and Beaufort Strait at its western gate 
(Charron, 2004). Davis and Beaufort Straits are themselves connected to the Labrador 
Sea and the North Atlantic, and the Beaufort Sea and the North Pacific, respectively. 
Taking this view, vessels that meet international shipping standards for environmental 
protection, crew training, and safety procedures have the right, under international law, to 
use the Northwest Passage freely. Moreover, in this view, Canadian regulations that add 
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further restrictions to vessels transiting the Northwest Passage would be incongruent with 
international legal standards (Huebert, 2001).  
Legal and political scholars on both sides of the border have discussed the 
strengths and weaknesses to be found in the Canadian and American positions on 
Northwest Passage governance (see in particular Kraska, 2007; McRae, 2007; Pharand, 




Still, neither Canada nor the United States appear ready to move from their 
respective positions. Charron (2004) in fact declares the situation a ―legal stalemate‖ 
noting, ―. . . all evidence suggests a strictly legal solution to the Passage is unlikely‖ (p. 
3). She and several other scholars (Byers, 2009; Flemming, 2008; Griffiths, 2008; C. 
Kirkey, in personal communication, December 1, 2009; Young, 1987) have 
recommended that Canada and the United States work together to solve the Northwest 
Passage dispute by devising a new allocation rights to the resource.  
What these scholars call for, essentially, is the development of a new institution to 
guide the use of this resource. Without the implementation of a new institutional 
arrangement, these scholars argue, future problems could emerge. Rising terrestrial and 
marine temperatures in the Arctic region linked to the phenomenon of global warming 
have caused the melting of the polar ice cap.  Between 1979 and 2007, Arctic ice cover 
declined by 40%; twenty percent of this loss occurred between 2005 and 2007 alone.
6
 
                                                 
4
 Corfu Channel Case (Merits), http://www.lawofwar.org/corfu_channel_case.htm 
5
 Fisheries Case, http://iilj.org/courses/documents/UnitedKingdomv.Norway_ICJ1951_.pdf 
6
 ―Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows,‖ Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis, National Snow 
and Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.html 
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Indeed, in the summer of 2007 the deepest and most preferred route through the 
Northwest Passage, using Parry Channel through McClure Strait, was freer of ice than 
was previously known to science (Figure 1.2). Many scientists believe that the Arctic 
meltdown could have serious environmental repercussions for not only the Arctic region 
but the whole of the planet as well. As this warming encourages continued Arctic ice 
remission, it is conjectured that the Northwest Passage will ultimately become what it 
was always hoped to be – an international shipping route joining the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans, a global economic resource.  
 







The initiation of industrial shipping in the Northwest Passage however is for 
many an unwelcomed prospect. Transit shipping is viewed as a threat to the fragile 
ecology of the unique Arctic region, and to the unique way of life of indigenous Arctic 
residents. The situation is compounded by the competing claims of Canada and the 
United States for governing Northwest Passage use – do national or international rules 
apply? Shipwrecks, environmental damage, even terrorism scenarios have all been 
discussed as potential consequences of a Northwest Passage that is ―opened‖ to shipping 
transits when this type of administrative confusion reigns.   
 
Institutional Change 
With uncertain conditions and potential negative consequences attached to the 
pending use of the Northwest Passage, calls for institutional change may not be 
surprising. According to Ostrom (1990) an institutional change is, ―A change in any rule 
affecting the set of participants, the set of strategies available to participants, the control 
they have over outcomes, the information they have, or the payoffs‖ (p. 140). Strategies, 
control, and payoffs are apparent in Furubotn and Pejovich‘s (1974) comments on the 
conditions that surround changing institutions:  
To engage in . . . new activities . . . requires the formation of definite 
contractual agreements that allow the participants to claim the potential 
benefits foreseen . . . if individuals are to appropriate the potential gains 
from innovative ventures, it may be necessary to change the content of 
contractual agreements; but the acceptance of changes in contractual 
forms must lead to a new or modified set of property rights assignments. 
Changes in property rights are triggered by the interaction between the 
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prevailing property rights structure and man’s search for ways of 
achieving more utility (p. 9, italics in original). 
Furubotn and Pejovich‘s representation of institutional change through the idea of 
contract renegotiation is also evident in the foundational work of North (1990). He says,  
Institutions change, and fundamental changes in relative prices are the 
most important source of that change . . . the process of institutional 
change can be described as follows. A change in relative prices leads one 
or both parties to an exchange, whether it is political or economic, to 
perceive that either or both could do better with an altered agreement or 
contract. However because contracts are nested in a hierarchy of rules, the 
renegotiation may not be possible without restructuring a higher set of 
rules (or violating some norm of behavior). In that case, the party that 
stands to improve his or her bargaining position may very well attempt to 
devote resources to restructuring the rules at a higher level (p. 86). 
 
Important to this study is North‘s related comment that, ―changes in bargaining power 
lead to efforts to restructure contracts, political as well as economic‖ (p. 85).  
Applying the above logic to the present case indicates the potential for contracts 
to form between Canada and the United States for the realization of emergent Arctic 
resource benefits, particularly ones connected to the Northwest Passage. But as Ostrom 
(1990) and Dolsak and Ostrom (2002) point out, potentiality in contract formation does 
not mean causality. Dolsak and Ostrom (2002) note that: 
Designing institutions . . . is a costly effort. Resource users will devise 
new institutions for managing that resource or change existing rules 
governing its use when the perceived benefits of the change in rules 
exceed the costs associated with creating the rules and with the change of 
the resource use pattern (p. 21).  
 
Ostrom‘s (1990) work on choosing among institutional alternatives leads her to 
the belief that:  
. . . individuals compare the net flows of expected benefits and costs 
produced by the set of status quo rules, as compared with an altered set of 
14 
 
rules. To explain institutional change, it is therefore necessary to examine 
how those participating in the arenas in which rule changes are proposed 
will view and weight the net return of staying with the status quo rules 
versus some type of change (p. 142). 
 
Of these rule changes, she says ―transforming existing rules can . . . be very 
costly‖ (p. 141), and goes on to say that: 
The costs of changing the rules vary substantially from one rule to 
another, from one political regime to another . . . and they also 
vary over time as participants and conditions change. Whether or 
not it will be costly to achieve any institutional change will depend 
on many variables . . .‖ (p. 140-141). 
 
Dolsak and Ostrom (2002) further suggest that even when net positive benefits 
accompany a rule change, the change may not come. Their work indicates that at times,  
―. . . motivation for changing the rules governing a resource is, however, not always 
sufficient to bring about such a change‖ (p. 21). 
Juxtaposing the ideas of these scholars of institutional change with the recent calls 
for modification of Northwest Passage governance creates some tension for policy 
analysis. It is possible that contracting for the allocation of Arctic resources, like the 
Northwest Passage, will occur. It is possible that new institutions to guide resource use 
will be innovated. But it is also possible that, despite the benefits, consensual contracts 
may not form. New rules may not be designed; existing institutions may be maintained 
instead. Claimants could decide to interact in a competitive or even conflicting fashion 
regarding Arctic resources. The theorists of institutional change like North and Ostrom 
draw attention to the fact that both benefits and costs accompany interactions such as 
contracting, rulemaking, and institutional formation and change. Institutional change 
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theorists recognize that outcomes can depend heavily on the relative weights assigned to 
these two factors.  
The Plan of this Study  
To begin an examination of institutional change for Northwest Passage 
governance, the following chapter presents an overview of the Arctic and the 
environmental change underway in the region, and also presents the Northwest Passage 
case. It notes historic attempts to transform the Northwest Passage into a commercial 
resource, the prospect that it is now becoming such a resource due to Arctic 
environmental change, and its uncertain status under international law. Chapter 3 presents 
the results of interviews conducted with Canadian and American academics and 
government officials who have expertise in Northwest Passage affairs. These interviews 
provide a subjective evaluation of Canada and the United States‘ respective positions on 
Northwest Passage governance. The benefits and costs of current and alternative 
approaches are noted. Informed by these interview results and findings from the scholarly 
literature on institutional change and strategic choice, Chapter 4 analyzes institutions as 
both solution and problem in the Northwest Passage governance dispute. The final 
chapter summarizes the results of the analysis and makes concluding remarks.  
Having laid out this research plan, it would be remiss to move forward without 
some characterization of past and present resource governance disputes between these 
neighbors, and their outcomes. The final section of this chapter briefly samples this 




Resource Disputes and the Canadian-American Relationship 
In a 1972 speech in Ottawa, then American president Richard Nixon proclaimed 
the ―special relationship‖ that existed between Canada and the United States was dead. 
Nixon told the Canadian parliament that, ―It is time for us to recognize that we have very 
separate identities . . . we have significant differences, and . . . nobody‘s interests are 
furthered when these realities are obscured‖ (Granatstein & Bothwell, 1991, p. 71). Ever 
since, scholars of Canadian-American relations have wondered how true the president‘s 
words may be (e.g. Elliot-Meisel, 1999; Muirhead, 2004).  Notions of American 
exceptionalism and the loss of Canadian identity at the hands of its neighbor have caused 
some to doubt whether the relationship was all that special to begin with (see Campbell & 
Finn, 2006; Thompson & Randall, 2008 as two recent examples).  
Special or not, there are some aspects of the relationship that do appear to be 
doing well. Each state is the other‘s number one trading partner, with approximately $1.5 
billion in trade occurring between them each day (D. Wilkins, in personal 
communication, September 9, 2009). According to Statistics Canada, almost $2 million 
in goods and services cross the border every minute. In 2008, there was $310.7 billion 
worth of Canadian investment in the United States, and $293.6 billion worth of American 
investment in Canada – roughly equal amounts. The United States receives more oil, gas, 
electricity, and uranium from Canada than from any other country. At the same time, 
Canada is the largest export market for goods from thirty-five American states (―The 
Canada-US Relationship,‖ 2009). And finally, it is well known that Canada and the 
United States share the world‘s longest unmilitarized international border. President 
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Barack Obama‘s first foreign visit after taking office was to Canada, where he and Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper cast the Canada-US relationship not as special, but in fact as a 
friendship (Harper & Obama, 2009). 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is surely to be credited for 
much of the economic productivity just mentioned. But plenty of controversy surrounded 
the negotiation of this agreement. Economic controversies between Canada and the 
United States like that involving NAFTA are not new. In fact the best insight into the 
status of the Canadian-American relationship may come from examining how these 
controversies and disputes are handled. Wang (1981) for example investigated the 
prevalence of arbitration used to resolve Canadian-American disputes from the years 
1794-1965. Using the 1972 work of A.M. Stuyt, Wang‘s research demonstrates that of 
the twenty arbitral incidences between Canada and the United States in this period, ten 
favored Canada (or Canada through Britain), six favored the United States, two were 
equally favorable to both parties, and two were deadlocked. Wang finds these results to 
be unexpectedly balanced. ―The record does not appear to be one-sided and adverse to 
Canada,‖ he says (p. 180).   
What may not be surprising is Wang‘s finding of these states‘ preference to avoid 
arbitration. He claims that when disputes arise from the implementation of bilateral 
treaties, the two governments rarely resort to adjudication, even when this method of 
dispute resolution is encouraged by the treaty itself. At the time of Wang‘s study, Canada 
and the United States had not taken any dispute to the International Court of Justice, or to 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, its predecessor. This reluctance to arbitrate 
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is corroborated by the former Canadian Ambassador to the United States Marcel 
Cadieux‘s (1970-1975) belief in ―. . . an ‗almost overwhelming‘ preference on the part of 
both Canada and the United States over the years to resolve their disputes through 
negotiation rather than through adopting a strictly legal approach‘ . . .‖ (p. 159). 
This preference notwithstanding, a noteworthy example of arbitration did occur in 
settling one of the deepest Canadian-American resource disputes to date. The softwood 
lumber dispute has spanned more than twenty years, beginning in 1982, and is now in its 
fifth iteration – referred to as Lumber V. At issue is whether government subsidization of 
Canada‘s timber harvesting industry exists, if this enables below market prices, and 
whether the United States can impose penalties to level the playing field. The issue 
matters greatly to American lumber interests since the United States imports roughly one-
third of its lumber from Canada. At times over the last two decades, an all out trade war 
had ensued where countervailing duties were met with taxes, quotas met with tariffs, and 
litigation and arbitration met with reviews and appeals to ever-higher national and 
international authorities (Cashore, 1997; Hajdu, 2010; Thompson & Randall, 2008). 
However, after years of costly litigation, and substantial investments of political capital 
(Thompson & Randall, 2008), the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) appears to 
have brought resolution to the problem, at least for the next seven to nine years. A system 
of minimum pricing standards, transparency regarding the volume and source of lumber 
exports, and compensatory payments made by both sides did the trick. Interestingly, the 
London Court of International Arbitration was chosen as the forum for dispute resolution, 
and is required to keep all proceedings open to the public (Crook, 2008). Prime Minister 
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Harper explained that the SLA ―demonstrates that, as two countries, we will disagree at 
times. But with goodwill and mutual respect, we can resolve our differences in a positive 
manner for both sides‖ (Thompson & Randall, 2008, p. 330). 
Unlike softwood lumber, the Canadian-American dispute over regulating 
transboundary acid rain was settled through negotiations, not arbitration. But it also took 
many years – fifteen – to be resolved (Golitch & Young, 1993). A number of factors 
complicated the bilateral acid rain negotiations, including the wide range of domestic and 
international stakeholders involved, as well as commons issues, absence of a 
supranational authority, asymmetric distribution of power between actors, asymmetric 
distribution of acid rain effects on the actors, different political cultures, issue 
interdependence, and economic and scientific uncertainty (Golitch & Young, 1993). This 
study notes many of these same factors with regard to the Northwest Passage dispute.  
Ultimately, the dispute over bilateral regulation of acid rain was resolved through 
an executive agreement. It committed both states to a program of sulfur dioxide and 
nitrous oxide emissions reductions and caps for industry, joint monitoring and 
implementation of the agreement, cooperative technological and regulatory development, 
and the use of the International Joint Commission (discussed later in this study) for 
dispute resolution. Though Canada had begun tighter domestic regulation of emissions by 
the late 1980s, the real impetus for bilateral agreement did not come until political change 
in the United States occurred. A new president, EPA administrator, and key legislators 
combined with new, compelling evidence on sources and effects of acid rain to cause 
20 
 
amendment to the Clean Air Act and the conclusion of a deal with Canada (Golitch & 
Young, 1993).  
Finally, the Canadian-American dispute over ownership of subsurface oil deposits 
in the Beaufort Sea has received renewed attention with the onset of Arctic 
environmental change. The demarcation of the Canada-US boundary off the coast of 
Alaska is uncertain, creating a 21,436 square kilometer area of ocean that both states 
claim. The area is resource rich – oil companies like ExxonMobil and BP have recently 
paid upwards of US$2 billion to obtain exploratory rights. But these oil and gas 
concessions, and also fishing rights, have been very controversial due to the overlapping 
state claims (Byers, 2009).  
It seems likely however that the economic value of the contested area will 
instigate a resolution in this dispute. Byers (2009) states, 
Ultimately, the oil companies will determine when the dispute is resolved. 
As more of the Beaufort Sea is explored, the multinationals will eventually 
turn their attention to the contested sector and demand legal certainty. The 
U.S. government . . . can be expected to respond (p. 102). 
 
A Beaufort Sea settlement is not yet at hand, however. Adding to the controversy is the 
new realization of the implication of the contested boundary on the states‘ extended 
continental shelf claims.
7
 Canada‘s boundary line in the southern Beaufort Sea serves the 
United States better once it reaches the outer continental shelf, and the United States‘ 
Beaufort Sea line serves Canada better when it reaches the outer continental shelf. With 
highly valuable ocean resources at stake, this new information could further complicate 
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21 
 




While this review of Canadian-American resource disputes and their resolution 
has been brief, it does demonstrate that more often than not, when settlement of 
disagreements has been sought by the pair, it has eventually been found. It is likely for 
this reason that the former American ambassador to Canada, the Honorable David 
Wilkins, takes a confident view of Canada and the United States‘ ability to resolve 
Northwest Passage issues, stating simply, ―we will work it out.‖ 
9
 This study will test 
Ambassador Wilkins‘ and other commentators‘ suggestions regarding institutional 
change beginning with Chapter 2. In it, an overview of the Arctic region, the Northwest 














 This has been Wilkins‘ statement on the Northwest Passage on several recent occasions, in public 




THE CHANGING ARCTIC AND THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE  
 
The Arctic region is located at the top of the planet in the area encompassing the 
North Pole and the Arctic Ocean. Parts of eight countries – Canada, Finland, Denmark 
(by way of Greenland, its dependent territory), Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the 
United States – are included within the Arctic. Delineation of the region varies; the Arctic 
Circle at 66.5ºN latitude, the 10º Celsius isotherm, and the northern extent of tree cover 
where permafrost begins are all commonly used. Each of these delineations is depicted in 
Figure 2.1 below: the Arctic Circle is shown as a broken, blue line; the 10º Celsius 
isotherm is a red line; the tree cover/permafrost extent is green. The physical 
characteristics of the Arctic are based in a complex interplay of atmospheric, oceanic, and 
terrestrial conditions. Ice and snow dominate the region, especially on the Arctic Ocean, 
its most notable geographic feature.   
 
Environmental Change in the Arctic 
While political debate continues in the southern world over causes and coping 
strategies for global climatic change, in the Arctic its effects are already underway.  
Because of the Earth‘s patterns of atmospheric and oceanic circulation, greenhouse gases 
and other forms of environmental pollution find their final resting place in the Polar 
Regions. For this reason, scientists consider these regions to be at the frontline of climate 
change. At the poles, scientists believe, the most immediate and amplified effects of 
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global warming will occur. From the poles, then, the earliest signals of rising planetary 
temperatures will emanate (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007).  
 
Figure 2.1:   The Arctic 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2002 
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In the Arctic, recent, warming-induced changes to the natural environment are 
sending these signals. Rising terrestrial and marine temperatures have caused the Arctic 
ice cap to retreat at an unprecedented rate; its extent diminished by 40% between 1979 
and 2007, with 20% of that loss occurring between 2005 and 2007 alone.
10
 
Increasingly warmer year round temperatures means Arctic ice returns to its 
previous extent less and less each winter. But while the Arctic ice cap has been slowly 
shrinking for at least the last 30 years, polar scientists were stunned by the rapidity of the 
ice retreat in summer 2007, a 20% decrease from just two years earlier (Figure 2.2). 
There is now growing scientific consensus that ice-free Arctic summers can be expected 
within 20 years, if not sooner (Byers, 2009).
11
   
Arctic warming has manifested itself in a variety ways across the region: the 
extent and thickness of ice cover in the Arctic Ocean has fallen significantly, soil 
temperatures are rising causing the contraction of permafrost across the landscape, snow 
cover and mountain glaciers in the region are shrinking, Canadian ice shelves are 
breaking apart,
 12
 and the Greenland ice sheet, the second largest body of ice on the 
planet, is liquefying (Overpeck et al., 2005). The impacts of the warming phenomenon on 
human and natural systems could be profound (Serreze & Francis, 2006; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). The Arctic Climate Impact 
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Assessment (2004), a product of the Arctic Council
13
 and the International Arctic 
Sciences Committee
14
, notes that climate change in the Arctic poses a range of stresses 









At the local level, these stresses have been best represented by the plight of the 
region‘s hallmark species, the polar bear (Ursus maritimus). Dependent on sea ice as its 
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 The Arctic Council is a high level intergovernmental forum for cooperation, coordination, and interaction 
among the Arctic States, Arctic Indigenous Communities, and other Arctic inhabitants, on common Arctic 
issues (http://arctic-council.org). 
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 The International Arctic Sciences Committee is a non-governmental organization encouraging and 
facilitating all aspects of Arctic research (http://www.arcticportal.org/iasc). 
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hunting grounds, polar bears now encounter great difficulty in pursuing prey as the melt 
continues. Malnourished, starved, and drowned bears have become more common (Aars, 
Lunn, & Derocher, 2006; Amstrup, Stirling, Smith, Perham, & Theimann, 2006; Regehr, 
Amstrup, & Sterling, 2006). Recently listed as a threatened species under the US 
Endangered Species Act,
15
 the bear is a species of special concern in Canada where 
discussion of changing its official status is ongoing.
16
  
 Other marine species adapted to the Arctic‘s cold waters, for instance fish, seals 
and sea lions, whales, crustaceans, plankton, and algae, may be unable to withstand a 
warmer aquatic environment.  On land, vegetation regimes may be altered by warmer 
regional temperatures, as forests and other tundra plants expand northward with the 
retreating permafrost.  Pests, microbes, and disease vectors previously unseen in the 
Arctic could also intrude northward as climatic barriers subside (Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, 2004). 
 Human populations in the Arctic are also experiencing change due to rising 
temperatures. Inuit and other indigenous communities that have hunted and herded since 
time immemorial fear the erosion of their traditional economies and cultures with 
alterations in environmental conditions. Numbering around 160,000, indigenous peoples 
are arguably the most directly affected by a changing Arctic since they depend on the 
local environment for their identity and their survival.
17,18
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More contemporary way of life may also be challenged by a warming Arctic. 
Buildings, roads and railways, oil and gas pipelines, and timberlands, could all become 
destabilized with the thawing of the permafrost layer that underlies much of the region. 
Logistics in the harsh Arctic environment are already difficult, but with continued 
warming and melting additional risks may be added. More frequent storms and larger 
storm surges, sea level rise, beach erosion, and inland flooding – the result of oceanic 
instability linked to rising Arctic temperatures – threaten coastal and inland communities 
and industries in the Arctic (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 2004). 
While Arctic warming can produce serious impacts on local ecological and 
human systems, the impact of these changes can also be felt outside the region. Snow and 
ice cover at the poles reflects excess solar radiation back into space, helping to moderate 
global temperatures. The cold Polar Regions also balance out the warmer conditions 
arising from Earth‘s equatorial areas. The contrast between these hot and cold areas of 
the planet helps form Earth‘s prevailing atmospheric circulation patterns (Chaturvedi, 
1996). In this way, an Arctic meltdown could risk the malfunction of an important 
planetary thermostat. 
Another far-reaching concern as the Arctic warms is the potential release into the 
atmosphere of millions of tons of stored methane from regional soils and lake beds. In the 
atmosphere, methane, a hydrocarbon, becomes a greenhouse gas and is many times more 
potent than carbon dioxide. Methane release thus has the potential to greatly exacerbate 
Arctic, and global, warming. 
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 Finally, less ice in the Arctic means less ice in the Arctic, since darker ocean 
water revealed by melting ice absorbs more solar radiation, causing further melting. This 
positive feedback cycle, referred to by scientists as ―Arctic amplification,‖ only hastens 
the overall melt. The loss of the Arctic ice cap could therefore contribute to greater and 
greater global climatic dislocations, touching off worldwide changes in temperature, 
weather, and ocean patterns, and reaching into plant and animal production.  
 
Arctic Resources and the Law of the Sea 
Interestingly, at the same time that Arctic warming trends are creating negative 
impacts on the local and global environment, some positive effects of environmental 
change in the Arctic have also appeared. As the polar ice has relinquished its hold, 
prospects of improved access to natural and commercial assets have emerged, 
reinvigorating economic interest in this environmentally sensitive but resource rich part 
of the planet. Components of the Arctic natural endowment, such as minerals and fish 
stocks, are increasingly viewed as prized commodities by rapidly expanding southern 
markets. Untapped stores of Arctic hydrocarbons are inspiring serious examination, 
particularly in relation to recent technological advancements and also an uncertain picture 
of global energy supplies. The potential for large-scale agricultural activities to return, 
after centuries of hiatus, to some Arctic lands, such as Greenland, is a promising 
development for local communities. And faster transport between markets through more 
navigable Arctic waters, the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route for instance, 
could lead to reduced production costs for many goods. Significant economic gains for 
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industries, investors, and communities, both near and far, appear to be in the offing as 
Arctic development, abetted by warming regional temperatures, unfolds.  
The existing and potential resources of interest lie in, on, or beneath the Arctic 
Ocean. The so-called Law of the Sea therefore becomes an important part of this resource 
picture. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the 
international legal framework that guides the use of the ocean‘s resources. Reached in 
1982 and ratified by 158 countries, UNCLOS is the original ―zoning plan for the 
oceans.‖
19
 UNCLOS provides for a 200 mile offshore area, called the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), in which nations can pursue economic development. In this zone, 
nations have rights to exploit and manage the resources of the water column, seabed, and 
subsoil. Waters beyond the 200 mile EEZ constitute the high seas, where access to the 
resources contained therein is open to all states (Byers, 2009; UNCLOS, 1982). 
UNCLOS also permits nations to utilize resources beyond the EEZ. If geophysical and 
bathymetric evidence demonstrates contiguity with its continental shelf, a coastal state 
can exploit and manage the resources of the seabed and subsoil out to an additional 150 
miles.  
Figure 2.3 below depicts the EEZ, the extended continental shelf, and other 
offshore jurisdictional zones established by UNCLOS. As the figure shows, baselines can 
be created by coastal states to join fringing islands and enclose indentions of the 
coastline. From the baseline, measurements for the EEZ and other zones are taken. To 
twelve miles seaward from the baseline is a nation‘s territorial sea. In this zone, full 
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 Components of the Obama administration‘s new ocean policy has been referred to with this moniker 
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control over the resources of the waters, seabed, subsoil, and even the airspace above is 
held by the coastal state. Foreign ships can pass through territorial seas as long as their 
passage is deemed ―innocent‖ – non-prejudicial to the safety and security of the coastal 
state (UNCLOS, 1982). Landward of the baseline lies the nation‘s internal waters. It is in 
this zone that Canada claims the Northwest Passage lies. Under UNCLOS, coastal states 
have full territorial sovereignty over internal waters; they are essentially no different from 
the state‘s land territory. Importantly, no right of innocent passage exists in the internal 
waters zone, as it does in territorial waters. Instead, coastal states can allow, prohibit, and  
 
Figure 2.3:   UNCLOS Jurisdictional Zones 
 
Source: GFDL, adapted from Images: Zones maritime UNCLOS.jpg by an anonymous user 
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set the legal and regulatory standards of ship passage through internal waters. Because 
Canada sees the Northwest Passage as its internal waters, it asserts that it can apply 
national laws and regulations for environmental and public protection to any ship sailing 
through. The requirements of these laws and regulations could be more stringent than 
those presently governing international shipping. Furthermore, if it ever deemed such an 
act necessary, Canada would be within its rights to prohibit ships from sailing the 
Northwest Passage (Churchill & Lowe, 1983; McRae, 2007; UNCLOS, 1982).  
In waters that comprise an international strait, the situation is quite different. 
International straits are those waterways ―. . . which are used for international navigation 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone (UNCLOS, 1982). In international straits, the 
regime of ―transit passage‖ rather than innocent passage is employed. While ships in 
transit passage are bound to refrain from threatening acts or the use of force against 
coastal states, coastal states can only effect laws and regulations that comply with 
international standards. Maritime pollution or traffic separation regulations, for example, 
must first be adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Submarines can 
remain submerged while in transit passage; when in innocent passage they must surface 
(Churchill & Lowe, 1983; McRae, 2007; UNCLOS, 1982). As McRae (2007) puts it, ―In 
respect of straits used for international navigation, the right of the coastal state to regulate 
shipping exercising the right of passage is more constrained‖ (p. 5). 
One interesting exception to the authority of the coastal state regarding internal 
waters occurs when, by implementing straight baselines to enclose fringing islands and 
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indentions of the coastline, a strait that had been used for international passage becomes 
internal waters. This exception is often pointed out with regard to the Northwest Passage 
case, ostensibly to indicate a weakness in Canada‘s legal argument. The idea is that even 
though Canada enclosed its Arctic islands with straight baselines thus making the waters 
between them internal, the Northwest Passage remains an international strait because it 
was used in this matter before the enclosure. However, according to McRae (2007), since 
Canada was not a party to UNCLOS at the time of its straight baseline implementation, 
this exception does not apply (p. 13). Canada implemented straight baselines in 1986; it 
acceded to UNCLOS in 2003.
20
  The history of the straight baselines policy adopted 
Canada is discussed in more detail below. 
The Northwest Passage case demonstrates that applying the UNCLOS 
jurisdictional scheme to the Arctic is not without controversy. In the Arctic, history and a 
near-impossible environment have combined to create a situation where the end of one 
nation‘s influence and the beginning of another‘s can be controversial. This lack of 
clarity, combined with the massive ice retreat witnessed in the summer of 2007, 
prompted the mass media to predict that countries would quickly rush to the Arctic to 
―stake their claim‖ to the untold spoils of new resources that were suddenly becoming 
more accessible.  
That prophecy appeared to be fulfilled when a Russian continental shelf-scouting 
submarine planted the nation‘s flag in the seabed under the North Pole on August 3, 
2007, symbolically gesturing that the whole of the Arctic was the property of the 
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 In response to the Russian tactics, Canada‘s Foreign Minister, Peter McKay, 
stated, ―This isn‘t the 15
th
 century. You can‘t go around and just plant flags saying, 
‗We‘re claiming this territory‘.‖
23
 
Or can you?  Territorial disputes are nothing new in the Arctic. Admiral Robert 
Peary raised the American flag at the North Pole in 1909 and the feat was immediately 
called into question, as were the attainments of many other polar explorers of the day. 
Today, the North Pole and adjacent territory up to the North Pole is simultaneously 
claimed by Canada, Denmark, and Russia (Byers, 2009).  
Further disputes between countries over boundaries and islands in the Arctic 
persist. Denmark and Canada have an ongoing dispute over the ownership of tiny Hans 
Island, lying in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and Northern Greenland, where 
Danish soldiers raised their nation‘s flag in 2002. And besides their differences over the 
Northwest Passage, Canada and the United States have another Arctic territorial dispute 
in the Beaufort Sea, where the position of the maritime boundary between the Yukon 
Territory and Alaska affects rights to access offshore petroleum reserves. Russia and 
Norway have had a persistent maritime boundary dispute that affects fishing rights and 
oil reserves in the Barents Sea.
24
  
Competing claims to the Lomonosov Ridge, a giant undersea mountain range that 
runs beneath the North Pole and defines one of the two great basins of the Arctic Ocean, 
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are very significant in the Arctic today. Russia, Canada, and Denmark are all claiming or 
seeking to claim the Lomonosov Ridge. Russia believes it to be an extension of its 
continental shelf; Denmark and Canada both have mapping expeditions underway to 
determine if the ridge is attached to their continental shelves (Currie, 2007; Dhanapala, 
2008; Gray, 1997). Whoever can establish the Lomonosov Ridge to be a part of its 
continental shelf may be in position to bring a huge portion of the Arctic seabed, and the 
resources contained therein, under its control. Arctic coastal states are therefore spending 
considerable sums of money and using advanced technology under difficult conditions to 
map the extent of their continental shelves in hopes of substantiating their territorial 
claims. UNCLOS rules give nations ten years to make their case once the claim process 
begins.  
To help resolve competing maritime claims, UNCLOS created the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and staffed it with geoscientists and 
marine boundary experts. Today the CLCS is working to process and offer advice on the 
extended continental shelf claims submitted by littoral states. What is at stake in this 
process? The chairman of the CLCS, Alexandre Albuquerque, knows. ―Money. Money, 
of course,‖ he says.
 25
 Though the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, the estimated 
value of resources it could be entitled to by way of maritime claims totals $1.3 trillion. 
The size of the offshore entitlement encompasses an area as large as the state of 
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California. Not surprisingly, the work of the CLCS has been described as the ―largest 





What is happening today in the Arctic is a fascinating instance of the detection of 
value and the emergence of resources. The term ―resource‖ has already been used several 
times in this study; what exactly is a resource? A short answer is that a resource is 
anything that helps. Buck (1998) in fact defines a resource as ―anything used to meet the 
needs of an organism‖ (p. 3). She identifies two types of resources: natural resources, 
those materials that take on economic or social value once extracted from their natural 
state, and spatial-extension resources, whose value derives from their location. Other 
types of resources are well-known, like human resources and cultural resources. Capital 
is a resource, in its fiscal, physical, and even political forms. These various types of 
resources are similar in that they all help in achieving some goal. Whether that goal is the 
attainment of wealth, of knowledge, or of power, what comes to be a resource may in fact 
be constrained only by man‘s own inventiveness.  
The idea of inventiveness is at the heart of Erich Zimmermann‘s (1951) landmark 
study of resources. In a work entitled World Resources and Industries, Zimmermann 
finds that resources have a lifelike quality to them. They ebb and flow, rise and fall, with 
the interests of man. ―Resources are living phenomena,‖ he says, ―expanding and 
contracting in response to human effort and behavior. They thrive under rational 





harmonious treatment. . . . To a large extent, they are man‘s own creation.‖ (p.7). 
―Resourceship‖ is the act of creating resources. For Zimmerman it is ―. . . the purposeful 
interaction of natural, cultural, and human aspects primed and kept going by demand 
based on availability for use‖ (p. 15). A necessary antecedent to resourceship is human 
appraisal – the recognition of a dormant utility, a potentiality, a latent ability, within 
some feature of the natural endowment. That feature can then be brought forward from 
the pre-resourceship world of ―neutral stuff‖ (p. 12) and manipulated by man to his own 
greater benefit.  
The result of Zimmermann‘s analysis is the determination that the things we know 
as resources do not exist in and of themselves. To be a resource, a thing first requires 
man‘s recognition of usefulness in it; its utility or value. It then requires his 
transformative hand to move it out of the world of neutral stuff and into a productive 
state.  ―Resources are not,‖ Zimmermann says, ―they become; they are not static but 
expand and contract in response to human wants and actions.‖ (p. 15). Zimmermann‘s 
study of resources was unique for its time in recognizing that human, cultural, and natural 
factors all combine to determine resource availability. He concludes the work by noting 
these factors in the broadest of terms as they relate to the availability of resources: 
The problem of resource adequacy is also one of social institutions, of 
government policies, of international relations . . . it is the altogetherness 
of things. In this inextricable mesh of forces and conditions man appears 
as the responsible agent. The problems of resource adequacy for the ages 








The Northwest Passage in a Changing Arctic 
 
Zimmermann‘s ideas are at their fullest expression in the contemporary Arctic. 
The extreme climatic conditions of the region, its remoteness, and its difficult logistics 
had previously maintained many of the Arctic‘s potential resources as uneconomic, 
known but unavailable, ―neutral stuff.‖ But with warming regional temperatures and the 
decline of both land- and sea-based ice, the region has entered an unprecedented period 
of resources becoming.  Now man has looked upon the ―new‖ Arctic assets – oil and gas, 
precious metals, fish stocks, transportation routes – appraised them positively, and with 
improving accessibility provided by warming temperatures and melting ice, is 
encouraged to bring them into production. 
One component of the Arctic endowment that appears to be on the cusp of 
becoming a resource is the Northwest Passage. The Northwest Passage is the fabled sea 
route which passes through the ice-covered waters of Canada‘s Arctic. For centuries, 
Europe and Asia, it was hoped, could be joined using this route instead of those requiring 
voyages around Africa or South America. With the rise of regional temperatures due to 
global warming, speculation continues apace that an ice-free Northwest Passage will 
enable regular inter-oceanic transits. As some 90% of world trade is today carried by 
sea,
27
 the prospect of a more dependably navigable Northwest Passage beckons shippers 
and maritime nations. It is estimated that the Northwest Passage offers a 7000-9000 km 
shorter route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans than more conventional ones 
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(Byers, 2009; Charron, 2005; Dittmann, 2009; Wilson, Falkingham, Melling, & De 
Abreu, 2004).  
It is only recently of course that the thought of regular shipments by way of this 
icy route could even be considered; sailing between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans 
through the Northwest Passage has for the most part been known only to the annals of 
history. Frozen over with seasonal and multi-year ice for nearly the entire year, use of the 
Northwest Passage has always been relatively uneconomic, if not utterly treacherous. 
Moreover, competition has always surrounded the Northwest Passage. As far back as the 
15
th
 century, when state-backed and commercial expeditions sailed from Europe seeking 
a shortcut to the Orient, through to the modern era of exploration, when nationalism and 
personal prestige drove adventurers and men of science, the Northwest Passage has been 
nothing if not the scene of man testing himself, the natural world, and other men.  
Roald Amundsen (whose map appears in Figure 2.4 below) was the first to 
successfully transit the Northwest Passage, between 1903 and 1906. A Norwegian who 
explored the Arctic and the Antarctic, Amundsen was the first to sail all the way through 
the Northwest Passage from end to end. He used a much smaller and lighter ship than 
previous Northwest Passage explorers; undertook superior preparation, especially 
regarding routing; and adopted techniques from Inuit met during the voyage. Amundsen 
later became the first person to reach the South Pole.  
But whether courageous captains like Amundsen sailed for science, commerce, or 
glory, the promise of the Northwest Passage – that it would provide a shorter, dependable 
shipping link between East and West – remained ever elusive.  
39 
 
Until today. Now, a new chapter in the Northwest Passage‘s history is being 
written. Abetted by warming temperatures and ice subsidence, ship traffic in the 
Northwest Passage has increased in recent years (see Figure 2.5 below and Appendix A). 
Between 1906 (when the first transit by Amundsen was completed) and 2004, ninety-nine 
transits, by sixty-seven vessels, under seventeen different flags have been made (Arctic 
Marine Transport Workshop, 2004). Canadian vessels have conducted thirty-eight, the 
majority, while American vessels have conducted eleven. Most transits are Coast Guard 
missions, and many are conducted for hydrographic research or other scientific purposes. 
However, there have been some passenger cruise ship transits, and even some private 
pleasure craft voyages. Appendix A contains these data. 
 

























Today the Northwest Passage is the scene of increasing movement of people and 
goods. Heightened demand for use of the waterway stems from the expansion of resupply 
programs for growing northern Canadian communities, a burgeoning Arctic tourism 
industry, and intensifying resource exploitation, specifically mining, fishing, and fossil 
fuel recovery. 
 
Figure 2.5:   Transits of the Northwest Passage1906-2004, by Decade  
 
 
Source: Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, 2004 
 
There is growing certainty among climate models that warming temperatures and 
ice subsidence will continue in the Arctic. Scientists now discuss an ice-free Arctic 
Ocean in the summer season as soon as ten and as late as thirty years from now.
28
  Under 
this scenario, a less risky, less time consuming Northwest Passage could become a more 
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economic alternative route for inter-oceanic transit shipping. Compared with the Panama 
Canal route, for example, thousands of kilometers in distance savings are possible 
(Charron, 2005; Dittmann, 2009; Wilson et al., 2004). 
The idea that the waterways of Arctic Canada, the Northwest Passage most 
prominent among them, may someday be subjected to increased ship traffic is not a new 
topic to Canadian scholarship. A number of scholars (e.g. Byers, 2009; Byers & Lalonde, 
2006; Charron, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Griffiths, 1987; Huebert, 2001; McRae, 1987) have 
explored this idea. Indeed, in their recent examination of Arctic socioeconomic change 
and its prospects for Canadian policy, Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrison, and Poelzer 
(2008) recommend that in the face of melting polar ice, Canada should make preparations 
for a ―rapid expansion of Arctic shipping.‖ ―In all likelihood‖ they say, ―the ships are 
coming‖ (p. 203).  
These views of the future Northwest Passage certainly comport with predictions 
of economic theory. Several economic theorists have noted the instance of previously 
undetected opportunities arising from changing conditions (e.g. Davis & North, 1971; 
Demsetz, 1967; Furubotn & Pejovich, 1974). For Furubotn and Pejovich, it is none other 
than the activity of shipping that exemplifies this idea. They say, ―. . . changes in the 
economy affecting private cost-benefit calculations tend to create opportunities for 
individuals and groups to capture profits by engaging in activities that were not 
previously considered profitable, e.g. high seas shipping‖ (1974, p. 9). Recognizing 
potential gains in new Arctic shipping routes, like the Northwest Passage, actors are 
moving to capture the benefits that emerge, as Furubotn and Pejovich predict.   
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Should the marginal cost of Northwest Passage transits in fact continue to fall, it 
seems Canada and the United States would be the two states most interested in transits of 
it, in the near-term. As noted above, Canadian Northwest Passage activities include the 
resupply of northern communities conducted by the Canadian Coast Guard and the 
movement of cargoes to and from resource development projects in Arctic Canada. 
Notably, much of this traffic moves north-south within the Northwest Passage and its 
vicinity, rather than through it from east to west. A third form of destination-oriented 
Northwest Passage traffic is cruise ship visitation to sites across the Northwest Passage 
itself. At this time however, these tourist cruises are not conducted by Canadian vessels 
(J. Falkingham, personal communication, March 19, 2009; D. Jackson, personal 
communication, March 19, 2009). 
The most notable forms of American ship traffic in the Northwest Passage to date 
have been connected to the movement of petroleum cargoes and the repositioning of 
defense assets. For the most part, these comprise the voyages of the SS Manhattan in 
1969, and the USCG vessels Polar Sea in 1985 and Polar Star in 1988. Future interest in 
Northwest Passage transits on the part of the United States would likely fall along similar 
lines. Such voyages could entail resource extraction, defense related, or scientific 
activities. Arctic marine science conducted from American icebreaking ships is ongoing – 
specifically offshore mapping missions carried out jointly with Canadian counterparts – 
and is certainly feasible in the future. With a less icy Northwest Passage, commercial 
transits to carry domestic oil shipments from the North Slope of Alaska to the east coast 
of the United States could materialize. The attractiveness of this option may increase if 
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thawing Arctic permafrost destabilizes land-based transportation infrastructure (J. 
Falkingham, personal communication, March 19, 2009). And should some Arctic-based 
threat ever jeopardize national interests or continental security, a United States Naval or 
Coast Guard voyage through the Northwest Passage could be vital. More generic training 
exercises or offshore law enforcement could also instigate such a transit.  
In this context, it is important to note that the Northwest Passage is actually just 
one route in a group of alternative Arctic shipping lanes (R. Hodgson, personal 
communication, April 2, 2009; M. Treadwell, personal communication, November 9, 
2009). Besides the Northwest Passage, this group also includes the Northeast Passage (or 
Northern Sea Route) along Russia‘s northern coastline, the Arctic Bridge which connects 
Murmansk and Churchill around the southern tip of Greenland, and the potential North 
Polar route over the top of the planet.  
The Northern Sea Route is similar to the Northwest Passage in that Russia claims 
the Northern Sea Route as internal waters while the United States views it as an 
international strait. The waterway runs the length of Russia‘s Arctic coast, connecting the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Barents Sea with Siberia, East Asia, and the Pacific. The 
waterway has seen continued development for industrial and military purposes beginning 
in the early Soviet Era. Since the 1970s, the Northern Sea Route has been instrumental in 
developing the oil and gas resources of northern Russia (Ragner, 2008). In the summer of 
2009, two German ships transited the Northern Sea Route carrying supplies from 
Vladivostok to Noyyov in Siberia, marking the first non-Russian commercial voyage of 
the route. And according to a Russian transport minister, a voyage of the Northern Sea 
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Route is planned for two Russian oil tankers in the fall 2010, sailing from Vitino on the 
White Sea to Southeast Asia.
29
 Hodgson notes the superior infrastructure of the Northern 
Sea Route, the relatively more conducive ice conditions, and the very capable Russian ice 
breaking fleet (R. Hodgson, personal communication, April 2, 2009). 
The Northern Sea Route and the other alternate Arctic routes offer shorter inter-
oceanic distances than conventional routes.
30
 Shipping enterprises may therefore have 
multiple routing options in an ice-diminished Arctic, where route choice would be guided 
by factors such as ice conditions and time and speed impedances.  
The lack of transshipment facilities in the Arctic zone is another important factor 
worth noting.  Without transshipment ports, ice-class vessels must steam long distances 
in open water when approaching and leaving the Arctic (R. Hodgson, personal 
communication, April 2, 2009). Were transshipment infrastructure available, cargoes 
could be carried by open water ships to the Arctic zone, then offloaded at the proper 
facility to ice-ready vessels. With a less than ideal port configuration in the region, Arctic 
routes like the Northwest Passage may be best suited to serve origins and destinations 
nearest to their end points.
31
  
Recent computer simulations appear to bear this out. Somanathan, Flynn, and 
Szymanski (2007) conducted modeling to evaluate the Northwest Passage versus the 
Panama Canal, including the port-to-port shipping cost component of the overall required 
freight rate. Recent historical ice conditions were also used. Shipping from St. John‘s 
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Newfoundland to Yokohama was found to be economic through the Northwest Passage. 
However extending the route to New York made the Northwest Passage non-competitive. 
The modeling showed that the critical economic variable is the incremental capital cost 
between an ice-capable and a standard Panamax ship (Somanathan et al., 2007).  
Computer simulations conducted in 2009 at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (Dvorak, unpublished; Pollock, unpublished) also support these findings. 
Combinations of vessels, alternative routes, including the Northwest Passage, and speeds 
were modeled for Arctic shipping. The time and expense of Arctic voyages were then 
compared to existing routes.  Based on this work, the likelihood of year-round reliable 
containership service through the Arctic is, according to these researchers, a matter of 
―perspective.‖ The researchers claim that sending containerships over the Arctic is 
generally considered by the industry to be economically, politically, or environmentally 
unfeasible for continuous, reliable service. However, the modeling does indicate that 
these voyages could be economic if minimally ice-strengthened containerships could be 
reliably escorted through the Arctic at a speed of at least 10 knots.
32
 
At present, private shipping enterprises conduct destination-based shipping within 
the Northwest Passage in transporting cargoes to and from project sites and assisting the 
Canadian Coast Guard with the seasonal resupply of Northern communities. Some tourist 
cruises with areas of the Northwest Passage have also been made (J. Falkingham, 
personal communication, March 19, 2009; R. Hodgson, personal communication, April 2, 
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2009; D. Jackson, personal communication, March 19, 2009). With respect to inter-
oceanic transits of the Northwest Passage, it has been estimated that since Amundsen‘s 
successful voyage in 1903-1906, about one transit per year has occurred (J. Falkingham, 
personal communication, March 19, 2009). 
To the extent that commercial transits Northwest Passage have or may occur, the 
shipping industry appears to have a number of wants. Fednav, for example, is Canada‘s 
largest shipping company.
33
 In transporting dry-bulk cargoes all over the world, its 
portfolio includes Arctic shipping services. Fednav‘s vice-president Thomas Paterson 
claims aviation and maritime safety, including a search-and-rescue agreement, are needed 
for shipping in the Arctic. He says,  
We need to have something to prevent a major incident before the incident 
shuts us down. . . (and) a set of rules not only for the construction of ships, 
but for the routes to go along Alaska and through the Northwest Passage. 
Until we get better ice and weather charts, (Arctic shipping will) remain a 
huge challenge, and all of these things are deterrents for commercial 
shipping. All these components need to be put into place before the Arctic 
truly opens up, even in the summertime (Gedeon, 2009). 
 
Petro-Nav, a Canadian liquid bulk shipper that handles petroleum and chemicals, spends 
approximately 200 ship days in the Arctic every year. Christopher King, Petro-Nav‘s 
director of operations, sees the need for an increase in icebreaking capacity, as well as for 
more navigational aids in the Arctic. King states, 
A lot of the charts and navigational aids that the ships are operating with 
were probably produced in the 1960s and ‘70s when there were probably 
half as many ships and they were probably half to a third of the size. This 
is where the potential for an environmental disaster is (Gedeon 2009). 





Beyond navigational aids, the need for even greater supporting infrastructure to 
serve Arctic shipping has been identified in economic and engineering research 
conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Henry Marcus, a professor 
of Mechanical Engineering and Maritime Systems at MIT, claims the technology to 
traverse Arctic shipping routes exists, as does the distance savings offered from 
traversing these routes. However what the shipping industry needs, and what the Arctic 
lacks, is sufficient infrastructure to serve the transshipment of cargoes.
34
 Hodgson agrees, 
noting that ice-capable ships are uneconomic in open water, and therefore transshipment 
ports in the Arctic would be necessary for routine transits (R. Hodgson, personal 
communication, April 2, 2009). 
Apparently, details such as these are not lost on shippers. Laserre (2010) surveyed 
125 shipping firms in Asia, Europe, and North America for their Northwest Passage 
shipping interest.
35
 Eleven indicated a possible interest. And of forty-six container 
shippers surveyed, only six reported a possible interest in any Arctic routes. According to 
Lasserre, ―These companies are really, really not interested in Arctic routes . . . It‘s (the 
Northwest Passage) never going to be a Panama Canal.‖
36
 
Although there is growing scientific evidence that Arctic ice will continue to 
subside, and an ice-free Arctic Ocean in the summer is likely, seasonal variability in ice 
coverage remains a concern for Northwest Passage shipping. Wilson, et.al (2004) warns 
against a ―false sense of optimism regarding the ease of future shipping in the Canadian 
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Arctic‖ (p. 1856). In reviewing predictions of warming impacts to future sea ice 
conditions, these researchers maintain that Northwest Passage ice conditions will be 
highly variable: ―Shippers in the Northwest Passage will continue to be faced with a wide 
range of possible ice conditions and it is important to remember that this significant 
variability will remain‖ (p. 1855). Noting the presence of three key ―chokepoints‖ in the 
western Northwest Passage caused by the break-up of older Arctic Ocean ice, the 
researchers state: 
Future navigation in the Northwest Passage may see a blockage of western 
Northwest Passage routes by the southern shift in pack ice and an increase 
in drifting OI (old ice) creating chokepoints in narrow channels and 
significant navigation hazards. It is important to remember that with our 
present imperfect ability to predict future impacts on Arctic sea ice, there 
are a number of plausible climate change scenarios (p. 1856). 
 
Finally, the American moratorium on offshore oil drilling after the April 2010 
Gulf of Mexico oil rig disaster could also affect Northwest Passage use. If, as a result of 
this policy, oil in the Beaufort Sea is not recovered, the utility of the Northwest Passage 
as a means for inter-oceanic resource transport could be reduced. If, however, Beaufort 
Sea fields do produce, it remains unclear that recovered oil would be brought out via the 
Northwest Passage anyway. Prudhoe Bay and the northern terminus of the Alaska 
Pipeline are of course just adjacent to the Beaufort Sea. This alternative could be seen as 
more reliable; moreover, the Alaska Pipeline is currently operating under capacity (J. 








All of this recent attention on the possibility of inter-oceanic transits of the 
Northwest Passage brings the Canadian-American governance dispute to the fore. As 
potentially North America‘s sole transoceanic shipping route, who holds the right to 
determine how maritime traffic can operate in the Northwest Passage – one country, or 
the entire international community? The divergent views of jurisdiction of the Northwest 
Passage that were discussed briefly in Chapter 1 are returned to here in more detail and 
related policy steps taken by each government are noted. 
Canada is certain in its sovereign right to regulate Northwest Passage transits 
since for it; the Northwest Passage is internal waters. Its preference would be to provide 
authorization to vessels for Northwest Passage transits, track and control this traffic, 
provide navigational aids to vessels in transit, and impose domestic rules for vessel 
design, crewing, and environmental protection and safety.  
The desire to protect the unique Arctic marine environment from the potential 
harm of industrial shipping is where Canada‘s practical efforts begin. However, over the 
years, Northwest Passage affairs have become intimately bound up with the expression of 
Canada‘s national sovereignty and identity.  As a Northern nation, the Northwest Passage 
is an integral piece of Canada‘s national mystique. As an essential symbol of the ―True 
North, strong and free,‖ the image of the Northwest Passage generates a near-mythic 
national and cultural affinity.  
Since taking office in 2006, Canadian Arctic sovereignty has become a 
centerpiece of Prime Minister Harper‘s national agenda. While a number of past 
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Canadian Prime Ministers have offered themselves as defenders of Canada‘s North, 
Harper has taken the idea to a new level. ―We have significant plans for national defence 
and for defence of our sovereignty, including Arctic sovereignty,‖ he said in 2006.
37
 The 
Prime Minister has made frequent visits to the North, which often include public 
pronouncements of policy goals and appearances with military personnel and native 
Canadians.  In a recent visit to Nunavut, Harper stated: 
The Government of Canada must be able to be anywhere, respond to 
anything, if necessary – from foreign incursions to emergency – and that is 
obviously why we have been boosting military and defence assets, to 
ensure we take responsibility for our territory. But obviously our 
sovereignty is far more greatly enhanced if we have thriving indigenous 
and domestic healthy communities throughout the territory, communities 
that are proudly Canadian, as the Inuit are. 
 
Harper‘s slogan regarding the Arctic – ―use it or lose it‖ – appears to drive 
policymaking; an expanded military presence, the new Coast Guard icebreaker CGS 
Diefenbaker, extending the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act to 200 miles offshore, 
mandatory ship reporting requirements (NORDREG), a study for a new national park at 
the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage, and deep-water berthing facility at 
Nanisivik, also at the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage, are some of the activities 
undertaken by the Harper government related to this issue.  
The issue of ―Northern sovereignty‖ for Canada, and its connection to the 
Northwest Passage, can be attributed in some measure to the influence of the United 
States, Canada‘s outsized next-door neighbor and other main client of the Northwest 
Passage. The United States‘ lack of acquiescence to Canadian domestic control of the 
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Northwest Passage is, in the Canadian view, a rejection of Canada‘s national sovereignty. 
Having been unable to convince others of its control over the waters it claims as internal, 
increased foreign-flagged traffic in an unfrozen, internationalized Northwest Passage is 
therefore perceived by Canada as a threat to its national sovereignty. 
Huebert (2007) discusses ―sovereignty exercises‖ undertaken recently by 
Canada‘s military. He says that with the onset of global warming and ice decline in 
Arctic Canada, the Canadian Defence Forces have ―returned‖ to the North after an 
extended post-Cold War layoff.  ―Sovereignty exercises‖ have been stepped up in the 
Arctic, a new all-indigenous Arctic ranger group has been formed, and two new military 
bases in the Canadian Arctic have been promised. According to Huebert, Canada‘s navy 
in particular sees an urgent mission. Monitoring and enforcement of Canada‘s Arctic 
waters, including the Northwest Passage, are now enhanced commitments. Increased 
access to the waters of Arctic Canada and emerging resource wealth, both brought on by 
climate change, demand a renewed sovereignty and security response. The regimen of 
Arctic naval exercises has intensified to better prepare for this objective, and as many as 
eight ice-strengthened patrol ships are on order (Huebert, 2007).  
The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is likewise securing new ships. As indicated in 
the interviews, a new three-season ice breaker is being built. The vessel will be state-of-
the-art, with a price tag of CD$720 million, and will replace the aging Louis St. Laurent, 
which has been scheduled for decommission in 2017 (D. Jackson, personal 
communication, March 19, 2009). This is good news for a department that finds itself 
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maximized by the growing demands of the Canadian North and a lengthened shipping 
season in the Northwest Passage.  
These recent activities follow an historical trend. Over the years, Canada‘s 
government has promulgated both domestic and international policies to reinforce its 
position of sovereignty over Arctic land and water, including the reconfiguring of its 
national boundary, anti-pollution laws, and shipping management systems. On January 1, 
1986 Canada implemented the ―straight baselines‖ method for enclosing the islands of its 
Arctic Archipelago, thus defining its internal waters.  Under the Law of the Sea, straight 
baselines can be used to delineate internal waters from territorial seas by connecting 
offshore islands with straight lines to establish an outer perimeter (Charron, 2004). The 
Canadian enclosure move came on the heels of the second voyage of an American vessel 
through the Northwest Passage in sixteen years. In summer 1985 the Polar Sea, a United 
States Coast Guard icebreaker, was a controversial visitor to Arctic Canadian waters, 
after the SS Manhattan had made a transit in 1969. Considerable public and media outcry 
ensued in Canada. Canadian sovereignty had been violated. In a speech to the House of 
Commons often referred to as the ―statement on sovereignty,‖ the Canadian Secretary of 
State for External Affairs (and former Prime Minister) Joe Clark noted the problem that 
the Polar Sea voyage presented. Clark stated that while Canada‘s legal position was 
secure, means of actually exercising sovereignty were wanting.  
Canada is an Arctic nation . . . Canada‘s sovereignty in the Arctic is 
indivisible. It embraces, land, sea, and ice . . . The policy of the 
government is to maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago and to preserve Canada‘s sovereignty over land, sea, and ice 
undiminished and undivided . . . no previous government has defined 
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(Canadian sovereignty‘s) precise limits or delineated Canada‘s internal 
waters and territorial sea in the Arctic. This Government proposes to do so 
(Griffiths, 1987, p. 270-272).  
 
Secretary Clark went on to officially announce the straight baselines policy and 
also mention a variety of other steps the Canadian government would take to bolster its 
position, including construction of a state-of-the-art icebreaker and the opening of talks 
with the United States to discuss ―cooperation in Arctic waters on the basis of full respect 
for Canadian sovereignty‖ (Griffiths, 1987, p. 272). The straight baselines enclosure was 
immediately protested by the United States, as have all other regulatory acts by Canada 
concerning the Northwest Passage. The European community also officially protested 
Canada‘s straight baselines policy (McRae, 2007). 
In the international arena, Article 234 of the Law of the Sea was implemented just 
before Canada‘s straight baselines enclosure. The article was negotiated by Canadian 
policymakers and adopted in UNCLOS in 1982 (McRae, 1987). Known as the ―Arctic 
exception,‖ Article 234 enables coastal states to enact laws and regulations to control 
marine pollution emanating from ships operating in ice-covered areas.  The inclusion of 
Article 234 in the Law of the Sea provided international acceptance of existing domestic 
Canadian legislation, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) of 1970. The 
AWPPA enabled a zone of pollution prevention control that extended 100 miles from 
Canadian Arctic coastlines. In this zone, tighter shipping standards are imposed to protect 
the unique Arctic ecology, especially from the threat of oil pollution. On June 10, 2010, 
the Canadian government amended the AWPPA to extend the pollution control zone to 
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The Northern Canada Vessels Traffic Zone reporting system, called NORDREG, 
is an additional instrument to help implement Canadian policy in its Arctic area. 
NORDREG is a reporting and tracking mechanism for ships entering Canada‘s Arctic 
EEZ. Mariners can obtain navigation, ice condition, and icebreaker assistance by 
participating in the system. Until recently, NORDREG was not mandated for vessels 
under Canadian law; it was a helpful service available to mariners if they chose to use it. 
Faced with the difficulties of navigating in the difficult Arctic maritime environment, 
most did. As of July 1, 2010 however, vessels greater than 300 tons and those with 
cargoes of pollutants or other hazardous materials are  required to report and participate 
in the NORDREG system for the waters of Arctic Canada.
39
   
Changes to the AWPPA and NORDREG come under the framework of Canada‘s 
so-called ―Northern Strategy,‖ recently propagated by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade Canada (DFAIT). This policy initiative was formally stated in 
2009 and frames several goals under a renewed commitment to Canada‘s Arctic, 
including: exercising Arctic sovereignty, protecting the environment, promoting social 
and economic development, and improving governance.
40
  
In pursuit of Northern Strategy goals, a variety of initiatives have been taken, 
including: continental shelf mapping; support for the recent International Polar Year; 
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creating new protected areas and parks, building new harbor facilities, ordering a new 
Polar Class icebreaker, the CCGS Diefenbaker; deductions for affordable housing; 
incentives for resource development projects; the conclusion of land claims agreements 
and devolution of governing responsibilities to territories; and others. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 
below present recent Northern Strategy commitments made by the Canadian government, 
including costs and revenues, where these have been determined. 
 
Table 2.1:   Recent Northern Strategy Commitments, Projected Costs and Revenues 
Commitments Cost (millions CD) 
Procurement of new CCG polar icebreaker 720.00 
UNCLOS-defined continental shelf studies 40.00 
Establishing an Economic Development Agency for the North 50.00 
Renewal of Strategic Investments in Northern Economic 
Development program 90.00 
Extension of Mineral Exploration Tax Credit 120.00 
Northern geo-mapping to facilitate private mineral and 
petroleum exploration 100.00 
Mackenzie Gas Project: environmental, regulatory, scientific, 
and Aboriginal consulting 37.60 
Creation of commercial fisheries harbor in Pangnirtung 42.00 
Northern social housing 200.00 
Increase in Northerners‘ daily residency deduction 20.00 
Enhancement of Territorial Formula Financing 195.00 
International Polar Year research 156.00 
Feasibility study for Arctic Research Station 2.00 
Upgrade of Arctic research infrastructure 85.00 
Creation and expansion of protected areas in the Northwest 
Territories 15.00 
total 1872.60 
Projected Revenue Streams Return (millions CD) 
Issuing offshore oil and gas exploration licenses in the 
Beaufort Sea 1800.00 
 
Source: Government of Canada, http://northernstrategy.ca/nsc-eng.asp 
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Table 2.2:   Recent Northern Strategy Commitments, Costs Undetermined 
Commitments 
Procuring new Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships 
Expansion and modernization of the Canadian Rangers 
Establishing a Canadian Forces Army Training Center at Resolute Bay 
Establishing a deep-water berthing and fueling facility in Nanisivik 
Launching Radarsat II 
Ongoing military and surveillance operations 
Introducing new ballast water regulations 
Amending the AWPPA 
Making NORDREG reporting mandatory 
Launching the Northern Regulatory Improvement Initiative 
Establishing a three-year moratorium on the application of Marine Navigation Service 
Fees 
Increasing funding for tourism promotion and community cultural and heritage 
institutions 
Negotiating basin-opening financial support for the Mackenzie Gas Project 
Investing in Northern recreational and green infrastructure 
Extending broad-band services 
Supporting Aboriginal Skills and Employment Partnership Program 
Delivering the Food Mail Program 
Improving territorial health systems  
Supporting research in Northern industrial innovation, health priorities, and social and 
economic development 
Establishing graduate fellowships on Canada‘s role in the circumpolar world 
Signing a MOU with the UK for polar research activities 
Establishing conservation areas and national parks 
Supporting the Health of the Oceans Initiative 
Accelerating action on the reclamation and remediation of federal contaminated sites  
Negotiating and implementing land claims and self-governance agreements with 
Aboriginal Northerners 
Advancing devolution and implementation of agreements to build effective governance 
models 
 
Source: Government of Canada, http://northernstrategy.ca/nsc-eng.asp 
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The Northern Strategy intends to be responsive to the ―challenges and 
opportunities of the 21
st
 century‖ that face Arctic Canada.
41
 These goals and initiatives 
indicate the concern for a strengthened presence in a stable and prosperous region. The 
Northern Strategy states plainly that Canada is an Arctic nation, but also recognizes the 
need for international engagement and cooperation in addressing Arctic issues.  
The United States insists that international rules allow for the free passage of 
ships through the Northwest Passage. It holds a more utilitarian outlook on Arctic 
shipping issues, emphasizing the interests of seafaring states generally in the Northwest 
Passage over those of any one state. And though American dealings in the Northwest 
Passage have been relatively sporadic, for Canada they have had profound effects. 
Like Canada, the United States also identifies itself as an Arctic nation. Its Arctic 
Region Policy is National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD-66/HSPD-25), and like the Northern Strategy also dates 
from 2009. The Arctic Region Policy explains, first and foremost, that the United States 
has ―varied and compelling interests‖ in the Arctic.
 42
 It frames these interests in the 
context of several ongoing processes: evolving domestic security and defense policy, 
climate change and increasing human activity in the Arctic, the work of the Arctic 
Council, and increasing understanding of the Arctic environment. In this context, the 
policy states that it will meet the nation‘s security needs in the Arctic, protect the Arctic 
environment, ensure sustainable development, strengthen institutions among the eight 











To implement these goals, the policy recommends a number of specific actions 
for many department and agency heads in what is referred to as a ―whole of government 
approach.‖ Generally these call for departments to consult, cooperate with, and support 
the international community, international organizations, and individual nations on Arctic 
issues; define and protect American interests; develop a greater understanding of the 
Arctic domain, its environment, and its resources; pursue strategies to responsibly 
manage and sustainably develop Arctic resources; and continue to develop measures to 




Notably, the policy states that in respect to some Arctic interests, the United 
States is prepared to act either independently or cooperatively. Such interests include 
―ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.‖
45
 The policy states in particular that 
―freedom of the seas is a top national priority‖ and that ―the Northwest Passage is a strait 
used for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for 
international navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those 
straits.‖
46
 In further discussion of maritime transportation in the region, the policy also 
gives priority to safe and dependable navigation, and the protection of maritime 
commerce and the environment. 











In large part, the United States Department of State is leading on Arctic policy 
implementation. Secretary Clinton addressed the Joint Session of the Antarctic 
Consultative Treaty Meeting and the Arctic Council (see above) and attended a Canadian 
conference of Arctic coastal state ministers (mentioned below). The ―Senior US Arctic 
Official‖ which represents the nation to the Arctic Council is also State Department 
official. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg recently explained the significance of 
Arctic issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: 
We consider ourselves an Arctic nation and we have important strategic, 
economic, environmental, and other interests which will only become 
more acute as climate change transforms the Arctic . . . the Arctic is kind 
of a test case of the ability of the international community to meet the 
international challenges of the 21
st
 Century. And how we address this and 
our success in addressing this . . . really are going to foreshadow our 
ability as an international community to deal with the great transnational 




Along these lines, the Arctic Region Policy also identifies the importance of 
international cooperation in the Arctic. In several areas, the policy calls for cooperation 
with the other Arctic states, with the Arctic Council, and other bilateral and multilateral 
organizations. Importantly, the Arctic Region Policy urges the United States senate to 
accede to UNCLOS. The United States is the only major country in the world not to have 
done so. 
National level politicians from the state of Alaska also have a stake in Northwest 
Passage outcomes, and some potential influence over them.  Acknowledging changing 
environmental conditions, new resource opportunities in the Arctic, and a potentially 
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navigable Northwest Passage, Congressman Don Young (R) and Senator Lisa 
Murkowski (R) introduced companion legislation in the House and Senate for the study 
of a strategic deep water sea port in Alaska (Arctic Deep Water Sea Port Act of 2009). 
The Alaska delegation, especially Senator Murkowski, strongly advocates for accession 
to the Law of the Sea. UNCLOS ratification enhances Northwest Passage outcomes by 
signifying the United States‘ formal acceptance of treaty definitions for international 
straits, internal waters, and other maritime categories. 
  
The Arctic Cooperation Agreement 
Currently, the Arctic Cooperation Agreement of 1988 defines the system of rights 
and responsibilities between Canada and the United States for use of the Northwest 
Passage (see Appendix A for the full text of the agreement). Despite calls for changes to 
or even the discard of this institution, the agreement remains the rules in use by the two 
states.  
From its name, the Arctic Cooperation Agreement (officially the Agreement 
between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America 
on Arctic Cooperation) sounds as though it would be far-reaching, dealing with the full 
panoply of Arctic concerns common to both states. In fact, the agreement managed to 
capture only a narrow slice of common ground for both states – essentially that a ship-
borne scientific mission not be perceived as trespassing. The states‘ opposing views of 
the legal status of the Northwest Passage made a broader regime untenable.  
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The agreement acknowledges a shared commitment to Arctic development, 
security, and environmental protection. However, the only actual guidance for vessel 
transits of the Northwest Passage is in a brief and somewhat opaque reference to 
American icebreakers conducting scientific research (see Article 3 of the Arctic 
Cooperation Agreement in Appendix A). The agreement requires that any such vessel 
wishing to navigate Arctic waters claimed to be internal to Canada must first ask for 
Canadian governmental consent.  Beyond this, the agreement simply states that the two 
governments agree to take advantage of icebreaker navigation through the sharing of 
research information, in accordance with international law.
48
 
Kirkey‘s (1995) discussion of the negotiations that led to the 1988 agreement is 
insightful and quoted at length below. He describes the bargaining position of Canada 
upon entering negotiations with the United States just after the Polar Sea voyage in 1985: 
Canada wanted an intergovernmental agreement that would 
unambiguously assert and reinforce existing Canadian claims to 
sovereignty concerning the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago - 
specifically the Northwest Passage; defuse a politically volatile, nationally 
symbolic, domestic issue; and be politically defendable before parliament 
and the Canadian public (p. 405). 
 
The guiding principle for the Canadian negotiators became the statement in the House of 
Commons on September 10, 1985 by Secretary Joe Clark (mentioned above): ―The 
exercise of functional jurisdiction in Arctic Waters is essential to Canadian interests. 
However, it is no substitute for Canada‘s full sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic 
archipelago‖ (p. 406).  
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For its part, the United States sought in the negotiations to  
deny recognition of Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage; to 
retain freedom of access to the Northwest Passage for United States 
maritime purposes; and to find a suitable arrangement for addressing 
Canadian political concerns without compromising the first two objectives 
– objectives that were fundamentally grounded in American oceans policy 
(p. 407).  
 
The American position should be viewed against the backdrop of President Ronald 
Reagan‘s policy statement from 1983 which declared, ―The United States would not 
acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of 
the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high sea uses‖ 
(Briggs, 1990). 
With neither side willing to retreat from entrenched ideological and political 
positions, a stalemate in negotiations quickly arose. The impasse was revealed in a 1986 
State Department memo: 
Because the Canadian public has perceived this issue as a challenge to its 
sovereignty, the Mulroney government has little room for compromise. At 
the same time the United States cannot accept the Canadian claim because 
to do so would constitute acceptance of full Canadian control of the 
Northwest Passage and would terminate US navigation rights in other 
areas  . . . Since the September 10 claim, we have had several meetings 
with Canadian officials to examine whether we might reach an agreement 
that provides a basis for cooperation in the Arctic region while not 
prejudicing either side‘s legal position. So far we have been unable to 
agree on a way of dealing with the central issue of sovereignty (p. 410). 
 
After two years of unsuccessful negotiation, a breakthrough finally came on the 
heels of a meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. 
Reagan essentially stated that the United States would not do ―. . . anything (in the 
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Northwest Passage) without your (Canada‘s) consent‖ (p. 414). Negotiators picked up on 
the President‘s use of the term ―consent‖ and used it to shape a compromise – ―the 
tradeoff of passage for consent‖ (p. 416). In so far as American scientific research taking 
place in the Northwest Passage would be occurring within Canadian jurisdiction, 
American negotiators became amenable to the notion of seeking consent from the 
Canadian government for icebreaking ships engaged in such missions – as long as the 
final agreement included ―disclaimer‖ language preserving legal positions without 
prejudice. The final text of the agreement therefore states: ―Nothing in this agreement . . . 
affects the respective positions of the Governments of the United States and of Canada on 




The Arctic Cooperation Agreement is neither affirmation nor refutation of 
Canadian sovereignty for the waters claimed internal. Nor is it affirmation or refutation of 
international straits status for these waters. Instead, it preserves the states‘ respective 
positions as non-prejudicial to the international legal status of the waterway. This means 
that requests for passage on the part of the United States, and grants of passage on the 
part of Canada have no bearing on international legal determinations of the status of the 
waterway. As the American Secretary of State George Schultz put it, ―we have basically 
agreed to disagree at this point as to sovereignty and develop a kind of practical 
operation, a way for life to go on in a constructive manner‖ (p. 418). Indeed, McDorman 
(2008-2009) notes the Arctic Cooperation has been invoked five times for United States 





Coast Guard ice breaker transits since its inception, without incident. The most recent use 
of the agreement was concerning a 2003 voyage of the USCGS Healy (p. 287). 
The Arctic Cooperation Agreement required over two years of expert negotiation 
to come about. Given the entrenched political positions of Canada and the United States 
and their unwillingness to seek international adjudication, it achieved a sufficient, or 
possibly efficient, balancing of the states‘ interests and resolution to the conflict. Kirkey 
describes it as a mutually satisfactory outcome for both parties, achieved through an 
interdependent relationship, close relations between the executives of both states, and a 
process of integrative bargaining (p. 401-402). The agreement has been criticized 
however, particular regarding its ―ambiguous‖ language as to what types of transits 
require Canadian consent (J. Kraska, personal communication, February 8, 2010). To the 
extent that there is some ambiguity in the text, the agreement could be seen as creating an 
―open-ended contract‖ that is applicable in changing conditions (Cooley & Spruyt, 2009). 
The intent of the agreement was of course to enable a bilateral regime for transits of the 
Northwest Passage. However, it could be argued that what the Arctic Cooperation 
Agreement actually does is to implement Part XIII Section 3 of the Law of the Sea 
concerning the conduct of marine scientific research. It is in this section of the law that 
coastal state consent for the performance of offshore scientific research in its territorial 
sea, EEZ, and continental shelf is required.  
This point was reaffirmed in 2006 by the United States Department of State in the 
form of a letter authored by then Ambassador to Canada David Wilkins. In clarifying the 
United States‘ position on the Northwest Passage to Canada‘s Department of Foreign 
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Affairs and International Trade, the letter made five points. First, that the United States 
could see no basis in international law for Canada‘s internal waters claim over the 
Northwest Passage; second, that the Northwest Passage is an international strait where 
transit passage rights apply and coastal state permission is unnecessary; third, that marine 
scientific research is not a right of transit passage and therefore consent is needed; fourth, 
that the Arctic Cooperation Agreement of 1988 does not affect either state‘s legal views 
in the matter; and fifth, that the United States sees no reason to seek Canadian consent to 
transit the Northwest Passage for vessels that are not conducting marine scientific 
research.  
In the United States, the Arctic Cooperation Agreement is as an executive 
agreement, one of three unilateral policymaking tools, along with executive orders and 
proclamations, which can be exercised by the president. Executive agreements are 
somewhat controversial since they are contracts with foreign governments concluded 
without congressional consent. As such, they might be seen as somewhat less-credible 
commitments. Executive agreements do however carry the force of law, and the right of 
the president to secure these agreements has been upheld by the judiciary. As an 
executive agreement negotiated by the American president without congressional 
involvement, it could be argued that a ―least-cost‖ method was used in negotiating the 
Arctic Cooperation Agreement. By the same hand then, would the costs involved in 






INTERVIEWS WITH CANADIAN AND AMERICAN 
NORTHWEST PASSAGE EXPERTS 
 
Chapter 2 presented a review of ongoing environmental change in the Arctic from 
which both positive and negative consequences result. Positive consequences of Arctic 
change stem from the phenomenon of resourceship (Zimmermann, 1951), where natural 
conditions and human appraisal can combine to produce valuable economic resources. 
The Northwest Passage is one such resource.  With continued Arctic change, the prospect 
that the Northwest Passage would be useable for industrial-scale transit shipping 
improves. Because of interests in continued access to this resource, their extant 
Northwest Passage use agreement, and the larger economic considerations for global 
shipping; new emphasis has been placed on Canada and the United States and potential 
policy change for bilateral governance of this resource.  
This chapter presents a contemporary assessment of Canadian and American 
interests, preferences, and positions regarding the Northwest Passage. International 
relations and economic research has suggested that actors‘ preferences are shaped by 
their interests, and institutions are shaped by their preferences. An understanding of the 
interests of Canada and the United States in the Northwest Passage is therefore useful 
when considering the prospects for institutional change regarding this resource. To 
observe these states‘ underlying interests with the Northwest Passage, this study 
employed expert interviews. Experts from both Canada and the United States assessed 
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the value of the Northwest Passage to each state, and the value of the position taken by 
each state with respect to its governance.  
 
Interview Format 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2009 and 2010 with five Canadian 
experts (three academics, one active public official, and one former public official), and 
five American experts (two academics, two former public officials, and one active service 
member). The interviewees were: Dr. Rob Huebert, a professor in the Department of 
Political Science and a co-director of the Center for Strategic and Military Studies at the 
University of Calgary; Dr. Heather Nicol, a professor in the Department of Geography at 
Trent University; Dr. David VanderZwaag, the director of the Marine and Environmental 
Law Institute at Dalhousie University; Mr. David Jackson, manager of the Canadian 
Coast Guard‘s Ice Breaking Program; Mr. John Falkingham, retired manager of the 
Canadian Ice Service within Environment Canada; Dr. Christopher Kirkey, a professor in 
the Department of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Canada at 
the State University of New York – Plattsburgh; Commander James Kraska, a professor 
of international law at the Naval War College in Rhode Island; Mr. Mead Treadwell, 
most recent past chairman of the United States Arctic Research Commission; the 
Honorable David Wilkins, former United States ambassador to Canada; and Commander 
Aundrea Taplin, a lawyer with the Office of the Judge Advocate of the United States 
Navy. These experts were selected because of their research on and/or extensive 
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knowledge of the Northwest Passage and the Arctic. They serve this study as able 
spokespersons for their respective state‘s views of the resource in question.   
Interview subjects appraised the position of both Canada and the United States 
regarding the governance of the Northwest Passage. The interview subjects were asked  
What are the costs and benefits of the Northwest Passage as internal 
waters, and what are the costs and benefits of the Northwest Passage as 
an international strait?   
 
In these interviews, ideas of costs and benefits were construed broadly by the informants; 
their assessments incorporated both qualitative and qualitative notions. 
 
Interview Summaries 
This semi-structured inquiry into costs and benefits revealed: (1) the importance 
of the Northwest Passage to either state, that is, the value of or interest in the resource, 
and (2) the importance of the position taken by either state, that is their preference toward 
its governance. A summary of each interview is presented here.  
 
Dr. Rob Hubert 
 
The most important benefit of Canada‘s internal waters position in the opinion of 
Dr. Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary is that it serves Canadian nationalism and 
reinforces the emotional attachment that Canadians feel for the Northwest Passage and 
Arctic Canada. Hubert notes that this same notion is found in other popular and academic 
sources in Canada. Another benefit of the internal waters approach is that it utilizes the 
extensive Canadian expertise in operating in the Arctic environment. According to 
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Huebert, this benefit accrues not just to Canada, but to all potential users of the 
Northwest Passage. Dr. Hubert explains that the Arctic is a unique and technically 
complex environment characterized by extreme ice and weather conditions, seasonal 
darkness, and incomplete global positioning system (GPS) coverage. Huebert notes that 
of the 110 transits of the Northwest Passage (as of March 2009), only three failed to 
request Canadian assent. Huebert believes this is because shipmasters understand the 
need for Canadian assistance in Arctic navigation. He notes that while Arctic ice is in a 
state of overall decline, first-year and multi-year ice both remain seasonally variable, and 
that free floating multi-year ice can do serious damage to ships. In Huebert‘s view the 
Northwest Passage is a risky environment where operations are best handled by 
Canadians, who possess the necessary expertise and experience.  
Huebert identifies the cost of the internal waters position for Canada as the 
investment in the resources needed to enable Northwest Passage traffic. These include 
providing escort services, search and rescue, aids to navigation, monitoring, enforcement, 
and others. He characterizes Canada‘s Northwest Passage problem as a ―Rubik‘s Cube‖ 
where commitment of Canadian resources, global demand for Arctic transportation, 
geopolitics, and environmental change are all moving parts of the puzzle. According to 
Huebert, the challenge for Canada lies in anticipating what is probably going to happen in 






Dr. Heather Nicol 
 
Dr. Heather Nicol of Trent University agrees that Canadian nationalism and 
maintaining the emotional attachment to the Northwest Passage and Arctic Canada is a 
key benefit of the internal waters approach. This benefit is so great as to be 
―unquantifiable.‖ Nicol believes that the nationalistic and emotive sentiments concerning 
the Arctic are a construct of media, political, and public perspectives in Canada. In her 
view, the urgency of the Northwest Passage issue and its centrality to Canadian 
nationalism has been ―pitched‖ to citizens. Dr. Nicol notes the possibility that an 
international straits regime for the Northwest Passage may require less outlay on the part 
of Canada for controlling and defending the waterway. In Nicol‘s opinion however, the 
political benefits of the internal waters position outweigh any of its costs.  
 
Mr. John Falkingham 
 
 John Falkingham, recently retired manager of the Canadian Ice Service in 
Environment Canada, concurs that with international strait status, Canada may not 
assume as many operating costs. Falkingham notes that currently the Canadian 
government provides satellite imagery, ice information, ice pilots, and other navigational 
aids for ships traversing Canadian and Canadian-claimed waters, with no cost recovery 
mechanism in place. Falkingham says that because there is no legal regime and because 
of international opposition, Canada cannot impose any fees on Northwest Passage 
transits. Falkingham goes on to note that with the internal waters regime, Canada would 
be encumbered with the cleanup costs of a fuel spill or other environmental mishap that 
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might occur in the Northwest Passage. It would also be Canada‘s place to respond to a 
human emergency in the Northwest Passage, a disabled cruise ship for example.  
Falkingham believes that reasonable laws made by Canada would best serve 
human and environmental security in the Northwest Passage. Canada would allow 
transits through the Northwest Passage in exchange for law-making authority, he 
believes. He states that Canada wants to have a presence in the Northwest Passage, 
providing services and protecting its national interests. However Falkingham wonders 
whether Canada is making sufficient investments in securing and controlling the 
Northwest Passage and the wider Canadian Arctic.  
 
Mr. David Jackson 
 
David Jackson of the Canadian Coast Guard acknowledges that fulfilling the 
Coast Guard mandate to provide nautical services is costly, and some of these costs are 
incurred through the internal waters position. With respect to the Northwest Passage, 
costs come in the form of the Coast Guard‘s monitoring, response, and enforcement 
activities. Jackson notes that these costs are now rising as changing ice conditions have 
enabled the Arctic shipping season to begin sooner and last longer. To meet this new 
demand, Jackson says the Coast Guard will be required to extend its programs in the 
Northwest Passage and the wider Arctic. Jackson says the Coast Guard is dealing with 
ever-increasing cargoes heading north as communities in the Canadian Arctic grow. More 
aids to navigation and more bandwidth to download ice charts and other information are 
needed by vessels.  
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Jackson mentions that the Canadian government has recently appropriated $720 
million to construct a new, state-of-the-art icebreaker. According to Jackson, providing 
this vessel will require the rebuilding of Canadian industry.  In his view, the new 
icebreaker confirms that the Northwest Passage is Canadian waters. Jackson further notes 
that together with private industry, Canada will be required to increase waterway 
development and dredging activities in the Arctic maritime.  
Jackson also sees the fulfillment of the Coast Guard‘s mandate for nautical 
services as a benefit, and says that whatever the status of the Northwest Passage, internal 
or international, the Canadian Coast Guard will still carry out its mission.  
 
Dr. David VanderZwaag 
 
Dr. David VanderZwaag of Dalhousie University says that if ice conditions 
opened the Northwest Passage for transit traffic, benefits to regional and global trade 
would accrue in the form of savings on distance travelled, time spent en route, and fuel 
required for the voyage. However, VanderZwaag cautions that even if the Northwest 
Passage were open, it remains a risky environment, especially for hazardous cargoes. He 
says that with the internal waters approach, Canada bears the costs of environmental 
damage in the Northwest Passage from a ship-borne spill, for example. Canada would 
also bear the costs of any contingency planning taken to avoid this type of environmental 
damage. VanderZwaag also points out that while impacts to the indigenous people of the 
Arctic caused by pollution are difficult to measure, they are a great concern. He notes that 
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with internal waters, search and rescue becomes a Canadian endeavor, adding further 
costs.  
Because of Canadian expertise in the Arctic maritime environment, VanderZwaag 
believes that keeping control of the Northwest Passage ―in house‖ is the best policy for 
both Canada and for the international community. VanderZwaag notes however that the 
international straits approach would mean reduced costs to Canada. He comments that a 
benefit of cooperation is one of cost reduction; when faced with the high costs of going it 
alone, Canada may instead seek a cooperative, sharing approach for managing the 
Northwest Passage.  
 
Commander Aundrea Taplin 
Commander Aundrea Taplin of the United States Navy Office of Judge Advocate 
General states that the United States Navy‘s position on the Northwest Passage is 
congruent with its National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic policy 
statement. Commander Taplin reiterates that for the United States, freedom of the seas is 
a top national priority. She states that the Northwest Passage is a strait used for 
international navigation, and that the regime of transit passage applies to passage through 
those straits. Commander Taplin notes that preserving the rights and duties relating to 
navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports the United States‘ ability to 





Mr. Mead Treadwell 
Mead Treadwell, who stepped down as director of the United States Arctic 
Research Commission in April 2010 to bid for Alaska‘s lieutenant governor position, 
notes that the benefit of the international straits approach for the United States is that no 
permission is required to transit the Northwest Passage. The precedent-supporting effect 
of an international Northwest Passage is an additional benefit for the United States, and 
Treadwell notes that the United States does not hesitate to champion straits passage 
anywhere in the world. He says that the United States is only one of one hundred 
countries that view the Northwest Passage as an international strait, so the United States‘ 
position is not a unilateral one. Treadwell notes the reluctance of the United States to 
cede to the political control of states that could bar access to Arctic shipping routes. 
According to Treadwell, the cost of internal waters to the United States is that it restricts 
access, especially for scientific research.  
Treadwell notes that while the United States may not agree with Canada‘s 
position on the Northwest Passage, it still respects it. He claims that the Arctic is 
important to the United States and that great opportunities exist to work together on 
economic and environmental issues in the region. As an example of ongoing cooperation 
between the United States and Canada in the Arctic, Treadwell cites work on search and 
rescue procedures, icebreaker design standards, and a joint proposal to the International 
Marine Organization for mandatory international Arctic shipping guidelines. Treadwell 
says that working together is in the interest of all parties, while an inability to cooperate 
on Arctic issues means everyone loses. In this vein, Treadwell recommends that a unified 
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effort be undertaken by Arctic states for managing regional shipping. With the full 
participation of all states in the region, rules to guide Arctic shipping would be made and 
applied inclusively. To this end, the Arctic Research Commission has created draft 
legislation which would enable funds for joint investment and the ability to negotiate 
with Canada, Russia, and other Arctic and seafaring nations.  
 
The Honorable David Wilkins  
 
The Honorable David Wilkins, former United States ambassador to Canada, says 
the Northwest Passage is, and can be managed as, an international strait. He feels that the 
position of the United States on this issue is unlikely to change. He identifies the benefits 
of the international straits approach for the United States as strengthening the precedent 
for navigating straits elsewhere in the world, and preventing Canada from barring access 
to the Northwest Passage. Wilkins acknowledges that Arctic sovereignty is a popular 
position in Canadian politics, but notes that for the United States, sovereignty is not the 
issue. Wilkins explains that the issue is whether a state can bar access to an international 
strait. For this reason, he says the issue is actually between Canada and the rest of the 
world. 
Wilkins is of the opinion that Canada can and should continue to develop its 
presence in the North. He says that the United States encourages these efforts, and when 
the changing ice conditions reach a critical level, Canada and the United States will work 
out a solution for this problem. Wilkins says it is in the interest of the United States to 
resolve differences, and based on the relationship that exists between Canada and the 
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United States, and the history of mutual trust between them, he believes this issue too 
will be resolved.   
 
Dr. Christopher Kirkey 
Dr. Christopher Kirkey of the State University of New York at Plattsburgh says 
the benefit to Canada of internal waters is the continued assertion of political sovereignty 
over land and waters. He describes Arctic sovereignty as ―mythical‖ for Canada. He 
notes that the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and the Arctic Cooperation 
Agreement were created to protect Canada‘s Arctic ―backyard.‖ He says that these past 
efforts strengthen Canada‘s internal waters position because they forward Canada as a 
steward of the environment. If, however, the legality of Canada‘s Northwest Passage 
policy were to be disproven, then these domestic acts could become untenable, and the 
internal waters approach would become a cost for Canada.  
Kirkey finds the benefit of the international straits position for the United States is 
that it maintains access for the nation‘s maritime activities, including military and 
commercial voyages. He explains that if Canada‘s position on the Northwest Passage was 
recognized by the United States, it would circumscribe the regime of unimpeded transit, 
and straits passage for the United States could be jeopardized elsewhere. The United 
States therefore does not want Canada to set an example that other coastal states might 
follow.  
Kirkey goes on to say that today Canada has a genuine concern for regulating the 
movements of oil tankers in the Northwest Passage. He says this concern extends beyond 
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sovereignty. He explains that beginning four decades ago, the possibility of sending 
tankers through the Northwest Passage was explored as a means for getting oil from 
Prudhoe Bay to southern markets. But with the 1989 Valdez spill in Alaska, the 
uncertainties of climate change, and the public and private sector interests at play in the 
Northwest Passage, it is in the interest of both Canada and the United States to be 
proactive on this issue. Kirkey says that the Arctic Cooperation Agreement had a short 
lifespan, and that it is now time for the two states to reengage on this issue. 
 
Commander James Kraska 
Finally, Commander James Kraska, a professor of international law at the United 
States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, identifies two important benefits for 
each state with respect to its Northwest Passage policy. For Canada, the foremost benefit 
of the internal waters view is a psychic one. Because Canada‘s historic demonstration of 
control over the Northwest Passage has been unconvincing; regulating access to it with 
the internal waters policy offers a sense of safety and security. The second benefit to 
Canada of the internal waters position is a political one. By standing firm on a position 
opposed to that of the United States; Canadian politicians are able to curry favor with the 
electorate. For the United States, the international straits view supports an important 
economic benefit; the global economy depends on freedom of navigation. According to 
Kraska, if the United States made an exception in the Northwest Passage case, other 
countries that make excessive internal waters claims would also want to make their own 
rules. The other major benefit for the United States of the international straits view is a 
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military one. Kraska claims that to maintain security and protect national interests, the 
United States military must be able to move about the world‘s oceans as needed.   
Kraska points out that the Arctic Cooperation Agreement of 1988 only applies to 
American icebreaking ships that are performing scientific research. Other types of ships 
do not need to request Canadian permission to transit the Northwest Passage. He notes 
however that Canada does not see the agreement this way, believing that the United 
States is required to ask for permission for any and all voyages. Kraska describes this 
difference in interpretation as the problem of ―constructive ambiguity‖ that can occur in 
international law.  
Kraska finds the internal waters view of the Northwest Passage to be insensible 
under international law. He also notes that Canada has changed its position on the 
Northwest Passage over the years. But now, by framing the Northwest Passage issue as 
one of contested sovereignty, Kraska believes that Canada has painted itself into a corner 
politically. The notion of Canadian sovereignty and its connection to the Northwest 
Passage has become an extremely popular position among the electorate. The opposing 
American position is seen by many Canadians as a challenge to its security and 
sovereignty. The combined message of politicians, the media, and academia in Canada 
reinforces this ―threatened sovereignty‖ view, and also makes it very difficult for the 
government to convince citizens of any other position. Kraska says it would be extremely 




Canada wants to keep this a bilateral issue which, according to Kraska, it is not. 
He says that Canada wants to leverage American power against other foreign seafaring 
countries, such as China, so it wants to get the United States to take its side. The problem 
for the United States, as Kraska sees it, is its lack of concern with the issue. Unlike in 
Canada, where a large segment of the population is politically motivated by the 
Northwest Passage dispute, in the United States the situation is largely unknown. As 
such, Kraska feels it could be very easy for the United States to accept a deal with 
Canada that would look good politically, but ultimately not be in its best interest.  
Finally, Kraska states that no country has the right to close off the high seas. 
Under the law then, the United States would not be able to make a bilateral deal with 




What benefits are encompassed within each state‘s preferred approach to 
governing the Northwest Passage? What costs are associated with each? Answers to these 
questions can be found in the comments of these interviewees. They are organized in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below.   
The value of the Northwest Passage to Canadian politics derives in large measure 
from its socio-cultural value, its place of primacy in the national identity. The sovereignty 
issue concerning the Northwest Passage and Arctic Canada stems from the connection 




Table 3.1:   Benefits and Costs of the Northwest Passage as Internal Waters 
Benefits Costs 
Serves Canadian nationalism and maintains 
emotional attachment to the Northwest Passage 
and Arctic Canada 
Investments in the resources necessary to 
enable Northwest Passage traffic and 
extending programs to effectively extend 
shipping season in Northwest Passage and 
wider Arctic, as ships start sooner and stay 
later, including: escorting; search and 
rescue; satellite imagery, ice information, 
ice pilots, and other aids to navigation; 
monitoring, and enforcement 
Human and environmental security in the 
Northwest Passage, a unique and challenging 
environment, are better served through Canadian 
laws and expertise; keeping control of the 
Northwest Passage ―in house‖ is best for both 
Canada and the international community 
To Canada, internal waters means the continued 
assertion of political sovereignty over land and 
waters, enabling Canada ―to be there‖ to fulfill 
government policy and mandate, provide 
services, and protect its national interests 
Canada would encumber the clean-up costs 
if a fuel spill or similar environmental 
damage occurred in the Northwest Passage, 
including indigenous losses from Arctic 
pollution which are difficult to measure; 
Canada would respond to a human 
emergency, such as a shipwreck, in the 
Northwest Passage 
 
By standing firm on a position opposed to that of 
the United States; Canadian politicians are able 
to curry favor with the electorate 
In concert with private industry, Canada 
would be responsible for some costs of  
waterway development and dredging 
activities; $720 million for new icebreaker, 
and the ―rebuilding Canadian industry to do 
it‖ 
 
―Rebuilding Canadian industry‖ to provide a new 
icebreaker 
Restricts access for the United States, 
especially for scientific research 
 








Table 3.2:   Benefits and Costs of the Northwest Passage as International Strait 
Benefits Costs 
Canada may not have to assume as many costs 
to control and defend the Northwest Passage 
Impacts to Canadian relations, i.e. spillovers 
into politics, and possibly military 
collaboration, such as undersea navigation in 
Arctic 
 
Freedom of the seas is a national priority for 
the United States; preserving the rights and 
duties relating to navigation and overflight in 
the Arctic region supports the ability to 
exercise these rights throughout the world, 
and maintains the precedent for international 
navigation; other countries would not be 
enabled to push for a special circumstance 
Since overflight is included in international 
straits North American security is threatened, 
anyone can send bombers over the Northwest 
Passage, an invitation to kick open a vulnerable 
―back door‖ 
Supports an important economic benefit for 
the United States in that it maintains access 
for commercial voyages; the global economy 
depends on freedom of navigation 
Weakens Canada‘s internal waters position and 
makes its authority for domestic acts less 
tenable; Canada would not be seen as the sole 
steward of the Northwest Passage environment.  
A military benefit for the United States; to 
maintain security and protect national 
interests, the United States military must be 
able to move about the world‘s oceans as 
needed 
 Prevents Canada from barring access to the 
Northwest Passage; no permission is required 
to transit the Northwest Passage  
 To counterbalance Russian arctic activity 
generally 
  
Apparently a large segment of the Canadian populace feels that increased 
Canadian control over Arctic assets, including the Northwest Passage, is imperative. The 
government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper has delivered a similar message on several 
occasions. Prime Minister Harper‘s pronouncements of a buildup of defense 
infrastructure in the Arctic region and his signaling of the intention to utilize the 
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resources of Arctic Canada to serve Canadian interests are by now well-known among 
the populace. Chapter 2 noted that the Canadian government identifies at least $1,800 




Besides economic development and security goals, these pronouncements and 
policy initiatives serve to demonstrate the resoluteness of the government on the issue of 
Northern sovereignty. As Dr. Heather Nicol noted, ―. . . nationalism and maintaining the 
emotional attachment to the Northwest Passage and Arctic Canada is a key benefit of the 
internal waters approach. This benefit is so great as to be ‗unquantifiable‘ . . . the political 
benefits of the internal waters position outweigh any of its costs‖ (H. Nicol, personal 
communication, March 18, 2009. And as another Canadian informant put it, for any 
government to appear soft on the sovereignty issue would be the equivalent of ―electoral 
annihilation‖ (I. Townsend-Gault, personal communication, March 20, 2009). In this 
way, the Northwest Passage, the icon of Canada‘s North, garners political capital for 
actors who use it.  
Interest in providing for environmental integrity and stable shipping activities in 
the Northwest Passage are noted by the interviewees. It is felt that the ability to monitor 
ship traffic and enforce Canadian laws and regulations in the Northwest Passage allows 
for a more secure homeland, ensures territorial integrity, and reinforces the psychic bond 
between Canadian citizens and their homeland. There is a strong interest in providing 
these services unilaterally, which stems from the desire to reinforce Canadian sovereignty 





of the resource. Also expressed in the interviews was the confidence that Canadian 
expertise with Arctic navigation and hazards is the surest way to safe, dependable, and 
efficient shipping in the Northwest Passage.  
The cost of Canadian implementation of the internal waters policy was noted by 
some interviewees, and appears to be a growing concern. Interviewees recognized the 
economic investments required of Canada to support safe, dependable, and efficient 
shipping activities in the future Northwest Passage. It was mentioned that cost reduction 
may in fact be the most compelling reason for Canada to seek a joint arrangement with 
the United States for managing the Northwest Passage.  
The United States has a strategic interest in the Northwest Passage. Its position on 
Northwest Passage governance is important because it allows for the continuation of legal 
and customary principles concerning the freedom of the seas, legitimizing the movement 
of military and commercial assets. As a route used for international navigation, the 
Northwest Passage completes a file of other international straits across the globe to which 
the doctrine of transit passage applies. It thus helps maintain a worldwide precedent for 
straits navigation available to the United States and all other seafaring nations.  From this 
view, freedom of navigation and the development of a state‘s economy are fundamental 
values. Together they comprise an international norm.  American informants point out 
that several nations, not only the United States, share this view. Through its view of the 
Northwest Passage and its international navigation policies, the United States sees itself 
adhering to and upholding this norm. Therefore, were the United States to submit to the 
Canadian Northwest Passage position, it is feared that the precedent for transit passage 
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through international straits would be circumscribed, and the United States and possibly 
other seafaring nations could lose freedom of access on the world‘s oceans. The United 
States is unable to accept an internal waters approach to governing the Northwest Passage 
because it fears other coastal states could follow the example set by Canada and attempt 
to bar passage through straits.   
Importantly, these interviews show that the fundamental interests of each state in 
the Northwest Passage have remained essentially unchanged since the institution that 
guides its joint use, the Arctic Cooperation Agreement, was created. For Canada, the 
Northwest Passage is a cultural resource. It is a unique component of the national 
heritage which helps fulfill national identity. It therefore deserves protection and 
stewardship. For the United States, the Northwest Passage is a strategic asset. By 
enabling the mobilization of commerce and the projection of military might, it helps to 
fulfill national interests and ideology.  
While these interviews point up the stability of the two states‘ preferences 
regarding the Northwest Passage, they also indicate some potential openings for 
institutional change. The following chapter discusses this potential. It also introduces two 
institutional models that have been forwarded in the literature and in interviews as 








THE BENEFITS OF INSTITUTIONS AND THE  
COSTS OF THEIR CHANGE  
 
Michael Doyle, a scholar of international institutions, sees institutions as a 
necessary guide for economic, social, and political interaction at the international level. 
He advocates ―broadening and deepening‖ the legitimacy of institutions to achieve this 
purpose.
51
 In the previous chapter, some interviewees suggested that Canada and the 
United States employ a cooperative arrangement to solve their resource governance 
dispute over the Northwest Passage. Calls from the wider academic and policy 
community have also recommended as much.  
This ―institutional solution‖ appears to be a sensible one. Canada and the United 
States share a robust history of developing institutions. From the Great Lakes Treaty, to 
NORAD, to NAFTA, the past century in particular has seen continued efforts by Canada 
and United States to strengthen their social and economic bonds by jointly creating and 
employing guidelines for mutually beneficial interaction.  
Over twenty years ago, Oran Young (1987) discussed the need for Canada and the 
United States to work together to create an international regime for Arctic shipping. 
Young suggested that the new regime could specifically address the management of the 
Northwest Passage by refocusing Canada and the United States away from their resource 
jurisdiction concerns and onto more functional concerns, such as mitigating the impacts 
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of shipping to ecological and human systems (Young, 1987, p. 128-132). Recent 
commentators have followed Young‘s lead, recommending Canada‘s engagement in 
bilateral and international regimes for the Northwest Passage, and advising that such 
arrangements focus on environmental stewardship and human security (Charron, 2004, 
2005a, 2005b; Griffiths, 2008). According to these commentators, participation in such 
regimes requires Canada to move ―beyond sovereignty‖ or to ―set sovereignty to the 
side.‖ Still other commentators have identified specific resource governance regimes 
upon which bilateral management of the Northwest Passage could be modeled (Kraska, 
2007; J. Kraska, personal communication, February 8, 2010; Flemming, 2008; M. 
Treadwell, personal communication, November 9, 2009; D. VanderZwaag, personal 
communication, April 2, 2009).  
Acknowledging the history of Canadian-American collaboration, as well as the 
above commentators‘ recommendations, what advantages lie in the development of an 
institution for Canada and the United States in resolving their Northwest Passage 
resource governance dispute? What are the benefits to be had with this course of action? 
This chapter explores the development of an institution as a means for resolving these 
states‘ resource governance dispute. Institutional concepts are presented, as well as the 
practical examples suggested by interviewees and other commentators. 
And what are the costs? Importantly, this chapter will also consider the costs 
associated with institutional adoption. Scholars such as Ostrom and North, mentioned 
earlier, direct attention to the fact that devising new rules or altering existing ones cannot 
be done for free. 
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Concepts of Institutions 
The concept of an institution was introduced in Chapter 1. The definition, 
function, and emergence of institutions are reviewed here in more detail. Institutions are 
sets of formal or informal rules that simultaneously constrain and facilitate the actions of 
their participants. Formal institutions include governments, firms, contracts, laws, 
markets, and property rights; informal institutions include conventions, customs, norms, 
taboos, and traditions (Coase, 1988; Haas, Keohane, & Levy, 1993; North, 1991). 
Treaties or other forms of agreement between states are an example from the 
international realm.  
Institutions enhance the order, efficiency, certainty, and profitability of economic, 
social, and political interactions. They help participants to cooperate and to resolve 
conflicts, and they shape actors‘ strategies and their expectations about the future (Haas, 
Keohane, & Levy, 1993; Mantzavinos, 2001, 2009; North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990). Often, 
institutions are simply referred to as ―the rules of the game‖ (Mantzavinos, 2009).  
Utilitarian theories of institutions find that institutions are demanded because they 
increase social welfare. By minimizing the costs of collaborative effort, institutions help 
produce goods that would not come about through independent effort. When actors have 
complementary interests, institutions can allow exchange to occur and the gains of trade 
to be realized, as with markets. When the interests of actors are in conflict, institutions 
can enable integration to occur, as in shared problem-solving (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 
1981; Raiffa, 2002). The problem-solving capacity of institutions is also recognized by 
Mantzavinos (2001). Given that actors are continuously striving to increase their utility, 
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Mantzavinos sees a problem of continuous conflict. He finds that institutions exist to help 
actors to resolve the conflicts that will eventually arise among them (p. 85-86).  
Bates (1988) notes that when trust is present and actors‘ commitments to one 
another are credible, the prospects for institutions to be supplied are improved. Actors 
who seek to form institutions can take steps to signal each other of their credible 
intentions and their trustworthiness. Repetitious interaction and an awareness of the 
shadow of the future reinforce trust and commitment among actors (Axelrod, 1984; 
Bates, 1988). The benefits of joint gains that accrue to institutional participants can serve 
as a strong disciplinary force at work in institutional preservation (Gourevitch, 1999). 
And when institutions are designed in such a way that actors‘ strategies become 
contingent and a sense of community is encouraged, self-monitoring and self-governing 
can occur (Ostrom, 1990).  
Choices must be made about the type of institution to be formed in a given 
situation. Further decisions about the specific structure and procedures of the institution, 
and other important details, must also be made. These choices are influenced by the 
preferences of the institutional actors themselves (Frieden, 1999). Furthermore, since 
institutions are often nested one inside another, these choices can also be influenced by 
the larger institutional setting in which actors operate (Morrow, 1999).  And since 
information is imperfect and the events of the future uncertain, institutions may be 
incompletely structured. In this way, an institution can be reconfigured or renegotiated as 
new conditions warrant (Cooley & Spruyt, 2009).  
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The uncertainty and complexity that actors face is also discussed by Mantzavinos 
(2001).  He explains that actors‘ cognitive limits are challenged by imperfect information, 
uncertainty, and complexity, and therefore institutions exist to simplify and stabilize 
interactions in a world that often defies understanding. In this view, institutions, as sets of 
rules, implement problem-solving and decision-making standards. With an institution in 
place, problems do not need to be solved and decisions do not need to be taken on an ―ad 
hoc‖ basis; actors are freed from the ―need to decide each time anew‖ (p. 86). Through 
institutions, the opportunity costs of the time, energy, and other resources that would be 
invested in deciding and problem-solving are saved.  
 
Institutional Models 
Having formed a conceptual basis for what institutions are, what they do, and why 
they come about, this section examines two existing institutions recommended by some 
of the interviewees and other scholars. These institutions are offered as models of 
resource governance that could be applied to the Northwest Passage case. Both Flemming 
(2008) and Treadwell (personal communication, November 9, 2009) have advocated for 
the application of the Saint Lawrence Seaway model for use in governing the Northwest 
Passage. Kraska (2007; personal communication, February 8, 2010) and VanderZwaag 
(personal communication, April 2, 2009) however have both advocated for the 
application of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore model to the Northwest Passage case. 
An overview of the institutions that govern these waterways is presented below. These 
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regimes are viewed in light of salient institutional concepts just discussed, and the 
advantages that these models afford the Northwest Passage are noted. 
 
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore 
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore (referred to from here as ―the Straits‖) lie 
off the coasts of the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. At 
520 nautical miles in length, the Straits connect the Indian Ocean with the South China 
Sea and the wider Asian Pacific. Since one-quarter of the world‘s commerce and half of 
its oil passes through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, they are considered vital to 
the health of the global economy (Ho, 2009). The International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) estimates that if the Straits ever closed to ship traffic, the effect would be an 
immediate increase in freight rates all over the world (Desker, 2005).  
Before the agreement of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 
1982, both Indonesia and Malaysia had attempted to assert territorial waters claims over 
the Straits (Kraska, 2007). These assertions caused users of the Straits to fear an 
encroachment on their rights of free navigation. But with the advent of the regime of 
transit passage created by UNCLOS, a new balance was struck between the rights of 
states bordering international straits and the rights of the users of these straits (Kraska, 
2007). By limiting straits states‘ regulatory capacity in international straits, the regime of 
transit passage upholds straits users‘ need for unimpeded transit of international straits. 
Straits states‘ powers to regulate illegal activities in their territorial waters are reinforced 
by UNCLOS, and Article 43 of the convention encourages burden-sharing between states 
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bordering international straits and states that use international straits. Article 43 requires 
that: 
User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement cooperate 
(a) in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary 
navigational and safety aids or other improvements in aid of international 
navigation; and (b) for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution 
from ships (UNCLOS, 1982).  
 
By the early 2000s, all parties interested in navigation in the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore would be called upon to do their share in ensuring safe and efficient 
passage. The events of September 11, 2001 in the United States combined with 
increasing acts of high seas piracy and political terror in the Southeast Asian region 
created concerns for the security of ships passing through the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore (Desker, 2005). In 2004, forty-five acts of piracy and armed robbery occurred 
in the Straits, the second highest total since recordkeeping began in 1991 (Ho, 2009). As 
a natural chokepoint, the narrowness and shallowness of portions of the Straits make 
transiting ships easy prey for pirates. Worse, it was feared that political terrorists could 
use hijacked ships in the Straits in the same way that aircraft were used on 9/11 (Ho, 
2009). For ships sailing east into the heart of Asia‘s economic engine however, avoiding 
the Straits would add on an extra 600 miles, and the associated costs, to the voyage (Ho, 
2009).  
With these potential threats to security and efficiency looming, the Indonesian, 
Malaysian, and Singaporean navies together undertook increased security patrols in the 
Straits (Desker, 2005). The equity problem in this course of action was quite clear to the 
Straits states and to IMO, however. Users of the Straits also needed to be involved in 
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contributing to the safety and security of this global resource. In providing the collective 
benefit of efficient straits passage, both the rights and the responsibilities of all 
stakeholders – the sovereign straits states and the navigators of international straits – 
needed to be guaranteed. Faced with these new circumstances, in 2006 the stakeholders 
and IMO undertook a joint effort to ensure safe and efficient shipping through the Straits. 
Together these parties would implement Article 43 of the Law of the Sea, an action that, 
at that time, had yet to be done anywhere in the world (Ho, 2009; Koh, 2007; Kraska, 
2007).  
To operationalize Article 43 in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, a framework 
for collaboration, the so-called Cooperative Mechanism, was devised. The Cooperative 
Mechanism enables the needs of the Straits, its users, and the Straits states to be 
addressed in a collective setting. The Cooperative Mechanism was agreed in negotiations 
between the Straits states, the user states, shipping industry representatives, and IMO 
between 2006 and 2007. It is composed of three parts: (1) the Forum for Cooperation, (2) 
the Project Coordination Committee, and (3) the Aids to Navigation Fund. The Forum for 
Cooperation, made up of officials from the maritime authorities of the Straits states, is the 
channel through which parties interested in assisting with Straits-related issues can 
engage the Straits states. The Project Coordination Committee oversees the development 
of infrastructure, clean-up, and awareness and response projects in the Straits. The Aids 
to Navigation Fund collects voluntary contributions made by stakeholders for financing 
these projects.  
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Under the Cooperative Mechanism, primary responsibility for security in the 
Straits remains with the Straits states. Funding for operations and infrastructure is 
requested from the user community, but is not required. In a commitment to transparency, 
the Cooperative Mechanism uses best international practices for managing the 
contributions of users and the financing of projects (Ho, 2009). As of 2009, these 
projects, either planned or in progress, have attracted approximately US$5.2 million in 
pledges and contributions from the Straits states, eleven user states, four industry groups, 
and one foundation (Ho, 2009).  In-kind contributions in the form of capacity building 
exercises and shared expertise have also been made by states, groups, and IMO. Projects 
include repair and replacement of navigational aids, development of information 
technology infrastructure for maritime domain awareness, preparedness and response 
systems for ship-based pollution, and technological infrastructure for ship identification 
and tracking (Ho, 2009).  
In successfully implementing Article 43 of the Law of the Sea Convention, the 
Cooperative Mechanism has served the needs of the Straits states, the user community, 
and the straits themselves. Tommy Koh, the president of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea from 1981-1982, noted that in creating the Cooperative 
Mechanism, the Straits states, the user community and IMO were all able to work 
together in an open and inclusive manner (Koh, 2007). In this way, convergent interests 
in navigational safety and environmental protection in the Straits, and the preservation of 




The Saint Lawrence Seaway 
 By the end of nineteenth century, the ―shared resource‖ (Jenish, 2009, p. 10) of 
boundary and trans-boundary waters had become a growing concern for Canada and the 
United States. In water bodies such as the Great Lakes and the Saint Lawrence River, 
problems with water quantity, navigation, hydroelectric power generation, and scenic 
preservation were increasingly the focus of disputes between parties on either side of the 
border (International Joint Commission, 2008).  
Canal building provided some relief. Canals for diversion and navigation had 
been built on shared waters by both countries for some years. The Welland Canal in 
Canada is a notable example. Skirting the Niagara escarpment to join the Great Lakes of 
Ontario and Eerie, the Welland Canal became fully operational by the mid 1800s. It 
would be rebuilt several times to accommodate increasingly larger vessels and improve 
the efficiency of marine transport from the eastern seaboard to the upper Great Lakes 
region (Jenish, 2009).  To investigate still greater efficiency in commercial navigation, 
Canada and the United States formed a joint Deep Waterways Commission in 1895 and 
tasked it with a feasibility study for a fully functioning seaway from the Great Lakes to 
the seaboard. But after this commission‘s work was complete, no cooperative effort 
towards a seaway was made.  
The signing of the Boundary Waters Treaty in 1909 would smooth the way for 
addressing common concerns on shared Canadian-American waters, including 
commercial navigation.  Now a century old, the Boundary Waters Treaty remains the 
mechanism through which Canada and the United States agree to manage their shared 
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water resources – including the Great Lakes and the Saint Lawrence River – for the 
benefit of both countries. The treaty created the International Joint Commission (IJC) to 
advise the two states in making joint policy for shared waters, and to resolve emergent 
disputes.   
Despite the accession of Canada and the United States to the Boundary Waters 
Treaty and the formation of the IJC, there would be still more decades of studies, 
independent actions, industry lobbying, and further treaty-making connected to the joint 
seaway project, with no result. Finally in the mid 1950s, conditions ripened for the 
construction of the Saint Lawrence Seaway by the two countries.  
The Saint Lawrence Seaway (referred to from here as ―the Seaway‖) was 
completed and opened to shipping in 1959 at a cost $475 million (Jenish, 2009). The 
Seaway is a 3700 kilometer-long deep draft waterway that allows commercial vessels to 
navigate from the Atlantic Ocean to Lake Superior, halfway across the continent of North 
America. The Seaway operates on the Saint Lawrence River and the Great Lakes, a 
combined system containing one-fifth of the planet‘s fresh surface water. In the view of 
Richard Corfe, the president of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation, 
the Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence River system is a ―shared resource,‖ and requires that 
the Seaway and all other stakeholders in the system develop a common agenda for its 
sustainability (Jenish, 2009). Indeed, one-third of the population of North America lives 
in the states and provinces that border this resource system, one which has made an 
important economic impact in this region, and beyond. Since its opening in 1959, the 
Seaway has carried 2.3 billion tons of cargo worth $350 billion to markets in Canada, the 
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United States, and the rest of the world. These cargos include grains, iron ore, coal, sugar, 
aggregates, petroleum products, and others. Some 225,000 jobs in Canada and the United 
States are connected to the Seaway. The commercial activities of the Seaway account for 
approximately $9 billion annually in personal income, business revenues, and provincial, 
state, and local government taxes (Jenish, 2009). 
Two corporations, one in either country, jointly administer the Seaway. The Saint 
Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC) is a government corporation of 
the US Department of Transportation. It constructs, operates, and maintains the portion of 
the Seaway between Montreal and Lake Eerie that lies within the territorial limits of the 
United States (SLSDC, 2009). The Saint Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation 
(SLSMC) is a Canadian non-profit corporation with a mission of providing safe and 
efficient marine traffic through the Canadian facilities of the Seaway (SLSMC, 2008). 
These corporations coordinate the rules and regulations, safety and environmental 
programs, tolls, daily operations, inspections, traffic management, navigational aid, 
operating dates, and trade development for the entire bi-national system (SLSDC, 2009). 
In this way, the two corporations together ensure safe and well-managed maritime 
commerce on the Seaway.  
The IJC provides official oversight for the Seaway operations of the two 
corporations. It has the authority to review and approve the waterway development 
activities of the two corporations.
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  The IJC is composed of six commissioners, three 
from either country which are appointed by the American president and the Canadian 
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Governor in Council, respectively. The IJC holds public hearings, conferences, and 
meetings related to boundary and trans-boundary water resource and air quality issues. 
These events provide a forum for individuals, groups, and organizations to become 
educated on boundary and trans-boundary resource matters and to present their opinions 
and concerns. The IJC also investigates boundary and trans-boundary resource issues and 
recommends policy options based on its findings, when requested by the two states. The 
IJC has a quasi-judicial authority over development projects on the resources in its remit. 
Project approval hinges on the consideration of development impacts to interests on 
either side of the border. To mitigate potentially damaging impacts and harmonize 
competing interests, the IJC can compel design or operational changes before granting 
project approval. Boards are created and staffed with stakeholders and members of the 
public from both countries to monitor project implementation in accordance with IJC 
decisions (IJC, 2008).   
The IJC also provides the corporations with a forum for the exchange of ideas 
regarding issues of common concern on the Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence River system. A 
recent example involves water levels and flows on Lake Ontario and the Saint Lawrence 
River. After management options for these water levels were proposed by the IJC, the 
SLSMC submitted its own analysis and commentary.
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 In guiding policymaking for 
shared Canadian-American waters, the IJC must consider, among other stakeholder 
concerns, the maintenance of water levels sufficient for Seaway operations. 
 





Beneficial Features  
In both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the Saint Lawrence Seaway 
cases, some of the conceptual features of institutions discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter are apparent. The Cooperative Mechanism in the Straits regime and the 
International Joint Commission in the Seaway regime both serve to mitigate conflict and 
enable cooperation. The Cooperative Mechanism provides an arena for collective action. 
It delineates the processes through which interested parties interact, take responsibility 
for resource-related issues, and commit themselves to other stakeholders and to the 
resource itself for providing these collective goods. The International Joint Commission 
provides a forum for exchange between stakeholders and develops guidelines regarding 
their activities. It authorizes and facilitates the activities of the two Seaway management 
organizations, the SLSDC and the SLSMC. These organizations themselves make rules 
that govern the day to day shipping operations of the Seaway.  
These institutions encourage trust and credibility, and supply orderly and efficient 
transportation, a joint product available to all users and stakeholders. The Straits regime 
is based upon an open and inclusive process, where financial best practices and 
transparency are pillars. In the Seaway regime, Canadian and American corporations 
coordinate rule-making and other activities with each other and engage other stakeholders 
through the IJC. This coordination works so well in fact that despite twenty-three border 
crossings for ships steaming along the Saint Lawrence Seaway into Chicago from the 
Atlantic, there remains only one telephone number, one standards book, one toll location, 
and one inspection point required of these ships (M. Treadwell, personal communication, 
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November 9, 2009). According to Treadwell, this is the positive effect of the Seaway 
regime. He states, ―We need to get to this (the Seaway arrangement) for Arctic shipping‖ 
(M. Treadwell, personal communication, November 9, 2009).  
Flemming (2008) also advocates for the application of the Seaway model in the 
Northwest Passage case. He notes, in particular, the joint authority of the two states over 
the resource implemented by the Seaway model. Flemming suggests that a cooperative, 
treaty-based arrangement between Canada and the United States, like that of the Seaway 
regime, is what is now needed for joint management of the Northwest Passage 
(Flemming, 2008).   
As with the Seaway, the institutions governing the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore also offer important advantages for participants. The most important of these, 
according to Kraska, is the implementation of Article 43 of the Law of the Sea. In so 
doing, the Straits regime adheres to the elements of international law (J. Kraska, personal 
communication, February 8, 2010). VanderZwaag further notes that the Straits regime 
operationalizes the standard contained in Article 43 for cooperation between straits and 
user states in providing efficient transit through straits. (D. VanderZwaag, personal 
communication, April 2, 2009). In the case of the Straits, burden sharing among all 
interested parties followed with the implementation of Article 43.  
Because of the advantageous elements found in the Straits and Seaway regimes, 
notably mechanisms for burden sharing, joint authority, and conflict resolution, both 
Canadian and American interviewees and scholars suggest these models for application 
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The high fiscal costs that Canada must assume in providing services, defending 
and monitoring, and responding to emergencies in the Northwest Passage was an 
important point made in the interviews. By using an institutional arrangement similar to 
that of the Straits regime, burden sharing could be achieved in the Northwest Passage to 
reduce these costs for Canada. Burden sharing arrangements make all users take 
responsibility for the maintenance of the resource. UNCLOS recommends burden sharing 
under Article 43.  
How was burden sharing achieved in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore? The 
Cooperative Mechanism set up three organizations: a funds collector (the Aids to 
Navigation Fund), a development organization (the Project Coordination Committee), 
and a discussion group (the Forum for Cooperation). Through these bodies, Straits-
related issues are raised by stakeholders; funds are volunteered by coastal and user states; 
and projects are carried out that benefit the resource, the users, and the coastal states.  
Certainly Canada and the United States could implement a similar design if they 
chose. The costs associated with NORDREG, waterway infrastructure projects, search 
and rescue activities, enforcement activities, and other needs related to safe, secure, 
efficient, lowest-impact Northwest Passage transits could be shared by Canada and the 
United States. Personnel from each state, in equal numbers, could be tasked to carry out 
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these functions. An institutional design such as this can provide an equitable solution for 
Northwest Passage governance that is consistent with international law.  
 
Joint Authority 
 With respect to the Northwest Passage, joint authority means that Canada and the 
United States would both have rights to the resource. In this way, as in the example of the 
Saint Lawrence Seaway, the states‘ activities would be coordinated and rules would be 
made jointly. In the Seaway, two management corporations exist, one Canadian (the 
SLSMC) and one American (the SLSDC). These two corporations jointly administer the 
conduct of shipping in the Seaway. The IJC serves as an oversight body for the 
corporations and is composed of equal numbers of Canadian and American 
commissioners.  
 Again, Canada and the United States could implement an institutional 
arrangement for the Northwest Passage where authority over the resource is held jointly. 
Domestic entities could be devised in both countries which would coordinate 
administrative activities in the waterway. The IJC, or some correlate, could provide 
necessary oversight. Indeed, Flemming (2008) hypothesizes a ―Northwest Passage 
Authority,‖ styled after the IJC, to serve this purpose. 
 
Conflict Resolution 
As Mantzavinos (2001) suggests above, the possibility of conflict is ever-present 
when actors constantly strive for utility increases. Institutions can help in these cases. 
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Since the two states disagree over the legal status of the Northwest Passage, and since the 
issue of Northern sovereignty has become highly politicized, evoking strong sentiments 
in Canada, diffusing emergent conflicts between the two states would be an important 
function for any institution adopted. In both the Straits and Seaway examples, a 
mechanism for resolving incipient conflicts exists; in the Straits it is the Forum for 
Cooperation, and in the Seaway it is the IJC. 
To deal with emergent Canadian-American conflicts surrounding the Northwest 
Passage, the IJC is, again, an obvious choice. It is operational, so a new organization 
would not have to be constituted. It is also a trusted body that the two states have used for 
decades. Over these years, the IJC has proven itself to be effective in gathering 
competing positions and reducing and resolving the conflicts among them. Certainly, 
however, a different conflict resolution forum or body could be found or created by the 
two states. In any case, reducing tensions and resolving conflicts are an important 
function of institutions. The means for achieving these outcomes can be implemented 
within institutional designs. 
 
Problems and Preferences 
Burden sharing, joint authority, and conflict resolution are examples of key 
benefits that could be had were Canada and the United to implement the Straits or 
Seaway models for the governance of the Northwest Passage. These advantages 
notwithstanding, it is in fact quite surprising that both Canadian (Fleming and 
VanderZwaag) and American (Kraska and Treadwell) commentators would recommend 
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these models, since both the Straits and the Seaway regimes are fundamentally flawed 
when applied to the Northwest Passage case.   
The problem, of course, with the Straits of Malacca and Singapore model is that it is a 
regime for governing an international strait. By implementing Article 43 of UNCLOS, it 
formally collectivizes the resource, enabling all parties to share in the costs and benefits 
of the Straits. Implementing this model in the present case would therefore create a 
serious predicament since international straits governance for the Northwest Passage is 
precisely what Canada does not want. Canada wants internal waters status for the 
Northwest Passage. It sees itself as the sole authority for governing the resource. For 
Canada, international straits status for the Northwest Passage means sovereignty, national 
identity, and the integrity of a treasured natural asset could all be compromised.  
Similar problems emerge when implementing the Saint Lawrence Seaway model. The 
Seaway model of course implements a regime for internal waters. The Seaway is part of 
both countries; it is internal to both. It is therefore only fitting that both countries have 
joint control over the resource. But implementing this model in the present case also 
creates a serious predicament since the internal waters form of governance is precisely 
what the United States does not want for the Northwest Passage. For the United States, 
internal waters status for the Northwest Passage means national interests, free movement, 
and global commerce could be compromised.   
This confusion between official preferences and institutional outcomes gives the 
analyst pause. A question arises as to whether misunderstanding of the Straits and 
Seaways models, the Northwest Passage case, or both, exist.  The confusion appears to 
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run deep; in a recent book, well-known Canadian Arctic expert and professor of 
international law Michael Byers (2009) comments on the ―. . . importance of 
demonstrating Canada’s commitment to make the Northwest Passage a safe and secure 
international shipping route. Without our showing that we are up to that job, there is little 
reason for anyone to recognize our internal waters claim‖ (p. 85-86, italics added). These 
comments do well to illustrate the ―sovereignty trap‖ Canada finds itself in with the 
Northwest Passage; that is, the more navigational aid, monitoring and enforcement 
capacity, and related infrastructure Canada applies to the Northwest Passage in an 
attempt to demonstrate controlled internal waters, the more conducive the Northwest 
Passage becomes to international transit passage. 
It appears that a review of the preferences of Canada and the United States with 
respect to the Northwest Passage, and the available alternatives for meeting these 
preferences is warranted. These alternatives include: submission, adjudication, a 
multilateralism, and unilateralism. In this analysis Canada and the United States are 
treated as a single problem-solving unit. The two states are viewed this way since, at the 
present time, a bilateral institution governing Northwest Passage use is in place – the 
Arctic Cooperation Agreement. To move away from the Arctic Cooperation Agreement 
would require a joint decision made by both states.  
 
Submission 
One alternative to resolving the Northwest Passage governance dispute could be 
for Canada or the United States to submit to the other‘s position. Submission to the 
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other‘s position would mean that either Canada willingly agrees to international straits 
status for the Northwest Passage or the United States willingly agrees to internal waters 
status for the Northwest Passage. The interviews presented in Chapter 3 have indicated 
that both states have deep-seated problems with the other‘s position, and both appear to 
be firmly committed to their own position, as the interviews and statements of Arctic 
policy indicate. As long as these conditions prevail, submission is an alternative that is 
preferred by neither state and therefore a highly unlikely outcome.  
Could submission ever occur? Submission only seems possible if Canada or the 
United States simply becomes convinced that the others‘ position is in fact the ―right‖ 
one. It seems that this change in course could only come about through a new 
understanding of the legal arguments involved. Based on the deeply ingrained legal views 
held by the two states (Charron, 2005a; McRae, 2007; Griffiths, 2008) however, this path 
to submission seems very unlikely. Submission would of course be possible if a court of 
law required it. This alternative is discussed below. 
There could be at least one other cause for submission, however – tradeoffs. This 
possibility will be discussed in the final chapter of this study.  
 
Adjudication 
Another alternative available to Canada and the United States in resolving their 
governance dispute would be to let an outside party do it for them. In a word, this 
alternative means adjudication. Taking this approach, a party external to the dispute with 
the authority to allocate rights to the Northwest Passage would make a determination as 
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to what rights either party holds with respect to the resource. Are vessels from any 
country allowed use of the resource? Is Canada allowed to apply its own regulations to 
transiting vessels?  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is an example of an adjudicative body 
with the capacity for dispute resolution that could be brought to bear on this issue. 
Indeed, past ICJ rulings concerning straits passage and maritime resource control are 
often mentioned in connection with the Northwest Passage. These rulings are the Corfu 
Channel Case
54
 and the Fisheries Case,
55
 respectively. Legal scholars have noted the 




But while capable adjudicators may exist, this alternative is also not preferable to 
Canada and the United States. Should the states submit their dispute for adjudication to 
the ICJ, or any other international arbitrator, one of them will end up losing. Once 
adjudication by an outside party is called for, the game instantly becomes zero-sum; 
whichever party is not favored by the decision of the outside adjudicator suffers a total 
wipeout. For Canada, a total wipeout means that sovereignty, identity, and the integrity of 
a treasured natural asset are compromised. For the United States, a wipeout means 
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 The first case decided by the newly-created ICJ, the 1949 ruling determined that Albania was liable for 
damages to the British Royal Navy caused by underwater mines. Of relevance here is the definition of an 
international strait issued in the ruling: a waterway joining two high seas areas.   
55
 In 1951 the ICJ ruled against Britain in its suit against Norway concerning high seas fishing rights. The 
court found that in fact Norway was operating within its own waters under international law. This case 
legitimated the straight baselines approach for delineating a nation‘s territorial waters. 
56
 Moreover, since 1986, the United States does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ on this or 
any issue. Canada only recently does.  
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national interests, national security, free movement, and global commerce are 
compromised.   
Though both states are firmly committed to their positions, expert opinion has it 
that there are legal arguments in support of both views. Therefore neither state seeks third 
party adjudication on this issue because of the risk of wipeout.  As noted in the research 
of Wang (1981) reviewed in Chapter 1, adjudicative outcomes are relatively evenly 
distributed between the Canada and the United States – an even chance of losing is not 
worth the risk of going to court. And as Byers (2009) points out, both states have likely 
not forgotten the outcomes of arbitration in 1903, which gave Alaska to the United States, 
and 1984, which gave part of the Georges Bank to Canada, much to the other‘s chagrin.  
 
Multilateralism 
Yet another alternative for resolving the Northwest Passage governance dispute 
could be for Canada and the United States to include other parties with interests in the 
region in helping to determine an acceptable outcome. Other states beside Canada and the 
United States have interests in the region, including interests in Arctic shipping. 
Denmark, Norway, and Russia – the other Arctic coastal states – are obvious examples. 
Indeed all of the member states of the Arctic Council, as well as the permanent 
participants, observing states, and observing organizations could have potential interests 
in Northwest Passage outcomes. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below present the membership of the 




Table 4.1:   Members and Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council 
Members Permanent Participants 
Canada Aleut International Association 
Denmark/Greenland/Faroe Islands Arctic Athabaskan Council 
Finland Gwich‘in Council International 
Iceland Inuit Circumpolar Council 
Norway Russian Association of Indigenous 
Peoples of the North Sweden 




Source: Arctic Council, http://www.arctic-council.org 
 
Table 4.2:   Observing States and Organizations of the Arctic Council 




Standing Committee of 
Parliamentarians of  
the Arctic Region 
Advisory Committee on 
Protection of the Seas 
Germany World Conservation Union Arctic Circumpolar Gateway 
Netherlands 
International Federation of  
Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies 
Association of  
World Reindeer Herders 
Poland 
North Atlantic Marine  
Mammal Commission 
Circumpolar Conservation Union 
Spain Nordic Council of Ministers 




Nordic Environment  
Finance Corporation 
International Arctic  
Social Science Association 
 
United Nations  
Development Program 
International Union for 
Circumpolar Health 
 
United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe 
International Working Group for 
Indigenous Affairs 
 




University of the Arctic 
  
World Wildlife Fund 
 
Source: Arctic Council, http://www.arctic-council.org 
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wish to be involved in any discussion of Arctic shipping issues that takes place, including 
discussion of the Northwest Passage.  
From the viewpoint of the United States, these parties should be included, since, 
for one, they are stakeholders in the Arctic region, and secondly, the governance dispute 
over the Northwest Passage is actually between Canada and the rest of the world. Equity 
concerns call for an all-inclusive approach, as noted in interviews (M. Treadwell, 
personal communication, November 9, 2009). By including other parties in Canada and 
the United States‘ resolution process, or by moving that process to a multilateral venue, 
new and creative suggestions for problem solving could be discovered.  
Indeed, these group dynamics were vividly displayed during a meeting of Arctic 
Ocean foreign ministers in Quebec in late March 2010. The day before the G8 Foreign  
Ministers meeting in Ottawa, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon took 
the opportunity to gather the ministers from the five Arctic coastal states. Their agenda 
was resource exploitation, environmental protection, and national security in the Arctic. 
Left out of the meeting, however, were Arctic indigenous groups and the three other 
circumpolar countries – Iceland, Finland, and Sweden. Indigenous groups voiced their 
objections to being snubbed, and Iceland also made public its displeasure at being 
excluded from the meeting. Norway‘s Foreign Minister Jonas Store claimed it was ―not a 
good thing‖ that the excluded parties were discontented. Also critical of the meeting‘s 
exclusivity was the American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who stated that when 
Arctic issues are under discussion, all parties with interests in the region should be 
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included. She expressed the hope that ―. . . the Arctic will always showcase our ability to 
work together, not create new divisions.‖
57
 
This example, combined with comments made in interviews, and the stated policy 
of international straits status for the Northwest Passage indicate that multilateral 
alternatives are preferred by the United States. In the interviews, the need for ―unfettered 
access, like in Antarctica‖ and a ―unified effort for shipping in the Arctic‖ was 
communicated (M. Treadwell, personal communication, November 9, 2009). As a 
superpower with worldwide interests who seeks to maintain its freedom of movement 
throughout the globe (Young, 1992), the preference of the United States is to ensure that 
the issue of Arctic access is not ―scaled down‖ so that only a select few make decisions. 
Rather, the United States prefers that the issue of Arctic access be ―. . . all hands on 
deck,‖ as Secretary Clinton put it.
58
 Including a larger segment of the international 
community would likely create a larger coalition supporting high seas freedom and the 
international straits view of the Northwest Passage.  
Clearly the broad multilateral alternative is not preferred by Canada. Canada 
prefers involvement by as few states as possible so that its unique view of the Arctic 
situation has less chance of being dominated. Critical for Canada, interestingly, is 
Russia‘s inclusion, especially in a small group setting. Russia provides a counterbalance 
to parties opposed to Canada‘s internal waters position on the Northwest Passage since it 
has its own waterway with the same status. As mentioned earlier, the Northern Sea Route 
is viewed by the United States and other countries as an international strait providing 
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access to and from the Arctic Ocean. Russia however is steadfast that the Northern Sea 
Route is internal Russian waters.  
 
Unilateralism 
 A unilateral approach however is favored by Canada. Under international law, 
Canada alone makes the rules that govern its internal waters, and since it sees the 
Northwest Passage as internal Canadian waters, it finds that it has sovereign authority to 
implement any measures it chooses for the waterway. Canada has taken and continues to 
take the steps it deems necessary to create a safe and secure internal Northwest Passage.  
The United States of course does not favor unilateralism. It finds the Northwest Passage 
to be a strait used for international navigation; therefore under international law no one 
state can unilaterally impose a greater regulatory burden on the waterway than that 
implemented by the international community. In public and policy statements, the United 
States consistently proclaims international straits status for the Northwest Passage. The 
regime of transit passage, it claims, applies to the Northwest Passage, and no state can act 
unilaterally to impede access to and through an international strait in any way that is 
inconsistent with international law. 
 Table 4.3 summarizes the alternative approaches available to Canada and the 
United States for meeting their preferences for the Northwest Passage.  
Based on interviews, policy statements, and other evidence reviewed here, neither 
state prefers to submit to the others‘ position, and neither prefers to adjudicate the 
dispute. The states disagree on multilateral and unilateral approaches – the United States 
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prefers a multilateral approach to governance for the Northwest Passage, Canada prefers 
a unilateral one. 
 
Table 4.3:   Alternatives and Preferences 
 
Preferred by 
Alternative Canada United States 
Submit no no 
Adjudicate no no 
Multilateral no yes 
Unilateral yes no 
 
How is it possible then for these states to neither submit nor adjudicate, and 
simultaneously allow unilateral and multilateral action? What institutional alternative 
could be adopted that would meet all of these preferences? 
 
Doing Nothing 
By agreeing to disagree on the legal status of the Northwest Passage and non-
prejudicially implementing international laws for marine scientific research in territorial 
seas, the Arctic Cooperation Agreement – the existing institution – fulfills these 
preferences. Given the array of economic and political incentives surrounding the 
Northwest Passage that this study has reviewed; the only alternative for these states, now, 
and likely into the future, is to do nothing, to not make an institutional change from the 
Arctic Cooperation Agreement. 
Doing nothing is a course of action. It is an alternative that is always available, 
and at times, may be the one with the lowest cost  (Yandle, 2001). In this case, doing 
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nothing means to maintain the status quo, to continue to agree to disagree over the 
Northwest Passage, to continue to use the Arctic Cooperation Agreement as the rules of 
the game.  
 
Costs of Institutional Change 
Do nothing? In the face of Arctic warming; persistent, even dramatic, ice retreat; 
and the possibility of regular vessel transits through the Northwest Passage, how can 
doing nothing be suggested?  
Again, theorists of institutional change – Ostrom (1990), Mantzavinos (2001), and 
Pierson (2000), for example – help provide an answer. Although institutions reduce the 
costs of collaboration and increase joint benefits, they themselves are costly to create, 
maintain, and alter. Trust, commitment, and thoughtful design all work toward solving 
the inherent dilemmas of collective action and encourage institutional supply, but the 
costs of institutional adoption and change will only be shouldered if net gains of doing so 
are perceived.  
Ostrom (1990) refers to the ―substantial‖ level of ―transformation costs‖ that can 
be involved in changing from the status quo to a new set of rules. Transformation costs 
are the resources expended in the process of considering a rule change (p. 198).  In this 
regard, Ostrom says actors are more attentive to the immediate costs they must bear than 
they are to future benefits they might receive. Therefore, when evaluating the future 
benefits of alternative rules for resource use, Ostrom claims that predictions of the future 
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quantity, quality, variability, and value of resource units under the proposed set of rules 
and the status quo rules are needed (p. 196). She says  
It is highly unlikely that (actors) will pay immediate transformation costs 
to change their rules if the discounted net benefits of a rule change are not 
expected to be large . . . Benefits and costs have to be discovered and 
weighted by individuals using human judgment in highly uncertain and 
complex situations that are made even more complex to the extent that 
others behave strategically (p. 209-210).   
 
For Mantzavinos (2001) this uncertainty and complexity are key factors regarding 
institutional change. Although relative price changes can incentivize actors to move to 
more efficient arrangements, in Mantzavinos‘ theory, these changes do not occur so 
fluidly. Instead of actors who are constantly optimizing, Mantzavinos sees actors 
constrained by cognitive limits, who seek stability amid the uncertain and complex 
situations to which Ostrom refers. For Mantzavinos, limited cognition and actors‘ desire 
to not have to constantly ―re-decide‖ complex problems are important reasons for 
institutional existence and persistence. As such, institutions are adopted to standardize 
decisions, expectations, and behavior, thereby ―unburdening‖ actors so that they can 
devote their energies to more productive uses (p. 88).  
These ideas suggest that a kind of institutional ―lock-in‖ or ―path-dependence‖ 
(Pierson, 2000) can emerge. Pierson notes that institutional arrangements elicit 
adaptations from participants that make their change not only difficult but also 
unattractive (p. 491). Pierson says that   
social adaptation to institutions drastically increases the cost of exit from 
existing arrangements. Rather than reflecting the benefits of 
institutionalized exchange, institutional continuity may reflect the rising 




Actors may demur when faced with unfamiliar with new rules, and as Simon (1957) has 
shown through the concept of ―satisficing,‖ once a set of rules is found that meets actors‘ 
present needs well enough, there is little motivation to continue the costly search for a set 
of rules that might do better.  
The ideas of theses theorists can be seen in calculations of institutional change for 
Northwest Passage governance. In this case, the costs that accompany a change to the 
institution that guides the use of the resource, is outweighed by the benefits of 
maintaining the status quo institutional arrangement. In examining the evidence compiled 
in this study, there is apparent support for the conclusion that institutional change is 
inhibited rather than encouraged and therefore appears unlikely in the Northwest Passage 
case. This evidence is reviewed here in a manner consistent with the theoretical ideas just 
mentioned relating to the costs, benefits, uncertainty, and path dependence involved in 
institutional change.  
 
Costly Transformations 
Transformation costs, the costs of adopting other alternatives, may be too high to 
alter the status quo in governing the Northwest Passage. These costs outweigh the 
expected reduction in transactions costs – the benefit – which may accompany an 
institutional change. From the Canadian point of view, the problem in changing to the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore institutional form is that if all have an equal voice in 
determining the use of the Northwest Passage, methods of management  that present the 
lowest costs to stakeholders, rather than ones to produce the highest benefit for the 
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resource, will be agreed upon. Even then, shirking will remain a problem. This situation 
could translate into high costs for Canada in terms of future human and environmental 
security in the Northwest Passage. With the Straits model, both users and coastal states 
share burdens, however funds and in-kind contributions are only requested, not required. 
There is no guarantee that sufficient funds will be available for projects that enhance 
safety and mitigate impacts.  
While multilateral alternatives can provide benefits in terms of additional problem 
solvers, they can also impose costs when newcomers bring their own interests to the 
table. Expanding the number of interests involved runs the risk that any particular interest 
will be drowned out as all parties attempt to guarantee their own needs under any new 
arrangement that emerges. 
Excessive transformation costs are attached to the Saint Lawrence Seaway model, 
as well. Implementing a Seaway-type institution through a bilateral treaty, as Flemming 
(2008) recommends, will require the approval of sixty-seven American senators. By 
contrast, the Arctic Cooperation Agreement, which took over two years to negotiate, 
required the approval of only the two executives. The likelihood of passing the proposed 
treaty in a sharply divided Congress with a crowded legislative agenda, when Canada and 
the United States already have an agreement for use of the Northwest Passage, must be 
questioned. Furthermore, the Obama administration has proven to be largely unsuccessful 
with treaty passage (Bellinger, 2010). Though proclaiming support for the ratification of 
UNCLOS; the Obama administration has been unable to even get this treaty on to the 
floor of Congress for debate. This situation prevails despite sufficient Congressional 
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support for its ratification,
59
 and the fact that the country already abides by it as 
customary law.  
Moreover, neither state wants to bear the costs of changing to ―joint‖ authority for 
the Northwest Passage, of the type that exists in the Seaway model. Logically, joint 
authority is in place for the Seaway because the Saint Lawrence Seaway forms the border 
between the two countries. It is internal waters to both. By contrast, Canada wants to be 
the only authority for the Northwest Passage, while the United States claims that no actor 
should have authority over the Northwest Passage. The costs for Canada to ―share‖ 
authority of the Northwest Passage, either jointly or collectively, could be substantial in a 
political sense. Indeed, 74% of Canadians polled in an August 2008 survey reported that 
Canada should invest heavily on securing sovereignty over its Arctic territory (Angus 
Reid Strategies, 2008).    
 
Costly Transits 
Just as important as the costs associated with adopting these suggested 
institutional alternatives are the costs associated with the Northwest Passage itself. There 
are many. 
While the long-term forecast is for overall less ice in the Arctic, significantly 
variable ice conditions have been forecast with respect to shipping in the Canadian 
Arctic, including in the Northwest Passage (Wilson et al., 2004). These conditions 
represent hazards for shipping, possibly of a type not widely encountered in the 
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Northwest Passage to date. This situation gives pause to shippers, as reflected in the 
comments of Thomas Paterson, vice-president of Fednav, which were presented in 
Chapter 2. Though Canadian expertise in Arctic shipping is alleged to be superior (R. 
Huebert, personal communication, February 30, 2009; D. VanderZwaag, personal 
communication, April 2, 2009), these comments indicate wariness on the part of 
Canada‘s largest shipping company toward the Northwest Passage.  
Insurance costs would likely be a critical concern for Northwest Passage shipping. 
With significant variability in ice hazards, it seems likely that the costs to insure cargoes 
transiting the Northwest Passage would rise. Moreover, if because of unfavorable 
conditions, transiting ships are unable to attain optimal speeds in the Northwest 
Passage;
60
 it seems likely that increasingly larger cargoes would need to be transported to 
make transits economic. It is likely that more cargo would also translate into rising 
insurance rates for shippers.  
Additionally with respect to cargoes, it is unclear just what cargo American-
flagged commercial vessels transiting the Northwest Passage might be carrying. Oil 
shipments from either Prudhoe Bay or deposits off the shores of Alaska would be most 
likely candidates. Indeed, the voyage of the SS Manhattan in 1969 was conducted to test 
the feasibility of transporting Alaskan oil eastward through the Northwest Passage. But 
with a transcontinental pipeline in place, continued lack of clarity with respect to the 
Canadian-American boundary in the Beaufort Sea, and the current uncertainty over 
American rules for offshore oil drilling in the wake of the Gulf of Mexico spill, there 
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United States Arctic Research Commission meeting, Cambridge, MA, November 2009 
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seems to be little demand to move oil through the Northwest Passage. Indeed, as far as 
this analyst is aware, since the dramatic loss of Arctic ice in the summer of 2007, there 
has been no indication whatsoever of any American shipping enterprise with an interest 
in carrying any cargo through the Northwest Passage from one ocean to another.  
More favorable conditions for trans-Arctic shipping may be available with routes 
other than the Northwest Passage. The Northeast Passage (or Northern Sea Route) is one 
example. With better ice conditions and the infrastructure conducive for Arctic shipping 
reportedly in place (R. Hodgson, personal communication, April 2, 2009); this route will 
soon convey valuable cargoes from eastern Russia to Southeast Asia, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2. These developments suggest that the Northwest Passage could be outcompeted 
by alternative Arctic routes. 
Overall, the preference of shipping firms is certainty. To deliver promised goods 
in accordance with schedules, shippers need dependable and safe routes. In the Arctic, 
and any place else that the shipping industry operates, it is intuitive that the preference 
would be for greater rather than lesser certainty. Based on the review of the evidence 
acquired in this study, the uncertainty surrounding the Northwest Passage as a transit 
route, including the cargoes that would most likely be carried through it, appear to make 
this waterway excessively costly for regular and reliable usage. 
What does this situation mean, then? For decision makers in the United States 
there would likely be little impetus to change from the status quo bilateral institution that 
governs the Northwest Passage. Following Ostrom, it seems highly unlikely that 
American decision makers would be willing to assume the costs of transforming the rules 
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if the benefits of a rule change are not expected to be large. As a transit way between 
oceans, the future quantity, quality, variability, and value of Northwest Passage transits 
are as yet uncertain. As such, the Northwest Passage remains relatively uneconomic, a 
weak competitor in the Arctic shipping arena. No benefits of the required magnitude 
appear to be on offer to American decision makers to alter or depart from the Arctic 
Cooperation Agreement.  
 
Benefits Locked-In 
And what does this situation mean for Canadian decision makers? Do they also 
consider Northwest Passage institutional change to be excessively costly? Or are net 
benefits of changing the Arctic Cooperation Agreement perceived?  
From the Canadian perspective, it is useful to consider the benefits that have been 
―locked-in,‖ in the Mantzavinos-Pierson sense discussed above. The Northwest Passage 
is a treasured cultural resource in Canada. As such, it merits stewardship and protection. 
Today, public sentiment joined with an assertive policy of security and stewardship 
makes the Northwest Passage an abundant source of political capital for politicians in 
Canada. This is especially so for Canadian politicians that ―stand up to‖ the United 
States, seen as recalcitrant if not encroaching on the issue of Arctic sovereignty.  Political 
points are scored with an electorate stirred by the rhetoric of resource nationalism; scenes 
of Canadian defense forces conducting sovereignty exercises; and steady community 
building, infrastructure upgrades, and increased environmental protection in ―Canada‘s 
Arctic.‖ Again in the words of Dr. Heather Nicol, these benefits are ―unquantifiable‖ and 
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―outweigh all costs‖ (H. Nicol, personal communication, March 18, 2009). A policy of 
unilateral authority over this prized cultural resource, indeed over all of Canada‘s 
―North,‖ translates into a sense of security in a part of Canada‘s dominion where it has 
been questioned in the past, and it translates into votes.  
There is nothing in the Arctic Cooperation Agreement or in the American position 
on the Northwest Passage prohibits Canada from continuing to do what it is doing – 
building its presence, its monitoring capabilities, and its safety and security infrastructure 
in the Northwest Passage and the Canadian Arctic. American officials have in fact 
publicly applauded and encouraged these efforts.  
Indeed by maintaining the status quo, both states lock-in the benefits afforded 
under the Arctic Cooperation Agreement. The United States would still be able to send 
icebreakers engaging in marine scientific research through the Northwest Passage, after 
seeking Canadian consent. It would still be able to refer to the Northwest Passage as an 
international strait, reinforcing the straits passage precedent. And it could continue to 
depend on Canada to build its presence in the region, monitor activity in the waterway, 
and secure this portion of Arctic North America. Canada could continue to make its 
argument for its jurisdiction in the Northwest Passage, and would continue to receive 
nothing worse than a diplomatic protest concerning incremental regulatory expansion. 
This discussion shows that, as the current institutional arrangement, the Arctic 
Cooperation Agreement has produced wider benefits for the two states than they could 
have achieved independently. How then has it fared in terms of its express purpose – to 
enable American icebreaker transits? McDorman (2008-2009) comments that the Arctic 
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Cooperation Agreement has been invoked on multiple occasions since its inception. He 
notes that each time this institution has been called upon, it has effectively allocated 
rights to the waterway, since, as he reports; there have never been any problems with its 
implementation. Apparently, the five United States Coast Guard transits of the Northwest 
Passage that have been conducted since the agreement took effect – two of the Polar Star 
in 1988 and 1989, one of the Polar Sea in 1990, and two of the Healy in 2000 and 2003 – 
successfully requested and received Canadian consent for their voyages and shared their 
scientific findings with the coastal state per the requirements of the Arctic Cooperation 
Agreement and UNCLOS.  
The Arctic Cooperation Agreement was negotiated by experts from the 
Department of External Affairs and the Prime Minister‘s office in Canada, and the 
Department of State in the United States (Kirkey, 1995). The creation of a formal 
intergovernmental agreement to standardize Northwest Passage operations demonstrates 
these states‘ unwillingness to constantly re-decide the issue. An institution was desired 
and one was obtained, for reasons consistent with the theorizing above. As Francois 
Mathys, one of the Canadian negotiators explained, the agreement was ―. . . a great 
success because it (the Northwest Passage) is off the bilateral agenda‖ (Kirkey, 1995). To 











Is it possible to identify any configuration of incentives that could motivate 
institutional change in the Northwest Passage case? Possibly a recalculation of the costs 
and benefits of the Northwest Passage on the part of either Canada or the United States 
could lead to a change from the status quo. One form of recalculation is discussed here. 
An approach forwarded by Byers (2009) and noted in the previous chapter, it is based on 
the near term payoffs from trade that emerge when the present governance dispute is 
linked with another. Although it may be difficult to imagine a new cost/benefit ratio 
emerging that would stimulate institutional change, this prospect cannot be rejected since, 
as Manzavinos (2001) has stated, ―If one takes creative thought and action seriously, the 
possibility of predicting institutional change is reduced dramatically‖ (p. 97). 
 
Issue Linkage 
Creative thought and action is apparent in Byers‘ (2009) suggestion for resolving 
the Northwest Passage governance dispute by linking it with the problem of the 
unresolved Canadian-American boundary in the oil rich Beaufort Sea. In the Beaufort 
Sea, ―. . . surveys and exploratory wells have established that the seabed sediments there 
contain oil and gas comparable with that of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska – the largest oil field in 
North America . . .‖ (Byers, 2009, p. 98). In 2007 Imperial Oil and ExxonMobil Canada 
paid $585 million for exploratory rights in the Beaufort Sea, and in 2008 BP paid $1.2 
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billion for the same (Byers, 2009). To the northwest of the Alaska/Yukon Territory land 
border lies a 21, 436 km
2 
area of the Beaufort Sea which both Canada and the United 
States claim. Regarding this area, Gray (1997) says ―Both countries have issued permits 
for petroleum exploration . . . but because of the dispute, they have established a 
moratorium on exploration‖ (Gray, 1997, p. 63).  
Given this situation, Byers sees ―. . . the opportunity for creative trade-offs 
involving multiple disputes‖ based on ―. . . a trade, whereby one country‘s position is 
accepted in one boundary dispute, in return for the other country‘s position being 
accepted in another dispute‖ creates (Byers, 2009, p. 103-105). By linking disputed issues 
together – in this case, the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea – the possibility 
exists that a package deal, a trade, could be constructed that would resolve both of these 
issues at once. 
Here, this trade would involve either (1) Canada‘s acceptance of a boundary line 
through the Beaufort Sea that gives a larger area of it to the United States, ostensibly 
granting it a larger portion of the oil reserves contained therein, in exchange for 
American recognition of the Northwest Passage as Canadian internal waters; or, (2) the 
United States‘ acceptance of a boundary line through the Beaufort Sea that gives a larger 
area of it to Canada, ostensibly granting it a larger portion of the oil reserves contained 
therein, in exchange for Canadian recognition of the Northwest Passage as an 
international strait.  
Put simply the trade for Canada is ―oil for acquiescence,‖ and for the United 
States it is ―oil for access.‖  
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In considering the proposed trade, rational actors would likely want at least three 
pieces of information: (1) the location of new Beaufort Sea boundary lines, (2) the 
expected values of the resources contained in newly acquired areas, and (3) accurate 
valuations of a national or international Northwest Passage, for example as provided by 
this study. With this information in hand, the question for Canada becomes: would 
Canada be willing to accept more Beaufort Sea oil in exchange for relinquishing its 
internal waters claim to the Northwest Passage? And for the United States the question 
would be: would the United States be willing to accept more Beaufort Sea oil in 
exchange for an internal Canadian Northwest Passage?  
Based on the evidence reviewed in this study, it seems highly unlikely that 
Canada would be willing to trade its internal waters claim for a greater share of Beaufort 
Sea resources. Significant in this determination is the dearness of the Northwest Passage 
to Canadian culture and identity, made plain in interviews. What about the United States? 
Would it be willing to trade acquiescence to Canada‘s internal waters claim to the 
Northwest Passage for a larger share of Beaufort Sea resources, most notably oil?  
Presented with this option, American decision makers would almost certainly 
balk. But they would do so not because they discount the value of greater shares of oil 
and other resources contained in the Beaufort Sea. Of course, these endowments 
represent substantial expected value and potentially great wealth. Rather, American 
decision makers would balk at this option because Canada discounts their values.  
The American moratorium on offshore oil drilling implemented in the wake of the 
Gulf of Mexico disaster surrounds the exploitation of Arctic submarine oil reserves with 
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high levels of uncertainty. Under these conditions, evaluating the costs and benefits of the 
resources that would be received under the proposed trade could be quite difficult.  
Furthermore, locations of boundaries can impute windfall gains and losses. The 
positioning of a boundary line that is favorable to American interests in the Beaufort Sea 
could prove unfavorable to American interests once it reaches the outer continental shelf 
(see Chapter 1, note 1). American decision makers would likely want to make full 
accounting of the impacts of all boundary line positioning.  
But even more critical for American decision makers than the evaluations just 
noted would be the costs of the trade to Canada. It must be recalled that the United States 
receives more oil, gas, electricity, and uranium from Canada than from any other country 
in the world. With respect to oil, Canada is the world‘s fourth-largest exporter, with a 
2008 estimate of 2.421 million barrels/day.
61
 It is the world‘s seventh-largest oil 
producer, with a 2008 estimate of 3.22 million barrels/day, and the world‘s tenth-largest 
consumer, at 2.26 million barrels/day. What is more significant than all of this, however, 
is that when the tar sands of Alberta and Saskatchewan are taken into account, Canada 
holds the world’s second-largest proved reserves of oil, with a 2009 estimate of 178.1 
billion barrels.
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With energy reserves in such abundant supply, it may not be surprising that 
Canada would be willing to part with some amount of Beaufort Sea oil in exchange for 
American submission to its claims of sovereignty in the Northwest Passage.  
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Comparing the opportunity costs of oil for Canada with the opportunity costs of 
acquiescence for the United States reveals the great disparity in the value of these 
tradables. This trade would likely be viewed by American decision makers as heavily 
skewed in Canada‘s favor, amounting to an unheralded win for Canadian politicians, but 
a large loss for the United States. Institutional change based on the payoffs of a trade 
enabled through issue linkage seems unlikely to occur in this case. For Northwest 
Passage institutional change to be incentivized through trade, much greater parity 
between the traded values would be needed. The costs borne and benefits received by 
each must be more closely equilibrated.  
 
Resources and Institutions 
This study has examined the views of the Northwest Passage held by Canada and 
the United States, their preferences for its governance, and the prospects of changing the 
rules for its governance. A governance dispute exists between Canada and the United 
States concerning use of the Northwest Passage. After reviewing environmental and 
economic changes underway in the Arctic and the Northwest Passage in Chapter 2, expert 
interviews featured in Chapter 3 revealed the costs and benefits to each state of its 
preferred means of governance for the waterway. While these interviews do suggest some 
possible openings for Northwest Passage institutional change, they also recognize forces 
that hinder it. Most importantly these interviews reaffirm the states‘ preferences for 
Northwest Passage usage over time. These preferences are, for Canada, unilateral control 
of the waterway, and for the United States, open access under international law. Two 
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further preferences surrounding the dispute are shared by these states: refusal to submit to 
the other‘s preferred form of governance, and a disinclination for adjudicating the matter. 
These preferences have remained stable since 1988 when the Arctic Cooperation 
Agreement devised a set of joint rules for use of the waterway. This institution remains in 
place today.  
Because Arctic environmental change could make regular Northwest Passage 
transits more feasible, bilateral rule changes have been called for by many observers. 
Changes however must be viewed in relation to the existing rules. Suggested institutional 
alternatives that could be adopted for use with the Northwest Passage were reviewed in 
Chapter 4. The sharing of costs and control and the mechanisms for dispute resolution 
offered by these alternatives are attractive, and could be implemented in the Northwest 
Passage through some design. However, when applied to the present case, these 
alternatives also bring forward high coordination and political costs that must necessarily 
be assumed to transform the Arctic Cooperation Agreement to the suggested institutional 
arrangements. Moreover, high value is placed on the continuation of political benefits 
derived from the current institutional arrangement. Despite the impact of global warming 
on the Arctic, the chance of regularized Northwest Passage transits, the calls of experts, 
and the benefits offered by exemplary institutional models, the weight of the evidence 
reviewed in this study suggests that Canadian-American institutional change for 
Northwest Passage governance is unlikely. Overall, the suggested institutional models 
cannot efficiently address both states‘ governance preferences. To avoid the 
unattractively high costs of change and continue the flow of benefits locked in by the 
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Arctic Cooperation Agreement, the status quo institutional arrangement will likely be 
perpetuated.  Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below summarize the costs of benefits of the institutional 
models reviewed above and the status quo institution, the Arctic Cooperation Agreement. 
 




Parties that benefits from the resource also 
assume the costs of its maintenance 
 
 
Straits of Malacca model internationalizes the 
resource, risks management for least cost rather 
than greatest benefit, funding from users is 




Parties‘ activities are coordinated and rules are 
made jointly 
St. Lawrence Seaway model internalizes the 
resource, no bilateral authority over an 
international strait; cannot meet American 
preferences 
Conflict resolution 
Tensions arising from parties striving for 
utility gains can be reduced 
 
Efficient allocation of rights 
Gains of trade are realized when parties 
exchange rights to the resources rather than 
allocate them by fiat 
Trading discounts American value of 
Northwest Passage and Canadian value of 













Legal status of the Northwest Passage is not 
resolved, but agreement allows a way for 




The opaque language of the agreement can be 
interpreted to support either national position  
Northern Strategy and political capital 
continues 
Canada can implement its Arctic policy and 
Canadian politicians can reap the benefit of 
opposing the American position 
 
Straits precedent and special relationship 
continues 
American transits for consent continue, the 
United States can continue to refer to the 
Northwest Passage as an international strait, 
and Canada secures and maintains the North 
 
Sovereignty and resource integrity maintained  
Disputed legal status may deflect other 
countries‘ transits, Canadian sovereignty 
therefore unchallenged, environmental and 




An institutional change – a change to the rules of the game – must be measured 
against the existing rules, in this case the Arctic Cooperation Agreement. Cost-sharing, 
shared control, and mechanisms for dispute resolution offered by the institutional 
alternatives reviewed here are attractive, and could be implemented in the Northwest 
Passage through explicit institutional designs. However, these alternatives also bring 
forward high coordination and political costs that must be assumed in order to transform 
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the Arctic Cooperation Agreement, the status quo institution. The costs of transforming 
the existing institutional arrangement between the two states, and the benefits that 
arrangement has locked-in for them appear, from this analysis, to be too great to 
overcome. Rational decision-making dictates that participants will require institutions to 
continuously provide them with net positive benefits. Therefore, calculations of costs and 
benefits will necessarily be performed by all actors considering creating, participating in, 
maintaining, and/or changing an institution. When the costs of institutional change 
outweigh the benefits, it is likely that the status quo will be maintained. This study 
suggests that the Northwest Passage case conforms to this logic. 
In drawing this research to a close, it seems appropriate to ask: just what is the 
status of this resource, the Northwest Passage? This question is indeed appropriate since, 
as the evidence presented here indicates, resources, and the net positive flows of benefits 
from them to change agents, such as national governments, have much to do with the 
process of institutional change. This includes encouraging and inhibiting changes to the 
rules that govern the Northwest Passage.  
For Canada, the Northwest Passage, as a resource, has clearly become. In Canada, 
the Northwest Passage is, more than anything else, a cultural resource. All but one 
interview made this plain. And because it has become such a valuable cultural resource it 
has also become a valuable political resource. Seventy-four percent of Canadians support 
greater assertion of national sovereignty (Angus Reid Strategies, 2008); for the 
government to appear soft on sovereignty would be to ensure ―electoral annihilation‖ (I. 
Townsend-Gault, personal communication, March 20, 2009). The Harper government has 
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been assertive in addressing these public desires. Major public works are planned or 
underway in Canada‘s North, Canadian forces patrol the Arctic land and waters, a state-
of-the-art icebreaker is being constructed for the Coast Guard, the AWPPA and 
NORDREG reach further than they ever have, and so on (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2).  
But the situation is totally different in the United States, where there is essentially 
no public recognition of the ―Northwest Passage issue.‖ It poses no concern to Americans 
whatsoever. The Northwest Passage is clearly not a political resource in the United 
States. It is an arcane legal matter, a diplomatic quarrel, but not a major agenda item.  
The Northwest Passage is also not an economic resource. At least not for the 
United States, or for most any other country in the world, except for Canada (Lasserre, 
2010).
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 The findings of this study provide ample evidence in support of this claim – 
continuing hazardous conditions; no ports, refuges, or transshipment facilities; inadequate 
navigational aids and search and rescue capacity, and etc. Crucially, no American 
shipping firms with interest in transiting the Northwest Passage are apparent. Indeed, 
Lasserre (2010) has found that almost no shipping firms anywhere appear to be interested 
in transiting the Northwest Passage. In surveying 125 shipping firms in Asia, Europe, and 
North America for their Northwest Passage shipping interest, only eleven indicated a 
possible interest using Arctic routes. According to Lasserre, ―These companies are really, 











This provides further explanation as to why the Northwest Passage is not a 
political resource in the United States. If the Northwest Passage were an economic 
resource, then the shipping industry in the United States would be lobbying government 
to make rules that favor its operations in the Northwest Passage. And in exchange for 
favorable rules, government would expect something in return, for instance campaign 
contributions, or high level corporate positions when public service careers end. Indeed, 
the influence over Northwest Passage institutional change wielded by the shipping 
industry could be quite large in the United States. As of now however, it is unclear that 
this influence is forthcoming.  
The American congress has no committee hearings on the Northwest Passage on 
its agenda. UNCLOS ratification is not even on its agenda. The United States Coast 
Guard, with responsibility for protecting American interests along its Arctic shores, has 
suffered withering budget cuts. Its last available ice breaker is its lightest, the Healy, as 
the Polar Sea and Polar Star have been taken out of service for 2010.    
Do Canada and the United States want the Northwest Passage to be a resource, 
one that facilitates regular commercial transits contributing to global trade?  The legal 
uncertainty caused by their governance dispute likely deflects potential transiting ships. 
Would shippers transporting large highly insured cargoes through hazardous conditions 
risk additional costs stemming from legal and political uncertainty? And when there are 
other alternative Arctic routes that could prove safer and more efficient.  
Both states may actually be well served well by maintaining the status quo. It 
helps to ensure that regular Northwest Passage transits will be unlikely. In this way 
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Canada need not worry over actual challenges to its claimed sovereignty while the United 
States maintains its ―special relationship‖ with Canada for access to the Northwest 
Passage. 
Effectively, these states keep the potential resource of the Northwest Passage in 
the world of neutral stuff. In this way, the Northwest Passage case confirms 
Zimmerman‘s theory. It is mankind, through his institutional arrangements that can allow 
resources to become or unbecome. Political, social, and economic forces, all three, 
impact the status of resources. These can encourage neutral stuff to become positive 
resources, or they can relegate existing resources to a neutral status.  
So if these states want the Northwest Passage to become a resource, and 
potentially deliver them wider benefits, they can make rules that will cause this to come 
about. They could together provide for safe, secure, efficient transits by rearranging the 
Arctic Cooperation Agreement in an innovative way. But again to do so requires their 
recognition of net resource benefits; there is a feedback relationship between resource 
change and institutional change. 
Can this theory apply to other Arctic resources that may be in process of 
becoming? It already has. Russia and Norway jointly agreed new rules for the 
exploitation of Barents Sea oil in March 2010. This move ended a decades-long dispute 
over which state had jurisdiction over this resource. Canada and the United States have 
indeed begun to move forward in resolving their divergent claims to oil reserves in the 
Beaufort Sea. In these cases the existence of a positive economic resource was brought to 
the attention of these governments, who then instigated institutional change. The story of 
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the creation of the Law of Sea provides further evidence. The governments of the world 
recognized the bounty of the oceans and created joint rules for its capture. The costly 
differences that may have existed between those governments were far outweighed by the 
expected values of ocean resources. 
 
Other Actors 
On the subject of multiple actors, it would be short-sighted to close this study 
without turning at least some brief attention to parties besides Canada and the United 
States that have important interests in the Northwest Passage.  Russia, just mentioned, is 
one; the indigenous residents of the Arctic comprise another.  
Russia has its own internal waters/international strait dispute with the United 
States. Like Canada, Russia sees the Northeast Passage (or Northern Sea Route) that hugs 
its Arctic coastline as internal waters. The United States however finds the Northeast 
Passage to be an international strait, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Under 
these circumstances, what effect might Russia have on Northwest Passage institutional 
outcomes?  
On one hand, it would seem that Russia would be an important supporter of 
Canada‘s internal waters position for the Northwest Passage, since it would benefit from 
a wider precedent for internal waters. On the other hand however, Russia now finds itself 
in a powerful position with respect to Arctic shipping. The Northeast Passage, which is 
4000 kilometers shorter than the conventional route through the Suez Canal, has seen 
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recent voyages from the ports of Western Europe and Russia to Siberia and East Asia.
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Joining Russian vessels, Norway now plans to ship iron ore to China via the waterway.
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If Russia wanted to protect this burgeoning monopoly on Arctic commercial transits, it 
could go silent on the Northwest Passage issue. By not lending support to the Canadian 
internal waters position, Russia could squelch its main competitor in the Arctic shipping 
arena.  
What of the preferences of indigenous peoples of the Arctic, including the Inuit, 
Saami, and other groups, with respect to the Northwest Passage? These groups have, 
possibly the largest stake in the Arctic‘s future. Do these groups wish to see shipping take 
hold through Arctic Canada, with potential economic development opportunities to 
follow? Or would they prefer that shipping not emerge, thus preserving the unique 
environment that sustains their way of life? Truly, the more discerning question might be: 
to the degree that some amount of ship traffic may occur in the future Northwest Passage, 
what is the role of indigenous people in the decision-making that surrounds it? Is there a 
role? Or are these decisions the province of national governments, as a representative of 
their citizens, solely?   
At this point, it is clear that indigenous groups want to be at the table when 
Northwest Passage decisions are being made. And they are – by way of their permanent 
participant status in the Arctic Council.  
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Furthermore, a trend toward greater self-determination for indigenous Canadians 
– through devolution, lands claims agreements, and other efforts – has been underway for 
some time in Canada. The Northern Strategy specifically mentions ―improving and 
devolving governance,‖ and takes special note of the well-being of indigenous Arctic 
communities.
68
 These are positive indications for inclusiveness in addressing Arctic 
resource management.  
Whatever the preference of indigenous groups on this issue, it should be taken 
into account by decision makers in the south. But might Ottawa move cautiously here? 
Although Canada, like the United States, observes the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, neither country has joined the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Representing a new bond between indigenous groups and 
nation-states around the globe, UNDRIP recognizes indigenous cultural rights and 
identity, as well as rights to language, health, education, and employment.
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 By not 
acceding to UNDRIP, do the governments of Canada and the United States demonstrate 
some reservation in perhaps ―giving away too much‖ to native peoples? Does their 
hesitation provide an altogether different signal in terms of the inclusion of indigenous 
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Besides other parties that may influence Northwest Passage outcomes, there are 
also other institutional models, beyond those already reviewed, that could be influential 
in Northwest Passage management. These models include ones that manage the resource 
to promote ecosystem values, to ensure adaptiveness in the face of uncertainty, and to 
encourage agreement through contingent contracts.  
 
Ecosystem-based Management 
Ecosystem-based management is a framework for natural resource management 
that is being employed with greater frequency, including in marine environments. 
Ecosystem-based management takes a comprehensive approach to management by 
addressing conservation, economic activity, user conflicts, and sustainability together 
(Council on Environmental Quality, 2010). Both the Canada Oceans Act of 1997 and the 
United States‘ National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, Coasts, and Great Lakes 
(National Oceans Policy) of 2010 utilize ecosystem-based management, and an integrated 
approach to management is explicit in each. The Oceans Act seeks to integrate marine 
conservation and economic development activities using principles of sustainability and 
precaution.
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 The National Ocean Policy claims to integrate coastal and marine 
management using so-called ―spatial planning‖ techniques.
71
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At the international level, ecosystem-based management has recently been 
adopted into the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) Regional Seas 
initiative. Across thirteen seas, 140 countries have adopted the regional approach to 
controlling pollution. Under this initiative, neighboring countries that share marine 
resources implement comprehensive and coordinated management actions through a 
regional convention and associated protocols. Among the objectives of the Regional Seas 
program, UNEP specifically calls for the ecosystem approach to integrated marine and 
coastal management. Two other objectives of the program particularly suit the Arctic 
Ocean: accounting for climate change impacts, and economic valuations of marine 
resources (United Nations Environment Program, 1982).
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The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), adopted by eight Arctic 
countries in 1991 (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the United 
States, and the USSR), is an outgrowth of a regional seas-type approach. The strategy 
concerns conservation, protection, monitoring, assessment, and emergency preparedness 
in the Arctic zone (Arctic Council, 1991). Environmental protection, pollution 
prevention, and accounting for the needs of traditional Arctic residents are more specific 
goals. The creation of the Arctic Council followed closely on the heels of the AEPS. The 
Arctic Council maintains the AEPS as its working strategy and in 2009 undertook the 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), which studied the effects of future 
shipping on the environment and native inhabitants of the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2009).  





The AEPS is nonbinding on its participants, however, and there is no formal 
convention and protocol system as found in the UNEP Regional Seas program. This 
situation notwithstanding, it appears that the Arctic Ocean could be a prime candidate for 
future inclusion in the Regional Seas program.    
 
Contingent Agreements 
When multiple parties are negotiating in the face of an uncertain future, as in the 
case of the Arctic and the Northwest Passage, contingent agreements (Susskind, 1994) 
can be useful. As Susskind explains,  
Contingent agreements sidestep the need for consensus on what the future 
holds or which policy responses are likely to be most effective. Instead of 
settling for a broad framework convention without targets or deadlines, the 
parties to a . . . negotiation could spell out – at the time a framework is 
debated – contingent actions that would come into force if certain events 
occurred or thresholds were passed . . . Not all of these would take effect. 
As measurements came in, it would be clear which protocols would apply. 
This would not eliminate the need for continued treaty monitoring and 
tightening (in fact, it would make monitoring even more important), but it 
would produce more effective agreement even when there was substantial 
. . . uncertainty . . . the lowest common denominator approach . . . could be 
avoided (1994, p. 80-81).  
 
Although the exact trajectory of environmental change in the Arctic Ocean is not certain, 
there is good scientific information regarding general trends – increasing warmth and less 
ice, for example. Such an approach requires a comprehensive view to try to determine all 
contingencies. Scientific information and continuous monitoring would be the key to a 
contingency agreement. With respect to the Northwest Passage, contingency negotiation 
might include future planning for military or commercial voyages should the need, and 
favorable environmental conditions, arise. Negotiating contingent details may be more 
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easily done now than in the future. In considering and negotiating for various 
contingencies, advance planning and preparation must be undertaken so that dynamic and 
uncertain environmental conditions can be better accounted for.   
 Are various contingencies not already in the back of negotiators‘ minds, driving 
their own propositions and their willingness to accept others? Certainly. And thus we 
have explained agreements with an incremental, short-term focus in the presence of 
uncertain and changing conditions. Canada and the United States however need not 
follow this course. They can negotiate with one another in the manner referred to as 
―Full, Open, Truthful, Exchange‖ or FOTE (Raiffa et al., 2002, p. 83). FOTE employs 
reciprocal and pre-play communication between the parties, collaborative decision 
making, and the revelation of true preferences. Its goal is the maximization of joint gains. 
Players using this method are not contestants in a zero-sum game.  FOTE is what Canada 
and the United States do when they negotiate.  
 
Adaptive Management 
Understanding future contingencies encountered in the changing Arctic Ocean 
might involve more than just modeling. It may involve experimentation, i.e. ―learning by 
doing.‖ This approach to resource management, known more formally as adaptive 
management, was popularized by the well-known Canadian ecologist C.S. Holling. 
Adaptive management goes beyond modeling to actual, often large-scale experimentation 
so that real-world responses of natural resource systems subjected to human intervention 
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can be detected and can inform managerial decisions (Walters, 1997). In the words of 
Walters,  
. . . adaptive management should begin with a concerted effort to integrate 
existing interdisciplinary experience and scientific information into 
dynamic models that attempt to make predictions about the impacts of 
alternative policies. This modeling step is intended to serve three 
functions: (1) problem clarification and enhanced communication among 
scientists, managers, and other stakeholders; (2) policy screening to 
eliminate options that are most likely incapable of doing much good, 
because of inadequate scale or type of impact; and (3) identification of key 
knowledge gaps that make model predictions suspect. Most often, the 
knowledge gaps involve biophysical processes and relationships that have 
defied traditional methods of scientific investigation for various reasons, 
and most often it becomes apparent, in the modeling process, that the 
quickest, most effective way to fill the gaps would be through focused, 
large-scale management experiments that directly reveal process impacts 
at the space-time scales where future management will actually occur 
(1997, p. 1). 
 
Awareness of the irreversibility of some human interventions in natural systems is 
necessary. Large-scale, real-world experiments involving human interventions in the 
Arctic Ocean and the Northwest Passage could involve high costs and high risks. When 
costs and risks are high, burden sharing is needed. Government, industry, and academia 
can collaborate in these instances to design useful experiments, hedge against risks, and 
share costs. The alternative may be a ―natural experiment‖ in the Arctic Ocean, rather 
than a controlled one to demonstrate system responses and contingencies to decision 
makers. By way of recent example, had the United States carried out effective oil spill 
research – possibly through controlled experimentation – as it tasked itself after the 
Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, the recent natural experiment of oil spill response in the Gulf 
of Mexico may have been averted.   
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A ―Dynamic Quo‖? 
The dynamic and changing Arctic environment, just mentioned, cannot be 
ignored. This study has suggested that, for now at least, the benefits of the Northwest 
Passage for Canada and the United States are most efficiently captured by the status quo 
institutional arrangement. However, the other management models just reviewed have 
begun to suggest the need for a different framework. Possibly, the needed institutional 
framework for resource management is one that would be more adaptive to the unique 
Arctic situation than a static costs and benefits model.  
Scientists who study Arctic climate are finding that, over the long term, dynamic 
physical and environmental change can be expected in the region. Their work has been 
noted in the earlier chapters of this study. As such, it could be a grave mistake to view the 
Northwest Passage situation in static terms, continuing to apply a status quo institutional 
model in the face of long-term change and future uncertainty. Doing so could induce 
unnecessary risks and foreclose future opportunities.  
The Northwest Passage situation might be likened to that of peak oil. The general 
trend is known – relatively less oil is available going forward. However, the precise 
trajectory of diminishing oil is not well known, it may shift from point to point within an 
overall trend. In the Arctic, a general warming trend prevails. It appears that, overall, the 
regional ice cover will continue to decline. But variation within this trend – the precise 
trajectory of ice decline – remains unclear. As the exact course of Arctic ice decline plays 
out into the future, utilities that are wholly different than those that dominate today may 
be brought forward. Twenty or thirty years from now, politics and precedents may no 
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longer be the primary concerns of Canada and the United States in the Northwest 
Passage. 
By focusing only on the costs of institutional change, the benefits of such change 
can be obscured, and in this way institutional innovation can be hampered. Institutional 
innovation may be what is needed now in this case – dynamic and changing physical 
conditions in the Arctic, with incumbent long-term uncertainty. A new institution for 
Northwest Passage management could be designed that accounts for both human and 
environmental values, that adapts its practices with new information, and that is flexible 
in dealing with contingent situations as they arise. Indeed, in a hot, flat, and crowded 
world, change and uncertainty is the true status quo. It is a ―dynamic quo‖ where both 
risks and opportunities will emerge. 
Environmental problems often find groups, individuals, and nation-states in 
conflicting positions. They often involve conflicts over economics, equity, ethics, and 
ideology. We might expect that in an increasingly interconnected world of competing 
claims to resources, disputes over the subjective or objective nature of values – like in the 
case of the Northwest Passage – may become more prevalent.  
So ―the Lexus and the olive tree‖ (Friedman, 2000) may feature prominently in 
the hot, flat, and crowded future. In competitions such as these, where identity is pitted 
against ideology, who will bid higher? Who will fight harder? Fortunately, for Canada 
and the United States, these questions can remain unanswered. As they manage their 
Arctic differences, Canada and the United States can draw on a rich history of 
institutional innovation for dispute resolution, and be forward-looking in designing 
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arrangements to deliver mutual benefits for an ever-improving relationship. Situations of 
Hobbesian disorder can be brought to resolution through the use of intelligently crafted 
institutions. In these situations, policy analysis can help that process by examining how 
organization occurs in the face of value disagreement and uncertain outcomes. From that 
point, policy analysis can then indicate a way forward. It can suggest not only what may 









































Transits of the Northwest Passage 1906-2004 
 
Year Vessel Registry 
1906 Gjoa Norway 
1942 St. Roch Canada 
1944 St. Roch Canada 
1954 HMCS Labrador Canada 
1957 USCGC Storis United States 
1957 USCGC Bramble United States 
1957 USCGC Spar United States 
1967 CCGS John A. McDonald Canada 
1969 USCGC Staten Insland United States 
1970 CSS Baffin Island Canada 
1970 CSS Hudson Canada 
1975 Pandora II Canada 
1975 Theta Canada 
1975 CSS Skidgate Canada 
1976 CCGC J.E. Bernier Canada 
1977 Williwaw Netherlands 
1978 CCGC Pierre Radisson Canada 
1979 Canmar Kigoriak Canada 
1979 CCGS Louis St. Laurent Canada 
1979 J.E. Bernier II Canada 
1980 CCGS J. E. Bernier Canada 
1980 Pandora II Canada 
1981 CSS Hudson Canada 
1982 Mermaid Japan 
1983 Arctic Shiko Canada 
1983 Polar Circle Canada 
1984 Lindblad Explorer Sweden 
1985 World Discoverer Singapore 
1985 USCGC Polar Sea United States 
1985 Vagabond II France 
1988 Society Explorer Bahamas 
1988 CCGS Henry A. Larsen Canada 
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Year Vessel Registry 
1988 CCGS Martha L. Black Canada 
1988 USCGC Polar Star United States 
1988 Canmar Explorer II Canada 
1988 Belvedere United States 
1988 Vagabond II France 
1989 USCGC Polar Star United States 
1989 Mabel E. Holland Britain 
1989 Northanger Britain 
1990 Terry Fox Canada 
1990 USCGC Polar Sea United States 
1990 Ikaluk Canada 
1991 Canmar Tugger Canada 
1992 Frontier Spirit Bahamas 
1992 Ikaluk Canada 
1992 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
1993 Frontier Spirit Bahamas 
1993 Dagmar Aaen Germany 
1993 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
1994 Hanseatic Bahamas 
1994 Itasca Britain 
1994 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
1994 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
1995 CCGS Arctic Ivik Canada 
1995 CCGS Arctic Ivik Canada 
1995 Canmar Ikaluk Canada 
1995 Dove III Canada 
1995 Canmar Miscaroo Canada 
1995 Hrvatska Cigra Croatia 
1995 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
1996 Hanseatic Bahamas 
1996 CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier Canada 
1996 Canmar Supplier Canada 
1996 Arctic Circle Canada 
1996 Kapitan Dranitsyn Russia 
1997 Hanseatic Bahamas 
1997 Supplier Bahamas 
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Year Vessel Registry 
1997 Alex Gordon Canada 
1997 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
1998 Hanseatic Bahamas 
1998 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
1999 Admiral Makarov Russia 
1999 Irbis Russia 
1999 Kapitan Dranitsyn Russia 
2000 Hanseatic Bahamas 
2000 Nadon (St. Roch II) Canada 
2000 Simon Fraser Canada 
2000 Evohe New Zealand 
2000 Kapitan Dranitsyn Russia 
2000 USCGC Healy United States 
2001 Turmoil Cayman Islands 
2001 Northabout Ireland 
2001 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
2001 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
2002 Hanseatic Bahamas 
2002 Arctic Kalvik Barbados 
2002 Sedna IV Canada 
2002 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
2002 Apostol Andrey Russia 
2002 Le Nauge France 
2003 Bremen Bahamas 
2003 Norwegian Blue Britain 
2003 Vagabond II France 
2003 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
2003 USCGC Healy United States 
2004 Kapitan Khlebnikov Russia 
2004 Polar Bound Britain 























































UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Agreement on arctic cooperation. Signed at Ottawa on 
11 January 1988 
Authentic texts: English and French. 





Accord sur la coopération dans l'arctique. Signé à Ottawa le 
11 janvier 1988 
Textes authentiques : anglais et français. 
Enregistré par le Canada le 27 janvier 1995. 
 
AGREEMENT1 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
ON ARCTIC COOPERATION 
 
1. The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of 
America recognize the particular interests and responsibilities of their two countries 
as neighbouring states in the Arctic. 
2. The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States also 
recognize that it is desirable to cooperate in order to advance their shared interests 
in Arctic development and security. They affirm that navigation and resource 
development 
in the Arctic must not adversely affect the unique environment of the region 
and the well-being of its inhabitants. 
3. In recognition of the close and friendly relations between their two countries, 
the uniqueness of ice-covered maritime areas, the opportunity to increase their 
knowledge of the marine environment of the Arctic through research conducted during 
icebreaker voyages, and their shared interest in safe, effective icebreaker navigation 
off their Arctic coasts: 
— The Government of the United States and the Government of Canada 
undertake to facilitate navigation by their icebreakers in their respective Arctic 
waters and to develop cooperative procedures for this purpose; 
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— The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States agree 
to take advantage of their icebreaker navigation to develop and share research 
information, in accordance with generally accepted principles of international 
law, in order to advance their understanding of the marine environment of 
the area; 
— The Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. 
icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken 
with the consent of the Government of Canada. 
4. Nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic neighbours 
and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the 
Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or 
other maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties. 
5. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. It may be terminated 
at any time by three months' written notice given by one Government to the other. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, 
have signed this Agreement. 
DONE in duplicate, at Ottawa, this 11th day of January, 1988, in the English 
and French languages, each version being equally authentic. 
EN FOI DE QUOI, les soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé 
le présent Accord. 
FAIT en double exemplaire, à Ottawa, ce llièm^ jour de janvier 1988, en 
français et en anglais, chaque version faisant également foi. 
JOE CLARK 
For the Government of Canada 
Pour le Gouvernement du Canada 
GEORGE P. SCHULTZ 
For the Government of the United States of America 
Pour le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique 

















Interview Data: Canadian Experts 
 
What are the costs and benefits of the internal waters policy, and the international straits 
policy, for both Canada and the United States? 
 
Dr. Rob Huebert, University of Calgary 
 
United States‘ benefit of international strait: 
 
1. Maintain the precedent for international navigation, so that another country, esp. a 
hostile, won‘t be enabled to push for a special circumstance 
2. To counterbalance Russian arctic activity generally 
 
United States‘ cost of international strait: 
 
1. Impacts Canadian relations, carries over into politics, and possibly military 
collaboration (e.g. undersea navigation in Arctic) 
2. Security cost, because overflight is included in international straits, Russia or 
anyone can send bombers over, North American security is threatened, an 
invitation to kick open a vulnerable ―back door‖ 
 
Canada‘s benefit of internal waters: 
 
1. Serves Canadian nationalism and maintains emotional attachment to the 
Northwest Passage and Arctic Canada 
2. To take full advantage of Canadian expertise in a unique environment – ice, 
weather, darkness, GPS dysfunctional, technically complex, technology has not 
kept pace with Arctic navigation, all but 3 transits out of 110 have asked for 
Canadian assent to navigate Northwest Passage because they know they need 
Canadian assistance, ice conditions diminishing but still seasonally variable, first 
year ice losing, and multi-year ice losing too, but free floating multi-year ice can 
damage ships, a risky environment where Canadians have the expertise and 
experience 
 
Canada‘s costs of internal waters: 
 
1. Invest in the resources necessary to enable Northwest Passage traffic – escort, 




―How can Canada fully anticipate the actual mix of resources, demand, geopolitics, and 
weather that will be in understanding what is probably going to be happening and what 
do we need to do to respond? How do we know what‘s right when even the best scientists 
aren‘t in agreement?‖ 
 
A ―Rubik‘s Cube‖ of 1) commitment of Canadian resources, 2) global demand for Arctic 


































Dr. Heather Nicol, Trent University 
 
Canada‘s benefit of internal waters: 
 
1. Serves Canadian nationalism and maintains emotional attachment to the 
Northwest Passage and Arctic Canada, this is unquantifiable, more a media, 
political, and public perspective, less of an academic perspective, this benefit 
outweighs costs, the central position of the Northwest Passage re: Canadian 
nationalism is what is pitched to the citizenry, an urgent issue 
 
Canada‘s benefit of international strait: 
 
1. Canada may not have to assume as many costs to control and defend the 
Northwest Passage  
 
Sorting things out will use scientifically grounded methods and legal benchmarks, there 
is a difference though in the policy approach and the legal approach, rule of law becomes 
























Mr. John Falkingham, Canadian Ice Service  
 
Canada‘s costs of internal waters: 
 
1. Canada provides satellite imagery, ice information, ice pilots, and other aids to 
navigation, with no cost recovery mechanism 
2. Canada would encumber the clean up costs if a fuel spill or similar environmental 
damage occurred in the Northwest Passage  
3. Canada would respond to a human emergency, for instance if a cruise ship 
became disabled in the Northwest Passage 
 
Canada‘s benefit of internal waters: 
 
1. Human and environmental security in the Northwest Passage better served 
through Canada‘s ―reasonable laws‖ 
2. Canada ―wants to be there‖ to provide services and to protect its national interests 
 
Is Canada investing enough to secure and control and Northwest Passage and the wider 
Canadian Arctic?  
 
Canada‘s posture is ―let us make reasonable laws and we‘ll let people go through the 
Northwest Passage.‖  
 
Shipping natural gas could be a viable possibility in 20 to 30 years, with improving 
technology. Shipping may become more attractive than land transport of gas because 
Arctic lands are changing in a way dominated by greater uncertainty and higher risks. 
However, the engineering of open water shipping is known; the future favors shipping as 
the mode of transport for gas. 
 
Because no there is no legal regime and because of international opposition, Canada can‘t 











Mr. David Jackson, Canadian Coast Guard 
 
United States‘ benefit of international strait: 
 
1. Like all sea powers, the United States wants free seas for its navy  
 
Canada‘s costs of internal waters: 
 
1. Generally, fulfilling Canadian Coast Guard mandate for nautical services per 
Canadian government policy 
2. Monitoring, response, and enforcement in the Northwest Passage 
3. Extending programs to effectively extend shipping season in Northwest Passage 
and wider Arctic, as ships start sooner and stay later 
4. Deal with more cargoes going north as communities grow there 
5. Increasing aids to navigation and bandwidth to download ice charts and other ice 
information 
6. Waterway development and dredging activities in concert with private industry 
7. $720 million for new icebreaker, and ―rebuilding Canadian industry to do it‖ 
 
Canada‘s benefit of internal waters: 
 
1. Generally, fulfilling Canadian Coast Guard mandate for nautical services per 
Canadian government policy 
2. ―Rebuilding Canadian industry‖ to provide new icebreaker 
 
Whether internal or international Northwest Passage, the Canadian Coast Guard still has 
to do its thing. 
 
New icebreaker ―confirms the Northwest Passage‖ is Canadian 
 
Canadian Coast Guard nightmare is a cruise ship with 3000 passengers rolls over in ice 
covered waters. How to get them off the boat or out of the water and where to put them? 
Currently incapable of handling just 500 – 1000 people in this situation.  
 
Re: energy sources . . . a situation of rising world need, less ice, and available resources. 
If the world needs it, they‘ll come get it, ice or not. 
 





Prof. Ian Townsend-Gault, University of British Columbia 
 
Costs of internal waters versus international straits dispute: 
 
1. Distracts from real issues: resource management and the development of a 
dedicated regime for a unique area and situation 
2. Confused interpretations of international law, undervalues ability of law to be 
used to knit together equity, economic, and political strands into a treaty or 
contract 
 
Benefits of internal waters versus international straits dispute: 
 
1. Political and/or economic expediency that serves more narrow interests 
 
Collectively, North America can do better than a ―straight baselines v. international 
straits‖ argument. We should be able to move forward in a principled way. 
 
























Dr. Dick Hodgson, Dalhousie University 
 
In the way that climate change is happening now, the consequences (―costs‖) of shipping 
in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are 
 
1. The North Polar would be available sooner than the Northwest Passage/Canadian 
Arctic Archipelagic routes 
2. Hazards may be even greater than before if multi-year ice is mobile 
3. In Northwest Passage it is destination based shipping versus transit 
shipping…destinations are where traffic is going, not ocean to ocean, these 
destinations are ones of resource development, community resupply, and tourist 
attractions via cruise ships…for transits it is critical that the ship is the proper ice 
class, has appropriate power and heating, and the right navigator – in open water 
and in warm weather these types of ships are a loser, so when getting to and away 
from the Northwest Passage these ships are uneconomical 
 
Therefore, transit traffic won‘t happen until it can operate year round.  
 
There has been no explosion of activity in the Northwest Passage to this point, as has 
been predicted. 
 
However, even though Northwest Passage shipping remains imminent at this time, it does 
not mean that the situation should not be addressed. 
 
Key issues/challenges regarding shipping in the Northwest Passage/Canadian Arctic 
 
1. The current economy is dampening resource development in Arctic Canada 
generally. There is expectation surrounding hydrocarbons in the High Arctic, but 
no development initiatives right now. Resource development is project oriented, 
requiring an environmental assessment project, which includes shipping. 
2. Community resupply in the North, few people in a large area 
3. Cabotage rules constrain foreign built vessels and constrain efficiency 
improvements. Would Canada not want high grade cargo to travel in Canadian 
flagged ships? Want to encourage domestic shipping. 
4. Arctic cruises offer less reward than Antarctic visits. Moreover, people live in the 
Arctic…Inuit are not sure where they stand on the Arctic cruise industry. Cruise 
ships don‘t operate under Canadian flag because of costs, making for a longer trip 
from Greenland or the US to the Arctic. The cruise market is a ―qualified 
success.‖ There are hazards to Arctic cruise passengers, often these are older 
persons…search and rescue related to cruise shipping is important. It is difficult 
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to support large expenditure for rare rescue operations of relatively few people. 
―Ships of opportunity‖ are needed to help in this effort. 
5. Ballast water for managing cargo loads poses a serious environmental threat to 
Arctic waters. It can do irrevocable harm and Environmental Impact Statements 
are needed to address its exchange and treatment. 
6. Monitoring and enforcement of shipping activities poses difficulties. Where are 
ports, refuges, and terminals? What will ―ice-capable patrol vessels‖ do? Ice 
breakers would be better (US icebreaking is also foundering). Canadian 
legislation is pending to push the AWPPA out further…the law can be used to 
refuse entry only when calling at a port, not available for transit traffic which only 
passes through and doesn‘t stop.  
7. What about cost recovery for ice-related services? At present this is free 
assistance. What about competition between routes? 
8. Who are the ice navigators to be provided? Where do they come from? How will 
they be provided and can the supply be ensured? 
9. The International Maritime Organization‘s Polar Code and the International 
Association of Classification Societies are working on Arctic ship standards. 
These standards need to be translated into domestic legislation. 
 
A governance and policy framework that allows for the above should be the imperative. 
 
The possibility exists for ―regulatory collaboration.‖ 
 
What commercial benefits are there for Canada for a ship to go through the Northwest 
Passage? The debate should focus on ―bang for the buck‖ in the Northwest Passage, not 


















Dr. David VanderZwaag, Dalhousie University 
 
Benefits of shipping through the Northwest Passage (if open) 
 
1. Saving on distance, time, and fuel 
2. A benefit to regional and global trade 
 
Potential costs to Canada of shipping through the Northwest Passage 
 
1. A risky environment, even if ―open‖, for hazardous cargoes 
2. Canada would bear the costs of a spill (for example) 
3. Canada would bear the costs of contingency planning for a spill or other 
environmental damage, if the country ―goes it alone‖ 
4. Indigenous losses from Arctic pollution, very real, hard to measure 
5. Search and rescue is a Canadian endeavor (at present, but there could be a move 
to a regional or bilateral S/R regime) 
 
Benefit of internal waters 
 
1. Keeping control of Northwest Passage ―in house‖ is best both for Canada and for 
the international community, because of expertise and know how issues (see 
Huebert) 
 
Benefit of international strait 
 
1. For US Navy operations (not for commercial operations) 
2. Reduced costs for Canada  
 
Canada may want a cooperative, sharing approach when faced with the costs of ―going it 
alone‖, so the potential benefit of cooperating is one of cost reduction. 
 
Domestic industries are impacted when Canada ―goes it alone.‖ 
 
The Malacca Strait model was noted as a cooperative solution, applicable in the 










Interview Data: American Experts 
 
What are the costs and benefits of the internal waters policy, and the international straits 
policy, for both Canada and the United States? 
 
Mr. Mead Treadwell, United States Arctic Research Commission 
 
US Benefit of International Strait 
 
1. No permission required 
 
2. In terms of NE Passage (NSR) for example, don‘t want to cede to the political 
control of country that could shut down access – Commission views shipping in 
terms of the whole basin not just NWP 
 
US Cost of Internal Waters 
 
1. Restricts access, especially for scientific research, need unfettered access like in 
Antarctica  
 
2. Precedent setting – US will go to bat for straits passage anywhere in the world 
 
The US views all of Arctic shipping, not just the NWP - the Arctic Ocean as a ―shipping 
area‖. A unified effort is needed therefore for shipping in Arctic. AMSA studied this. 
Want to avoid cheaters so that traffic doesn‘t proceed through waters of a coastal state 
that is less concerned about environmental integrity 
 
At least 3 routes (potentially 4) – NWP, NSR, Bering Strait…Polar route. Master can 
select various routes or change en route per conditions. Further, the US sees the three 
current routes all as straits. 
 
USARC wants nation to do its homework on Arctic issues. Be prepared. The US and 
Canada need to know what they need to know about the Arctic. AMSA related to this 
homework. USARC drafted AMSA implementation act attached to USCG authorization 
bill. Enables funds for joint investment, negotiate with Canada, Russia, Arctic, and 





St. Lawrence Seaway as a model. Cross US-Can border 23 times if coming into Chicago, 
but only 1 phone number, 1 standards book, 1 toll location, 1 inspection point. Need to 
get to this for Arctic shipping. 
 
Cooperative work with Canada ongoing – search and rescue, icebreaker design, together 
going to IMO for changes to Polar Code to mandatory international guidelines on Arctic 
shipping, article 234 had US backing cognizant of NWP issue so any argument for 
conditional NWP transit short of ―no‖ has already been dealt with 
 
US will go to bat for straits passage anywhere in the world. It is only 1 of 100 countries 
with the same view, so not a unilateral position 
 
Military implications of moving assets back and forth is majorly important, a quietly 
played trump card for both sides 
 
Plenty of ways to get around this problem…respect Canada‘s position even if 
disagree…US sees great opportunities in the Arctic to work together on economic and 
environmental fronts 
 
The Arctic is important to the US. Ottawa and DC ignore the importance of the issues to 
residents of the region. We collectively lose when we don‘t agree on Arctic shipping 
issues or on broader Arctic problems.  A brand new ocean - maybe up to a quarter of the 

















The Honorable David Wilkins, former American Ambassador to Canada 
 
 
US Cost of Internal Waters 
 
1. Weakens the US‘s position worldwide regarding the ability to navigate straits 
 
2. Canada could block entry to NWP 
 
NWP can be managed as an international strait 
 
Canada can and should increase its presence in the North and has, the US applauds and 
encourages these efforts, decisive Canadian presence is necessary and warranted 
 
To the US, sovereignty is not the issue; it is instead a question of whether a state can 
close down an international strait. The sovereignty position is a popular one in Canadian 
politics. 
 
Ambassador Celluci‘s position, that Canadian control of the NWP would take the burden 
off the US, is not that simple…there are other countries involved…the issue is really 
between Canada and the rest of the world 
 
Relationships matter. The Reagan-Mulroney relationship helped the ACA. This issue will 
be resolved because of mutual trust, a history of trust, and the relationship between 
Canada and the US. Relationships are the ―deal closer.‖ When ice conditions are such 
that a critical mass is reached, Canada and the US will ―figure it out.‖ 
 
It is to our interest to resolve differences. 
 
The US‘s position is unlikely to change. How to go forward? Quietly restate our position 










Dr. Christopher Kirkey, State University of New York – Plattsburgh 
 
  
Canada‘s Benefit of Internal Waters 
 
1. Continued assertion of political sovereignty, not just over waters but also land, 
this is ―mythical‖ in nature for Canada 
 
2. Not much commercial activity (presumably this means the internal waters 
argument can still be safely made) 
 
3. AWPPA and ACA were created to apply to Canada‘s Arctic ―backyard‖, 
Canada‘s efforts in those past positions do not dilute its legal position re: the 
NWP but instead help it and forward Canada as a ―steward‖; if the legal position 
re: the NWP were to be diluted by these acts, then the  internal waters approach 
would become a cost to Canada 
 
4. The context is the Valdez spill in Alaska and, starting in the late 1960s, exploring 
options for getting Prudhoe oil to market, which included the possibility of 
sending tankers through the NWP. So beyond sovereignty, just regulating oil 
tanker traffic in the NWP is, under today‘s conditions (of a changing climate and 
diminishing ice) a genuine concern for Canada 
 
Canada‘s Cost of Internal Waters 
 
1. Position risks being diluted if domestic legislation is untenable 
 
US‘ Benefit of International Strait 
 
1. Maintains access for maritime, military, and commercial activities 
 
US‘ Cost of Internal Waters 
 
1. If DC recognized the Canadian position it would circumscribe regime of 
unimpeded transit, other straits passage could be jeopardized, US doesn‘t want 
other states to follow Canada‘s example 
 
Canada has played its hand (mostly) through domestic legislation. Much has changed 
now, though. In 1987, no real issue of resource development as a backdrop of the ACA. 




It is in DC‘s and Ottawa‘s interest to look ahead. A short lifespan for the ACA as it turns 
out; the states now need to reengage. The political nature of the situation means if they 
still can‘t agree on whose is whose, then an ACA style model is needed (presumably 
Kirkey means one that looks past sovereignty in an integrative way). 
 
The Canadian government may not be interested in a broader Arctic shipping approach or 
regime (as the US might press for) because Canada would not want the US to line up 

































Commander Aundrea Taplin, United States Navy 
 
The United States Navy‘s position on the Northwest Passage is congruent with the Navy 
policy statement entitled ―National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the 
Arctic,‖ which states:  
 
―Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a strait used for 
international navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those 
straits. Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic 
region supports our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including 






























Commander James Kraska, United States Naval War College 
 
Canadian benefit of internal waters: 
 
1. Regulating access to the Northwest Passage through the internal waters policy 
offers psychological benefits to Canada in the form of a sense of safety and 
security over an area which historically the state has been unable to convincingly 
impose its control 
2. Canadian politicians score points with the electorate by standing pat on a position 
that is opposed to the position taken by the United States  
 
American benefit of international strait: 
 
1. An economic benefit, in that if the United States made an exception in the 
Canadian case it would mean that many other countries that make excessive 
internal waters claims would also want to make their own rules. The global 
economy depends on freedom of navigation 
2. A military benefit, in that to maintain security and protect national interests, the 
United States‘ military must have the ability to be able to move about the world‘s 
oceans as it needs  
 
Until now, Canada has had the benefit of free security provided by the United States. The 
opposing American position is seen by Canada as a move contra to the maintenance of its 
security. Canada has painted itself into a corner politically by framing the Northwest 
Passage issue as one of contested sovereignty. This has become an extremely popular 
position among the electorate. The combined message of politicians, the media, and 
academia in Canada will make it very difficult for the government to convince citizens of 
any other position. For Canada‘s government to change course is extremely risky 
politically.  
 
Canada‘s position is legally insensible. It has also changed its position over the years. 
The Arctic Cooperation Agreement applies only to US icebreakers doing scientific 
research. Any other type of ship does not need to request Canadian permission to transit 
the Northwest Passage. Canada does not see the agreement this way however. It believes 
that the US is required to ask for permission for all voyages. This difference in 
interpretation is a problem of ―constructive ambiguity‖ in international law. It is possible 
that in the future during the summer months the fastest way to get military assets between 
Iraq and North Korea is through the Northwest Passage. Canada cares greatly about this 
issue and the United States doesn‘t. The US could accept a deal with Canada that would 
not ultimately be in its interest, because there is no domestic constituency, because it 
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could be easily done, and because it could look good politically. Canada wants to keep 
this a bilateral issue which it is not; it is Canada vs. the world. It wants to leverage US 
power against other foreign seafaring countries, such as China, so it wants to get the US 
on board and to take its side. The Saint Lawrence Seaway model is a great deal for 
Canada because those are internal waters, and Canada gets free resources provided by the 
US. Such a model offers no benefit to the US. The Malacca model is better for the US 
and for everyone because it implements Article 43 of UNCLOS. No country has the right 
to close off the high seas; therefore the US could not do a bilateral deal with Canada that 
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